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Abstract 
This thesis examines the means by which corruption sustains itself in the relationship between 
business and the tax system. It is predicated on a desire to understand the possibility of 
sheltering the relationship from corruption and other similar societal challenges. It relies on the 
intuition that certain structural elements of this relationship permit the infiltration and 
sustenance of corruption. With the aid of both qualitative and quantitative data obtained from 
empirical research in Nigeria, it constructs a model that exposes these structural elements.  
This thesis argues that a ‘two-way relationship’ between businesses and the tax system 
not only exists but is anchored in the interaction between the actors (businesses, tax policy-
makers, tax law-makers, tax administrators and tax arbiters) that represent both institutions. It 
explores four mechanisms (‘access’, ‘awareness’, ‘distortion’ and ‘inaction’) that affect the 
interaction and consequently the relationship between business and the tax system.  
It also addresses the difficulty in defining corruption by adopting a process definition 
of this phenomenon. In this definition, the tag ‘corruption’ applies where an act or state of 
affairs and the gain derived therefrom breach the expectations of the legal, economic, political 
or moral dimension of a given society.  
This thesis then argues that corruption sustains itself in the two-way relationship by 
exploiting a ‘power gap’ between the actual and institutional powers of actors in the said 
relationship. It defines the ‘institutional power of actors’ as that which accords with the 
institutional limits of their social setting. An actor’s ‘actual power’, in contrast, refers to that 
which the actor may exercise in any given circumstance. 
This power gap is potentially increased or decreased by the levels of the four 
mechanisms in the relationship. Therefore, any real effort to tackle corruption in the 
relationship between businesses and the tax system must seek to address these four mechanisms 
in a manner that limits the power gap and opportunities for corruption.  
The concept of the power gap and its four mechanisms is a novel approach to 
understanding and tackling corruption. It aspires to support the design of tax systems with the 
capacity to adequately balance competing interests, especially in countries where corruption is 
endemic.  
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THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF BUSINESS AND THE TAX SYSTEM IN NIGERIA: 
‘THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION’ – INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER  
1.1 Introduction 
As the world recovers from the recent economic downturn, and given that revenues from the 
exploitation of natural resources remain volatile, developed and developing countries are 
increasingly prioritising the need to encourage, attract and sustain private sector investments. 
The motivation for this are the benefits that increased or sustained investments may yield. 
These benefits include a reduction in the level of unemployment; an increase in technology 
transfer; the improvement of infrastructure; and, in time, an increase in government revenue.  
The ability of a polity to encourage, attract and sustain investments largely depends on 
it possessing the ‘right investment climate’.1 This in turn depends on several factors such as 
nearness to market, level of infrastructure, availability of qualified pool of labour, access to 
raw materials and government policy.  
One form of government policy which has attracted a considerable amount of interest 
from academics and policy-makers is taxation. Governments of both developed and developing 
countries try to use their tax systems to improve their investment climate. This usually involves 
striking a balance, at least in the short run, between investments and the primary revenue 
generation role of the tax system. Irrespective of the structure and contents of the tax system, 
whether the right balance will be struck inevitably depends on the actions or responses of the 
vehicles behind private sector investments (i.e. businesses).  
Businesses, for their part, passively and actively play a role in directing the attempts by 
States to improve their investment climate via their tax systems. Through their interactions 
with the arms of government, businesses endeavour to steer the tax system in a direction 
conducive to the achievement of their individual and collective goals. The success of such 
endeavours depends on how they are perceived and responded to by the tax system.  
                                                          
1 For a survey of businesses about factors that affect the investment climate of a given state, see Geeta Batra, 
Daniel Kaufmann and Andrew H Stone, Investment Climate Around the World: Voices of the Firms from the 
World Business Environment Survey (World Bank 2003). 
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Even without a deliberate attempt by one institution to influence the other, the goals of 
business and the tax system are such that a state of constant interactions between both 
institutions in a modern society is the norm. These interactions form the basis of an important 
relationship between business and the tax system. This relationship is, however, susceptible to 
the vagaries of the societal factors that pervade polities. One societal factor – corruption – has 
the potential to alter the dynamics of this relationship owing to its ability to determine the 
nature, frequency, context, goals and results of the interactions between business and the tax 
system. Corruption is widely believed to be detrimental to both this relationship and the general 
fabric of society. Despite wide condemnation across societies, corruption still persists, 
especially in the relationship between business and the tax system.  
This research is therefore born out of a desire to understand the mechanisms through 
which corruption sustains itself in the relationship between business and the tax system. In 
arriving at the research question, the relationship between business and the tax system was 
artificially separated from its harbouring society so as to inquire whether this relationship can 
be cocooned from the vices in its site of existence.  
One may imagine the relationship as a container floating in polluted waters (that is, a 
corruption-infested society). One may then ask: what structural features of this container may 
prevent it from being infiltrated by the polluted waters? What aspects of this container make 
infiltration by the polluted waters possible? In line with this analogy, my research question is: 
what aspects of the relationship between business and the tax system does corruption exploit 
in order to sustain itself in the said relationship? What structural features of this relationship 
may prevent or reduce infiltration by corruption? To answer this question, I conducted an 
empirical study of the relationship between business and the tax system in Nigeria, where 
corruption is reputedly rife.  
Following this study, my central argument is that corruption remains a part of the 
relationship between business and the tax system by exploiting a ‘power gap’. This refers to 
the gap between the institutional and the actual powers of actors in the relationship. This power 
gap is increased or decreased by the levels of four mechanisms (‘access’, ‘awareness’, 
‘distortion’ and ‘inaction’). Therefore, any comprehensive attempt to address corruption in the 
relationship between business and the tax system must tackle the levels of these four 
mechanisms so as to reduce the power gap and opportunities for corruption in the said 
relationship. This argument is supported by a descriptive analysis of data obtained from the 
empirical research in Nigeria. 
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1.2 The Two-Way Relationship  
In order to construct a firm foundation for answering the research question, this thesis critically 
examines the relationship between business and the tax system.  
The term ‘tax system’ in this research refers to the entire machinery used by 
government to generate tax revenue. It comprises rules, policies, institutions and persons. 
Equating the tax system with the tax administration alone would shield this research from the 
analysis of important interactions that take place during the formulation of tax instruments and 
the resolution of tax disputes. Focusing only on policies, laws and regulations, and thus leaving 
out the institutions and processes by which they are formed, also suffers from the same 
weakness. The term ‘tax system’ is given a broad meaning to enable proper analysis of the core 
question of this research. 
However, defining the tax system as a machinery of government excludes business (and 
other taxpayers) from its purview. This restriction is apt due to the nature of this research. This 
is because by separating business from the tax system, it enables the proper analysis of the 
interactions between both institutions. 
In this thesis, I will argue that the relationship between business and the tax system is 
a product of the interactions that take place in four key ‘terminals of the tax system’. I have 
named these terminals to signify the fact that the interactions between business and the tax 
system through which both institutions receive information take place at these locations. These 
terminals, named according to their output, are the ‘tax policy terminal’, ‘tax law (statute) 
terminal’, ‘tax administration terminal’ and ‘dispute resolution terminal’. Reference to these 
terminals rather than to the arms of government (executive, legislature and court/judiciary) is 
due to two main reasons. Firstly, it enables the research to focus only on the relevant aspects 
of these arms of government. Secondly, the customary appellations do not adequately describe 
the various functions performed in the tax system. The courts (judiciary), for example, may not 
be the only institution charged with the responsibility to resolve disputes. Therefore, using the 
term court/judiciary in place of the term dispute resolution terminal will be unduly limiting.  
I will also contend that business and the tax system partake in a two-way relationship 
in which each institution has the potential to influence the operations of the other. The tax 
system, on the one hand, may influence the levels of investments, location of investments, the 
choice of financing investments, the organisational structure of investments, attitudes to 
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compliance and other operations of businesses.2 Business, on the other hand, may exert 
political, practical and judicial influence on the tax rates, the tax rules, tax administration and 
other facets of the tax system.3 
   
1.3 Actor Network Theory as the Theoretical Approach  
In order to understand how corruption may sustain itself in the relationship between business 
and the tax system, it is important to look beyond businesses and the terminals of the tax system 
and identify other less conspicuous actors that may play a role in this relationship.   
I apply ‘Actor-Network Theory’ (ANT) in order to achieve this task. With this, I argue 
that the relationship between the tax system and a business or group of businesses at any given 
point in time is the product of ‘a network of human and non-human actors’.4 This network is 
‘transient’ and ‘heterogeneous’ in nature.5 This implies that the actors that form the network 
are varied and constantly changing. The network is also unstable and may collapse with the 
loss of an important actor.6  
The durability of the relationship between the tax system and a particular business or 
group of businesses depends on the nature of the actors that comprise this network or, to put 
differently, it depends on the materials of this network or relationship.7 These actors have their 
private interests. The existence of these private interests may lead to conflict and consequently 
the disintegration of the entire network if these interests are not properly managed.8  
                                                          
2 For a general review of the impact of the tax system on the decisions of businesses, see Michael P Devereux, 
‘The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms and Profit: A Survey of Empirical Evidence’ (Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper No 07/02, April 2006) 
<http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/3395/1/WP0702.pdf> accessed 5 July 2015; See also James Hines, ‘Tax Policy and 
the Activities of Multinational Corporations’ (NBER Working Paper No 5589, 1996) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4609> accessed 5 July 2015, in which the author analysed 
existing (US-related) research which suggests that taxation influences FDI, corporate borrowing, transfer 
pricing, dividend and royalty payments, research and development activity, exports, bribe payments and location 
decisions. 
3 On the power of businesses to influence government on matters pertaining to taxation, see Dennis P Quinn and 
Robert Y Shapiro, ‘Business Political Power: The Case of Taxation’ (1991) 85(3) American Political Science 
Review 851. 
4 See Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Oxford 
University Press 1987); John Law, ‘Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network: Ordering and Strategy and 
Heterogeneity’ (1992) 5 Systems Practice 379. 
5 Law (n 4). 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid. 
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Therefore, the classification of the relationship between the tax system and a business 
as one of compliance,9 for example, can only be temporary. Understanding the state (the 
durability) of this network will require identifying and examining the actors that constitute it, 
their private interests and the process by which they were co-opted or enrolled into the said 
network. It is also important to understand how the potentially conflicting interests of the 
different actors are controlled so as to prevent the breakdown of the entire network.10  
In sum, ANT uncovers certain less conspicuous actors in the two-way relationship. It 
also provides a framework through which these actors (in particular, corruption) may be 
examined so as to understand their individual and collective impact on the relationship between 
business and the tax system. ANT also encourages the conducting of an empirical study11 of 
these actors using a qualitative methodology12 which is in keeping with this research. 
  
1.4 The Influence of New Institutional Sociology 
Although ANT is the main theoretical approach adopted in this thesis, it is pertinent to 
acknowledge the influence of ‘New Institutional Sociology’ (NIS) as well. NIS influenced the 
analysis of the behavioural dynamics behind the responses of the terminals of the tax system 
and business to the interactions that take place via the communication link.  
The use of NIS is not without the challenges associated with a theory that has been 
subject to different interpretations within and across academic fields. The elusiveness of its 
core concept of ‘institution’ or ‘institutional environment’ from comprehensive definition 
threatens to deprive the entire theory of validity On the meaning of institution, for example, 
Williamson remarked in 2000 that ‘we are still very ignorant about institutions’.13 
Nevertheless, NIS’ recognition of the imperfections of the decision frame of actors, the 
contextual nature of their interests, the duality of their relationship with their institutional 
environment, and diverse instruments of influence14 make it a suitable tool for elucidating the 
                                                          
9 See Karen Boll, ‘Taxing Assemblages: Laborious and Meticulous Achievements of Tax Compliance’ (PhD 
Thesis, IT University of Copenhagen 2011). 
10 Law (n 4). 
11 See Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford University 
Press 2005). 
12 See John Roberts, ‘Poststructuralism against Poststructuralism: Actor-Network Theory, Organisations and 
Economic Markets’ (2012) 15 European Journal of Social Theory 35, 41. 
13 Oliver Williamson, ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’ (2000) 38 Journal of 
Economic Literature 595; See also Douglas North, ‘Institutions’ (1991) 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 97, 
111; Douglas North, ‘Institutions and Credible Commitment’ (1993) 149 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 11.  
14 Paul J DiMaggio and Walter W Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism And Collective 
Rationality In Organizational Fields’ (1983) 48 American Sociological Review 147. 
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rationality of the operations of the actors in the two-way relationship. NIS postulates that the 
interactions between actors and their institutional environment give rise to certain social 
expectations which influence the structure, decision frame and actions of these actors as well 
as shape the existing institutional environment.15 It suggests a two-way relationship of 
influence between an actor and its institutional environment, which aligns with the 
understanding of the relationship between business and the tax system in this thesis. 
  
1.5 Why Corruption?  
There is hardly another phenomenon that remains as highly relevant to modern societies as 
corruption does. Its existence can be traced as far back as Babylon16 in the 22nd century BC, 
Egypt17 and India18 in the 14th century BC, and the biblical stories of Luke.19  
In the contemporary world, while corruption is usually discussed as a problem of 
developing countries, it remains a problem in their developed counterparts.20 This is because 
the development or modernisation of a country does not eradicate corruption; corruption 
merely adapts to the changed circumstances.21 Corruption exists in all forms of government, 
albeit at different levels of pervasiveness.22 Amongst states with similar socio-economic 
structures, the levels of corruption may also differ.23 However, statistics show that poorer 
countries or areas are likely to be more corrupt. Lipset, for example, argues that the levels of 
corruption are higher in areas with low levels of education and income.24 This may not be 
unconnected with the fact that corruption allegedly thrives on financial, social and mental 
poverty, and opportunity. However, other researchers point out the lack of clarity over whether 
corruption increases poverty or poverty increases corruption due to the inability of poor 
countries to fight corruption. For instance, Gupta and others argue that corruption increases 
                                                          
15 ibid. 
16 Law Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon. 
17 Great Edict of Horemheb, King of Egypt. 
18 Kautilya’s Arthashastra. 
19 Such as the stories of Zacchaeus the tax collector (Luke 19:8) and the parable of the unjust steward (Luke 
16:3-8). 
20 Carl J Friedrich, Man and his Government (New York 1963) 167. 
21 See John Girling, Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy (Routledge 1997). 
22 See Carl J Friedrich, The Pathology of Politics: Violence, Betrayal Corruption, Secrecy and Propaganda 
(Harper & Row 1972) 128. 
23 See Jens Chr. Andvig and Karl Ove Moene, ‘How Corruption May Corrupt’ (1990) 13 Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 63; Francis T Lui, ‘A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence’ (1986) 31 Journal of 
Public Economics 1. 
24 See Seymour Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (John Hopkins University Press 1981); 
Edward L Glaeser and Raven E Saks, ‘Corruption in America’ (2006) 90 Journal of Public Economics 1053.  
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poverty.25 For his part, Husted points out that some countries may simply lack the resources to 
tackle corruption adequately.26 Some have described the relationship between corruption and 
poverty as a two-way relationship.27 Research has shown a negative correlation between 
corruption and economic development.28 Research also shows that corruption and human 
development influence each other.29 In general, some causes of corruption are weak institutions 
that allow for wide discretionary powers, poor internal control and detection mechanisms, poor 
wages and working conditions of staff, and political interference in bureaucracy and culture.30 
From an extensive list of societal factors, corruption was picked for consideration in 
this thesis for two main reasons. The first and well recognised reason is the importance of 
corruption and its impact on the ability of modern states to achieve their goals. The second 
reason is the seeming affinity between corruption and tax compliance. Both refer to the extent 
to which an act accords with certain expectations in society, albeit that the source and value of 
expectations regarding corruption are more likely to be contested. To the extent that both 
corruption and non-compliance are punishable legal, moral or economic wrongs, their likely 
occurrence, from an economic perspective, can be surmised as dependent on a comparison of 
their uncertain costs and benefits. The costs include the severity of the penalties for both acts 
as multiplied by the probability that these penalties will be administered. The benefits include 
the tax burden avoided or corrupt gain secured. 
In order to give weight to the above reasons, the following subsections discuss the form, 
nature and impact of corruption. This discussion assumes a prior understanding of the meaning 
of corruption. However, a detailed consideration of the controversy over the definition of 
corruption is carried out in Chapter 3. It is sufficient to state at this point that a process 
definition of corruption is adopted in this thesis. By this definition, an act will be corrupt where 
                                                          
25 Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi and Rosa Alonso-Terme, ‘Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and 
Poverty?’ (International Monetary Fund, IMF WP98/76, May 1998). 
26 Bryan W Husted, ‘Wealth, Culture and Corruption’ (1999) 30 Journal of International Business Studies 339, 
341-2. 
27 Robert E Hall and Charles I Jones, ‘Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker 
Than Others?’ (1999) 114 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 83; Jakob Svensson, ‘Eight Questions About 
Corruption’ (2005) 19 Journal of Economic Perspectives 19. 
28 Alfredo Del Monte and Erasmo Papagni, ‘The Determinants of Corruption in Italy: Regional Panel Data 
Analysis’ (2007) 23 European Journal of Political Economy 379; Ghulam Shabbir and Mumtaz Anwar, 
‘Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries’ (2007) 46(4) The Pakistan Development Review 751. 
29 Eleanor RE O’Higgins, ‘Corruption, Underdevelopment, and Extractive Resource Industries: Addressing the 
Vicious Cycle’ (2006) 16(2) Business Ethics Quarterly 235. 
30 For these and other causes of corruption, see Daniel Treisman, ‘The Cause of Corruption: A Cross-National 
Study’ (2000) 76 Journal of Public Economics 399; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: 
Causes, Consequences and Reform (Cambridge University Press 1999). 
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both the act and the gain derived therefrom breach the ideal expectations of the legal, moral, 
economic or other relevant dimension of society. 
  
1.5.1 Nature and Forms of Corruption 
This thesis focuses on corruption that may exist in the two-way relationship between business 
and the tax system. It recognises that a considerable amount of corruption may exist solely 
within the tax system or solely within business. These may have an indirect effect on the 
relationship between business and the tax system but are not central to this thesis. Three forms 
of actions are identifiable as constituting corruption in the two-way relationship. These actions 
are:  
1) the demand for, offer of or receipt of social or economic gain for the performance of 
public services that should be provided ordinarily; 
2) the demand for, offer of or receipt of social or economic gain for the performance of a 
service that should not be provided; and  
3) the extortion of social or economic gain from or by businesses. 
Some have divided these forms of corruption into two main categories. Langseth and 
others, for example, state that corruption can be categorised as either according-to-rule or 
against-the-rule. The first and second category involve situations where the service provided 
by the official is in accordance with or against the law respectively.31 
In this thesis, however, emphasis is placed, not on these aforementioned forms but on 
the expectations of actors in the two-way relationship as the barometer for what constitutes 
corruption. These expectations are sourced from different ‘dimensions’ (such as economic, 
moral or legal dimensions) in society which possess institutional mechanisms through which 
they secure compliance with their dictates. Consequently, there can be no fixed and exhaustive 
list of forms of corruption. The content of any such list is likely to change as the expectations 
of the different dimensions in society change. 
Two models have been developed by academics to aid the analysis of corruption. They 
are: the principal-agent-client model32 and the collective action model.33 Under the principal-
agent-client model, a principal seeking to maintain a relationship with a client but constrained 
                                                          
31 See Petter Langseth, Rick Stapenhurst and Jeremy Pope, ‘The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting 
Corruption’ (1997) 23 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 3.  
32 See Rose-Ackerman (n 30); Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (University of California Press 1988). 
33 See, for example, Heather Marquette, Vinod Pavarala and Kanchan K Malik, ‘Religion and Attitudes Towards 
Corruption in India: A Collective Action Problem?’ (2014) 24 Development in Practice 854.  
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by time or expertise may co-opt an agent to interact with the client on his behalf. This 
constitutes a restatement of the principal-agent problem. The tax system, for instance, has been 
described as a hierarchy of contracts between the principal, the agent and a supervisor. Under 
this model, the principal is often the elected representative of the people, the agent is the 
taxpayer and the supervisor is the tax official who ensures that the taxpayer complies with his 
civic duty.34 The principal sets the agenda for this relationship, which the agent should comply 
with when dealing with the client. The principal may directly monitor the relationship between 
the agent and the client or may do so indirectly with the aid of other agents. The principal may 
similarly appoint other agents to provide parallel services to the client in line with his set 
agenda.  
The first step in applying this model to the relationship between business and the tax 
system involves the identification of the principal, agent and the client. This task involves 
hidden complexities which may be easily neglected. These complexities lie in the power play, 
contributed to by the surrounding economic and political circumstances, which determines the 
identity of the actor that sets, enforces and monitors the agenda in a given case.  
Though with differing levels of probability, any actor in the two-way relationship may 
hold the position of principal in accordance with whose interests and under whose direction the 
agenda is set for the tax system as a whole. However, researchers commonly award this role to 
either the people35 (as will be the case in a representative democracy) or to the political actors 
(tax policy-/law-makers) who stipulate the laws and policies by which the tax system is 
administered and adjudged.36  
Under this principal-agent-client model, corruption is usually perceived as a function 
of the ability of the principal to monitor the actions of the agents and demand accountability, 
which is  affected by the extent of the agent’s discretionary powers. In line with this, Klitgaard37 
argued that within the principal-agent-client model, corruption equals monopoly power plus 
discretionary power minus accountability. However, despite access to an adequate mechanism 
for monitoring and demanding accountability, passive or active collusion between the principal 
                                                          
34 See Jean Tirole, ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organisations’ (1986) 2(2) 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 181; R Antle, ‘An Agency Model of Auditing’ (1982) 20 Journal 
of Accounting Research 503. 
35 Nico Groenendijk, ‘A Principal-Agent Model of Corruption’ (1997) 27 Crime, Law & Social Change 207. 
36 Tim Besley, Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government (Oxford University Press 2006); 
Susan Rose-Ackerman (n 30). 
37 Klitgaard (n 32). 
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and the agent in flouting the agenda may be sufficient to sustain corruption. It is this foundation 
that forms the basis for introducing the theory of collective action to the concept of corruption.  
Collective action theorists acknowledge the potential unwillingness or incapacity of the 
principal to defend the agenda or its inherent interests. They propose a study into the causes of 
this unwillingness or incapacity. These causes may include the usurpation of the mantle of the 
majority by minority interests due to the superior organisational prowess of the latter.38 It may 
also include the loss of faith in the essence of the agenda or the often misguided hope for present 
or future profit from its violation on the part of the principal.39 This is captured by Besley’s 
call for ‘principled principals’.40 
Arguably, there is no substantive difference between an approach based on the 
principal-agent-client model and that based on collective action. The formal difference between 
both approaches resides in the identification of the principal whose interests the set agenda 
seeks to protect. Where a contextual attempt to identify the true principal is conducted, rather 
than adopting a pre-defined view of this actor, principal-agent-client and collective action 
approaches become, by and large, similar. 
For the purpose of this thesis, corruption will be addressed as a potential actor in the 
network that constitutes the relationship between business and the tax system. It may serve as 
an actor (or intermediary) through which other actors are enrolled or co-opted into the network 
that forms the two-way relationship. For instance, compliance (or non-compliance) may be the 
result of the presence or absence of corruption in the network. Compliance (or non-compliance) 
may also be an actor in the network that produces corruption. Likewise, businesses may only 
be able to reach out to the various terminals of the tax system and attain influence at a distance 
where corruption is present (or absent) in the network.  
Corruption is, in essence, a transient network composed of a potentially diverse 
collection of human and non-human actors. Its strength and durability in any system depends 
on the variety of actors that make up its network. A strong culture ingrained in the psyche of 
persons in the tax system, for example, may be an actor in the network that produces corruption. 
This, together with other actors, may account for the strength and durability of corruption 
within that system. 
                                                          
38 For example, by applying Olson’s logic of collective action. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 
(Harvard University Press 1965).  
39 See, for instance, Monika Bauhr and Marcia Grimes, ‘Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of 
Transparency for Societal Accountability’ (2013) 27 Governance 291. 
40 Besley (n 36).  
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1.5.2 Impact of Corruption  
A considerable amount of research has been carried out on corruption, especially as it relates 
to tax administration.41 It has been held to have a negative correlation with economic growth,42 
as well as an adverse effect on tax effort,43 tax morale,44 rule of law,45 human capital,46 domestic 
firm growth,47 firm value48 and foreign direct investments (FDIs)49. Egger and others 
distinguish between ‘grabbing hand’ and ‘helping hand’ corruption and state that the former 
(which suggests a negative correlation with FDI) outweighs the latter (which suggests a 
positive correlation).50 They also found that corruption is an important determinant of FDI in 
developing countries but not in developed countries.51 Uhlenbruck and others argue that 
multinational companies are more likely to enter into a jurisdiction where corruption is highly 
pervasive via a wholly owned subsidiary rather than through a local partner.52 Hope and others 
                                                          
41 Odd-Helge Fjelstad, ‘Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda’ (Chr 
Michelsen Institute Working Paper No 10, 2005); Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Bertil Tungodden, ‘Fiscal 
Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue?’ (2003) 31 World Development 1459; Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, ‘Fighting Fiscal 
Corruption: Lessons from the Tanzania Revenue Authority’ (2003) 23(2) Public Admin Dev 165; Sheetal K 
Chand and Karl O Moene, ‘Controlling Fiscal Corruption’ (1999) 27(7) World Development 1129. 
42 Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘Corruption’ (1993) 108 Quarterly Journal of Economics 591 (cf 
Nathaniel Leff, ‘Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption’ (1964) 82(2) American Behavioural 
Scientists 337; Francis Lui, ‘An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery’ (1985) 93 Journal of Political 
Economy 760. See Pranab Bardhan, ‘Corruption and Development: A Review of the Issues’ (1997) 35 Journal 
of Economic Literature 1320 for a review of literature on corruption and development.  
43 Tax effort is usually measured by the ratio of tax revenue generated from the Gross Domestic Product of a 
country. See, Richard Bird, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Benino Torgler, ‘Tax Effort in Developing Countries 
and High Income Countries: The Impact of Corruption, Voice and Accountability’ (2008) 38(1) Economic 
Analysis and Policy 55; Dhaneshwar Ghura, ‘Tax Revenue in Sub Saharan Africa: Effects of Economic Policies 
and Corruption’ in George T Abed and Sanjeev Gupta (eds), Governance, Corruption and Economic 
Performance (International Monetary Fund 2002). 
44 Tax morale refers to the attitude of taxpayers to compliance. Fjeldstad and Tungodden (n 41). 
45 Vito Tanzi, ‘Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures’ (International Monetary 
Fund, IMF WP98/63, May 1998). 
46 Pak Hung Mo, ‘Corruption and Economic Growth’ (2001) 29 Journal of Comparative Economics 66. 
47 Raymond Fisman and Jakob Svensson, ‘Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm Level 
Evidence’ (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 2485, 2000). 
48 Michael Long and Rao Spuma, ‘The Wealth Effect of Unethical Business Behaviour’ (1995) 19 Journal of 
Economics and Finance 65. 
49 Shang-Jin Wei, ‘Why is Corruption So Much More Taxing than Tax? Arbitrariness Kills’ (NBER Working 
Papers No 6255, 1997). Corruption may also affect the choice of entry modes, Peter Rodriguez, Klaus 
Uhlenbruck and Lorraine Eden, ‘Government Corruption and the Entry Strategies of Multinationals’ (2005) 
30(2) Academy of Management Review 383. 
50 Peter Egger and Hannes Winner, ‘How Corruption Influences Foreign Direct Investment: A Panel Data 
Study’ (2006) 54(2) Economic Development and Cultural Change 459; cf Peter Egger and Hannes Winner, 
‘Evidence on Corruption as an Incentive for Foreign Direct Investment’ (2005) 21 European Journal of Political 
Economy 932.  
51 ibid. 
52 Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden (n 49). 
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argue that corruption increases business costs and deters investments as a result.53 Furthermore, 
corruption has been held to lead to inefficient governments, faltering economic 
competitiveness,54 distrust amongst citizens55 and general lowering of social capital.56 It has 
been argued that corruption also leads to the inefficient diversion of talent57 and government 
expenditure.58 Participating in corruption may be seen as an option for businesses that wish to 
operate in the formal economy while avoiding an associated regulatory burden.59 It may also 
enable firms to continue operating in the shadow economy without detection from the 
authorities.60 
Though not central to this thesis, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the nature and 
possible impact of corruption on the formulation of tax policies and enactment of laws, the 
administration of tax laws and policies and the resolution of tax disputes. This provides added 
justification for a study into the persistence of corruption in the two-way relationship between 
business and the tax system. 
 
1.6 The Formulation of Tax Policies and Enactment of Laws 
Although the actors operating at the tax policy and law terminals may be different – hence the 
separation of the terminals – the issues arising from both terminals are broadly similar. This is 
why they are discussed under the same heading in this section. 
Corruption at these terminals may involve the grant of favourable tax policies and laws 
(such as exemptions and tax holidays) in return for some form of social or economic 
consideration from businesses. It may also involve the outright demand for such considerations 
in order to avoid unfavourable tax policies or laws. Corruption may construct formal or 
substantive barriers that restrict certain businesses from interacting with the tax system at the 
                                                          
53 Kempe Ronald Hope and Bornwell C Chikulo, Corruption and Development in Africa (Macmillan 1999). 
54 Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella, ‘Rents, Competition and Corruption’ (1999) 89(4) The American 
Economic Review 982. 
55 Manuel Villoria, Gregg G Van Ryzin and Cecilia F Lavena, ‘Social and Political Consequences of 
Administrative Corruption: A Study of Public Perceptions in Spain’ (2012) 73 Public Administration Review 
85. 
56 Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, ‘Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country 
Investigation’ (1997) 112(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1251. 
57 Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘Why is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?’ (1993) 
83 The American Economic Review 409; William J Baumol, ‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and 
Destructive’ (1990) 98 Journal of Political Economy 893; Tanzi (n 45). 
58 Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, ‘Corruption, Public Investment and Growth’ (International Monetary Fund, 
IMF WP97/139, October 1997). 
59 Jay Pil Choi and Marcel Thum, ‘Corruption and the Shadow Economy’ (2005) 46 International Economic 
Review 817.  
60 Stravox Katsios, ‘The Shadow Economy and Corruption in Greece’ (2006) 1 South-Eastern European Journal 
of Economics 61. 
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tax policy and tax law terminals. It may also trigger voluntary withdrawal by businesses from 
interaction with the tax system at these terminals. These consequences may deprive the 
terminals concerned of information about the plight of these businesses, thus reducing the level 
of responsiveness between the tax system and the disaffected businesses.  
Conversely, corruption may increase the level of interaction between these terminals 
and businesses that benefit from the state of affairs. It may also lead to an increase in interaction 
between the disaffected businesses and other terminals of the tax system. For instance, the 
promulgation of ‘corrupt laws’ may lead to increased recourse by businesses to the dispute 
resolution terminal to challenge these laws.  
The grant of tax exemptions, holidays and other policies or laws which result in the 
narrowing of the tax base as a result of corruption may lead to the increase (concentration) of 
the tax burden on a limited number of businesses. This grant of specific exemptions may also 
increase the complexity of the tax system, which may in turn increase uncertainty, discretionary 
powers of officials and the compliance costs of businesses. Corruption may also lead to a high 
perception of unfairness and inequality by businesses in relation to these terminals. It may 
cause these businesses to seek both legal and illegal means of escaping the tax net such as by 
tax evasion, avoidance or by leaving the jurisdiction altogether. 
 
1.7 Administration of Tax Policies and Laws 
Corruption also has a significant impact on the interaction between business and the tax system 
at the tax administration terminal. At this terminal, the interaction between business and the 
tax system is most direct.  
By the use of corrupt methods, businesses may escape the tax net, reduce their tax 
liability or reduce the burden of administrative compliance on them. Apart from giving an 
unfair advantage to favoured businesses, corruption at this terminal may lead to the narrowing 
of the tax base. This may in turn result in the increase of the tax burden of those remaining 
within the tax net. The increased tax burden may result from the reaction of the tax system to 
the need to generate the required level of revenue for the provision of infrastructure or the 
maintenance of the welfare state. This reaction may, for instance, take the form of increased 
tax rates or the reduction in the number of general tax exemptions. The shortfall may also be 
replenished through over-enthusiastic or excessive enforcement of the tax laws on non-
participating businesses.  
The increment of tax rates or intensification of tax audits targeted at generating more 
tax revenue may cause both corrupt tax officials and businesses to adopt new strategic 
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positions. These corrupt tax officials may view this increment or intensification as an added 
opportunity to negotiate or obtain higher bribes. Businesses may be pushed to hide more 
revenue from the tax net. Consequently, the increment or intensification may yield less revenue 
for the state.61 
Where businesses obviate oppressive compliance requirements or the application of 
archaic laws through corruption, this may reduce the incentive on these businesses to instigate 
change through their influence on the tax system. This may in turn reduce the interaction 
between business and the tax system at the tax policy and tax law terminals on this issue, 
thereby depriving these terminals of information and reducing the responsiveness of the tax 
system to the needs of business in this regard. Corruption in the relationship between business 
and the tax system may therefore be partly responsible for the continued existence of archaic 
and burdensome policies, laws and administrative requirements in certain tax systems. Corrupt 
tax officials may also resist any simplification of the tax system which may endanger their rent-
seeking activities.  
The increased tax burden, the general perception of unfairness or the sense of 
disillusionment which may result from the prevalence of corruption may incentivise 
disgruntled businesses to look for ways to avoid or limit their exposure to the tax system 
through tax avoidance, evasion62 or by leaving the jurisdiction entirely. 
 
1.8 Resolution of Tax Disputes  
Consideration of the impact of corruption on the interaction that takes place between business 
and the tax system at the courts, tribunals and other bodies that make up the dispute resolution 
terminal is essential. This mainly falls under the umbrella of judicial corruption which has been 
defined as utilising the court’s authority for the private benefit of the court officials or other 
public officials.63  
The dispute resolution terminal plays a crucial role in the relationship between business 
and the tax system. Businesses as well as other actors rely on this terminal as the final regulator 
of actions and meaning. Its impartiality is integral to the performance of its functions. 
Therefore, where corruption is rife at this terminal, the entire foundation of the relationship 
                                                          
61 Amal Sanyal, Ira N Gang and Omkar Goswami, ‘Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve’ (2000) 105 
Public Choice 61. 
62 For instance, Smith has argued that businesses may resist tax laws and authorities as a result of corruption by 
tax officials. See Kent W Smith, ‘Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives’ in Joel Slemrod (ed), Why 
People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement (University of Michigan Press 1992) 227. 
63 See Petter Langseth, ‘Judicial Integrity and its Capacity to Enhance the Public Interest’ (UNODC, CICP8, 
2002). 
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between business and the tax system may be put at risk. For example, in a valedictory speech 
a former justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court described the impact of a corrupt arbiter in the 
following words:  
A corrupt judge is more harmful to the society than a man who runs amok with a dagger in a crowded 
street. The latter can be restrained physically. But a corrupt judge deliberately destroys the moral 
foundations of society and causes incalculable distress to individuals through abusing his office while 
still being referred to as honourable.64 
  
The decisions of the arbiters in the dispute resolution terminal may be steered by their 
receipt of financial or other corrupt considerations from businesses. Where corruption of this 
nature is rampant, the decisions of these arbiters will not only be unfair but will also be 
inconsistent. This will in turn increase the general level of uncertainty on the state of the law.   
While increased uncertainty may empower the tax administration with regard to 
businesses that do not socially or economically purchase decisions, it may weaken the tax 
administration with regard to those that do and create an unfair advantage in favour of the latter. 
However, the number of persons in the latter group may be reduced by the high cost of 
purchasing decisions – which includes both the cost of instituting the action and the payment 
to (or some form of relationship with) the arbiter – leaving the majority at the mercy of the tax 
administration.  
Uncertainty may also lead to an increased recourse to the dispute resolution terminal 
by businesses wishing to challenge the application of the law by the tax administration. This 
may in turn increase the transaction costs of these businesses. Conversely, where businesses 
perceive that corruption is prevalent in the dispute resolution terminal, these businesses may 
lose faith not just in the dispute resolution terminal but in the entire tax system. This may serve 
to limit their recourse to this terminal in the face of what they believe is a contravention or 
misapplication of the law by tax officials, thereby increasing the powers of the tax 
administration with regard to these businesses.   
Corruption in the dispute resolution terminal may heighten the sense of unfairness and 
the disillusionment of non-participating businesses as well as increase their transaction costs. 
This may consequently incentivise them to seek legal or illegal means to reduce or escape their 
tax liability. 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 See Samson Uwaifo JSC, ‘Valedictory Speech’ (2005) 1 Supreme Court of Nigerian Judgment 20. 
24 
 
1.9 The Interaction between the Terminals 
Actors within a terminal of the tax system may possess and utilise a power to alter the impact 
of corruption at a different terminal of the tax system. However, this ability depends on the 
structural relationship between the terminals. It may also depend on the presence of different 
levels of corruption in these terminals.  
It is important not only to consider whether an actor possesses the power to alter the 
impact of corruption but also the practicalities of the exercise of such power. This alteration 
can be achieved either by changing the constitution of the other terminal or by changing the 
nature of its output. 
In terms of altering the constitution, actors within the tax policy terminal may have the 
power to determine the amount of corruption in the tax law terminal and vice versa. These 
actors may do this by investigating the activities of the members of the other terminal and 
facilitating the removal and prosecution of erring members. However, the relationship between 
these terminals may make the exercise of this power impractical or may lead to the infection 
of one with the ‘disease’ of the other. This is more likely to be the case in a system of 
government which lacks clear separation of powers and independent arms of government or a 
one party state as opposed to a system of government with clear separation of powers and 
independent arms of government or a multi-party state. 
Actors within the tax policy and tax law terminals may also affect the amount of 
corruption in the tax administration and dispute resolution terminals through the exercise of 
their powers to appoint, promote and discipline staff of those terminals. For instance, they may 
increase the level of corruption and ethnic bias by appointing officers that are corrupt or share 
their ethnic bias.  
Furthermore, actors within the tax policy and tax law terminals may enact (and enforce) 
policies and laws that regulate the procedures in other terminals in a manner that curtails or 
increases corruption. By a similar token, actors within the dispute resolution terminal may 
entertain (or refuse to entertain) challenges to policies and laws specifying procedures which 
may give rise to corruption. Businesses may be indicted for corruption by the tax policy, tax 
law and dispute resolution terminals, thereby curtailing their use of this societal factor to 
achieve their private goals. The aforementioned actions have the effect of changing the 
constitution of the receiving terminals, and thus regulating the impact of corruption on their 
activities.  
As for altering the output of the terminal, in the process of enacting laws, actors within 
the tax law terminal may alter the impact of corruption on the bills received from the tax policy 
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terminal. For instance, these actors may reject corrupt bills or tone down the effect of unduly 
discriminatory bills after taking into account the interests of businesses that were hitherto 
excluded. Conversely, they may intensify the impact of corruption on these outputs by their 
amendments to it.  
Actors within the tax administration may reduce the effect of discriminatory laws by 
granting extra-statutory concessions targeted at extending favourable policies to excluded 
businesses. These actors may also decide not to enforce laws that discriminate against a 
particular kind of business. Conversely, they may strengthen the discriminatory effect of laws 
or policies in the manner in which they implement them.  
Actors within the dispute resolution terminals in most jurisdictions are authorised to 
modify the output of the tax policy and the tax administration terminals where this is tainted 
by corruption. These actors may also alter the output of the tax law terminal for a similar reason. 
However, this is usually only legally (as opposed to factually) justified in common law 
jurisdictions where there is a superior law which the said output contravenes. They may, 
however, intensify the effect of corruption through their exercise of (or failure to exercise) 
these powers. 
Nevertheless, the power of the actors within the dispute resolution terminal to modify 
the effect of the societal factors in other terminals is limited by the fact that the said actors can 
only act when a dispute is brought before them for adjudication. Where the outputs of the other 
terminals are not challenged by businesses, these actors usually have no power to modify them. 
This has the effect of safeguarding outputs which are unduly favourable to certain businesses 
as a result of corruption from the scrutiny of the actors within the dispute resolution terminal. 
This is because a business that has avoided or mitigated its tax obligations with the aid of 
corruption would not challenge this state of affairs. Furthermore, other businesses that may 
wish to challenge this state of affairs through the dispute resolution terminal may be hindered 
from doing so by either a lack of information or procedural rules such as the requirement of 
locus standi.   
Finally, actors within the tax policy and tax law terminals can alter the outputs of the 
tax administration and dispute resolution terminals by creating a new policy or law to 
counteract them.  
This summary depicts the considerable role that corruption may potentially play in the 
two-way relationship between business and the tax system. It also provides sufficient basis for 
a study into the means by which corruption persists in the said relationship. This study will be 
carried out using the methodology described below. 
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1.10 Methodology 
This research is socio-legal in nature. It seeks to determine the means by which corruption is 
sustained in the two-way relationship between business and the tax system. Using ANT, the 
researcher isolated and examined corruption as a possible actor-network in the two-way 
relationship between business and the tax system. The researcher gathered information needed 
to answer the core question of this research through an empirical study. Conducting an 
empirical study follows from the use of ANT as the theoretical approach in this research. As 
Law states, ‘Actor-Network Theory almost always approaches its task empirically’.65 
The empirical research used a mixed methods approach, comprising both qualitative 
and quantitative methods. Using qualitative methodology is appropriate for this research due 
to the delicate nature of its subject matter and the information it seeks to derive. This 
information includes the beliefs, fears, attitudes and perceptions of individuals on sensitive 
issues such as corruption, which may be too diverse to be captured by a rigid quantitative study. 
However, while a qualitative methodology may be used to obtain information on the potentially 
broad experiences of actors in the field, a quantitative methodology may be used to provide 
statistical data to back up certain conclusions reached, as was done in this research. This serves 
to mitigate concerns about anecdotism often associated with the usage of qualitative data. 
Hence, the research was divided into two phases: qualitative methodology was used in phase 
one, and quantitative methodology in phase two.  
In phase one of the empirical research, semi-structured interviews were used as the 
primary tool for gathering data. Fifty participants were interviewed comprising business 
representatives (including tax practitioners) and tax officials. Interviews were conducted either 
face to face or by telephone depending on what was practicable in the circumstances. There is 
a concern that telephone interviews produce data of poorer quality than face-to-face interviews 
due to the potential for reduced rapport between the interviewer and interviewee.66 Also, certain 
data such as body language may not be captured by telephone interview.67 Nevertheless, 
telephone interviews remain a valid way of obtaining data, especially on sensitive and 
                                                          
65 Law (n 4) 385. 
66 Roger W Shuy, ‘In-person versus Telephone Interviewing’ in James Holstein and Jaber Gubrium (eds), Inside 
Interviewing: New Lenses, New Concerns (Sage Publications 2003). 
67 Gina Novick, ‘Is There a Bias against Telephone Interviews in Qualitative Research?’ (2008) 31 Research in 
Nursing and Health 391. 
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potentially embarrassing issues such as corruption and taxation.68 In the view of the researcher 
after conducting the research, there was no noticeable difference in the quality of data derived 
from both interview methods.69 
The face-to-face interviews took place at various locations including the offices or 
homes of the participants, and in restaurants and malls. With the permission of the participants, 
every interview was audio tape-recorded by the researcher and a transcript produced as soon 
as possible after the interview.  
The researcher made direct approaches to various potential participants via LinkedIn or 
by visiting their offices. After concluding an interview, participants were asked to refer the 
researcher to fellow tax practitioners who may be willing to participate in the research. Owners 
of small businesses, who participated directly in the research, were randomly approached by 
the researcher at their offices or other place of business for the research. 
The researcher sought information about the experiences of these participants at or with 
the terminals of the tax system, in relation to their business activities. The interview was 
conducted based on a topic guide which covered the following issues: the existence of 
interaction; the means of interaction; the frequency of interaction; issues affecting interaction; 
the expectations of businesses; the responses of businesses to unexpected actions, and the 
reasons for these responses.  
On completion of phase one of the empirical research, the data collated was subjected 
to qualitative content analysis. The themes or codes used were partly derived from an analysis 
of the raw data and partly based on the research undertaken on the theoretical aspects of the 
thesis.  
Based on the results of the qualitative content analysis, certain issues were identified 
which formed the subjects of the quantitative study (phase two). These issues included: 
business attitudes to compliance; the likelihood and means of protest against wrongdoing; the 
perception of the level of discretionary powers of tax officials and vagueness of the law; the 
levels of corruption engaged in by the different actors in the two-way relationship; the levels 
of access which businesses have to the various terminals of the tax system; and the levels of 
awareness of the main actors in the two-way relationship.  
The researcher developed a questionnaire to elicit information that addressed these 
issues and tested the same in a pilot with three tax practitioners. The researcher also made 
                                                          
68 Judith E Sturges and Kathleen J Hanrahan, ‘Comparing Telephone and Face-To-Face Qualitative 
Interviewing: A Research Note’ (2004) 4 Qualitative Research 107. 
69 ibid.  
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amendments to the questionnaire based on the results of the pilot before it was administered on 
the participants directly or online. About 90% of respondents in phase two of the research 
project completed the questionnaire on paper. The researcher met these respondents either in 
tax conferences in Nigeria or at their offices. Before handing the questionnaire over to them, 
the researcher introduced himself as a research student at the London School of Economics and 
gave a brief introduction to the topic of his research. The researcher also assured respondents 
that they would be accorded complete anonymity and that their responses would be used solely 
for his PhD research. The other 10% of participants completed the survey online through a link 
provided to them by email. The email also introduced the researcher and his research topic and 
promised anonymity to the online participants.  
The results of the survey were analysed using the Qualtrics software. The hard copy 
responses were inputted manually into the software by the researcher, while the online 
responses were automatically recorded upon completion of the survey by the respondents. The 
results are mainly represented in tables and percentages. While the results of the qualitative 
phase form the primary basis for empirical findings in this research, the results of the 
quantitative phase provide valuable measures for various assertions and conclusions reached 
from the data obtained through the qualitative study. 
  
1.11 Nigeria as the Case Study  
Nigeria, a middle income country, is not only the most populous country in Africa but also has 
the highest GDP on the continent, following the rebasing of its GDP in 2014.70 It is a rentier 
state as about 80% of government revenue is derived from the exploitation of oil and gas. The 
recent drop in the price of oil has severely affected the ability of the governments of Nigeria, 
at the state and federal levels, to meet their basic obligations such as the payment of government 
staff salaries.71 This has also brought to the fore the urgent need for a vibrant tax system capable 
of generating sufficient revenue to fund the cost of government, amongst other things.  
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By current estimates, the GDP to tax ratio in Nigeria is at an abysmal level, ranging 
between 4% and 12%.72 This reveals huge potential for the ongoing reforms of the Nigerian 
tax system targeted at establishing a viable revenue generating alternative to the unreliability 
of oil and gas exploitation. To the extent that these reforms relate to business, the Nigerian 
government, in its drive to secure more revenue, must carefully consider the impact of whatever 
policy it introduces on the movement of capital. This is especially the case as capital becomes 
increasingly mobile against the backdrop of globalisation and advancements in technology.  
Prior to Nigeria’s independence in 1960, corruption was already conspicuous and 
featured prominently in the country’s discourse.73 The perpetration of corrupt acts, however, 
predates the country’s creation in 1914 or its subjugation to British colonial rule in the late 19th 
century.74 Powerful actors in pre-colonial times engaged in activities that fell short of ideal 
expectations in terms of the exercise of power, as recognised by the inhabitants of the landmass 
currently called Nigeria. However, the advent of British rule appeared to alter both the source 
and nature of expectations through the institutionalisation of formal rules with different ideal 
limits to the exercise of power. Britain partly justified its incursion into Nigeria by pointing out 
the prevalence of practices adjudged corrupt by ‘British standards’.75 In a bid to entrench law, 
order and efficient administration, the British government established various public 
institutions. These institutions facilitated the exploitation of the Nigerian state and people by 
the colonial masters and their local administrators respectively.76  
Despite relatively established rules governing corrupt practices, the British attitude to 
corruption was greatly influenced by political expediency. As a result, equally corrupt activities 
were accorded different treatments depending on the British political goals. For instance, 
corrupt actions by pro-independence activists in the south (eastern and western Nigeria) were 
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subjected to intense public scrutiny. In contrast, similar actions by local allies of the British 
government in the north were either ignored or dealt with in secret.77   
Two local leaders from the eastern and western parts of Nigeria were publicly indicted 
for corruption in two separate reports by the colonial government.78 However, no serious action 
was taken to punish these leaders for seemingly clear cases of corruption owing to several 
factors including the need not to be perceived as unduly prejudicing the transition into 
independence.79 The local elites who took over governance on independence continued to allow 
the reproduction of corruption. Some argued that corruption by the leaders in the newly 
independent African countries was merely part of the initial difficulties on the road to full 
independence and self-governance.80  
However, corruption grew in prominence in the years following independence and 
became institutionalised during the country’s many military regimes.81 This was despite the 
fact that the primary justification for most coup d’états was the need to tackle corruption. These 
military governments either lacked sufficient time to prove themselves or relapsed into 
corruption like their predecessors. Even the ‘intermittent’ democratic experiences in Nigeria 
failed to stem the tide of corruption in a similar fashion.  
Assisted by an improved level of freedom of speech and free press, the discourse on 
corruption has blossomed since the country’s return to democracy in 1999. Currently, 
corruption is reputed to have infiltrated all aspects of Nigerian society. In 2014, Nigeria scored 
27 out of 100 and was ranked 136th out of 174 countries in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index.82 This is evidenced by the diverse and alarming cases of 
corruption regularly reported in the media. According to the former Chairman of the anti-
corruption body, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Nigeria lost US$380 billion to 
corruption and mismanagement between 1960 (independence) and 1999 (the return to 
democracy). Foreign companies have also often been caught and punished for giving bribes to 
Nigerian officials. For example, Halliburton is reported to have paid US$2.5 million to a 
Nigerian tax official to secure favourable tax treatment worth US$14 million.83  
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Based on the ongoing challenges and reforms of the Nigerian tax system, coupled with 
the country’s long history and current predicament with corruption, the researcher viewed 
Nigeria as an ideal case for the empirical study. The researcher has also lived and worked in 
Nigeria for many years. While working as a lawyer in Nigeria, the researcher was made to 
understand the importance of facilitation or grease payments to one’s ability to practice law. 
Failure to provide such payments when filing documents in court, for example, may cause 
severe delays to the client's case and damage the prospects of client retention.  
Even while conducting the empirical research in Nigeria, the researcher was confronted 
by corruption in its full force. Driving in Lagos to a meeting, the researcher took a wrong turn 
up a one-way street as there was no visible sign at the start of the street to indicate this. He was 
stopped by two police officers who were meant to be guarding an embassy on the street. The 
officers told the researcher that he would be taken to the station to face legal sanctions for the 
traffic offence. Soon after, the researcher noticed that other individuals who had also been 
stopped for making the same error quickly paid the officers some money, after which the police 
officers allowed them to continue their journey. The researcher then confronted the police 
officers about these payments threatening to report his observations to their superiors when he 
reached their offices. One of the officers agitatedly blurted out: ‘Where is the evidence? When 
we get to the office, we will see where you will find the evidence.’ However, the other police 
officer became friendly at this point. He was suddenly interested in the researcher’s plans for 
the day; and inquired whether anything was recorded on the researcher’s phone. When he was 
assured that nothing was recorded, he ‘let the researcher go free’. This experience illustrates 
the means by which corruption might exploit the power gap, as buttressed by the levels of 
access, awareness, distortion and inaction. 
 
1.12 A Synopsis of the Thesis 
This thesis examines the mechanisms through which corruption may sustain itself in the 
relationship between business and the tax system. It is predicated on the belief that by 
subjecting this relationship to intense scrutiny, it is possible to observe the avenues for 
corruption in the said relationship. 
It begins in Chapter 2 with the premise that business and the tax system are parties in a 
two-way relationship in which both institutions may influence each other. Business may 
influence the structure and contents of the tax system politically, practically and judicially. 
Likewise, the tax system may influence various aspects of business such as the location of 
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investment, choice of investment, the methods of financing investment and the levels of 
investment.  
This relationship is dependent on the interactions between the actors representing both 
institutions. These interactions take place through a ‘communication link’ that connects 
business with the four terminals of the tax system and these terminals with each other. The 
efficacy of the communication link (comprising 10 individual channels of communication) and 
consequently the two-way relationship is affected by the levels of four mechanisms. These 
mechanisms are access, awareness, distortion and inaction.  
This relationship between business and the tax system is the product of a 
‘heterogeneous assemblage of human and non-human actors’.84 These actors are enrolled into 
the network that constitutes the relationship using intermediaries. The potentially conflicting 
interests of these actors are controlled to maintain a façade of stability and avert the 
disintegration of the network. Achieving a good understanding of the two-way relationship in 
a given setting is only possible after the conduct of an empirical study of these actors, their 
interests and the means by which order is maintained despite the presence of conflicting 
interests. This empirical study was undertaken using Nigeria as the case study.  
The primary tool for attaining influence and order in the two-way relationship is 
communication. It may be used for rule-setting, scrutiny, compliance or appointment. An 
actor’s communication is also prima facie evidence of his actual power in the two-way 
relationship. However, as explained in Chapter 3, rules and their accompanying expectations 
place limits on communications. These rules are sourced from different dimensions in society. 
Out of the many possible dimensions, this thesis focuses only on the dimensions that are 
directly relevant to the two-way relationship. These dimensions are the legal, economic and 
moral dimensions. These dimensions possess institutional mechanisms through which they 
secure compliance with their dictates or ideal expectations. 
Despite these institutional mechanisms, an actor’s actual power as evidenced by its 
communications may either exceed or fall short of the ideal expectations of these dimensions. 
This constitutes a gap between the actual and institutional powers of actors. This ‘power gap’ 
may exist in three forms. The first exists where an actor fails or is unable to act in accordance 
with the dictates of a dimension in society. The second exists where an actor acts in accordance 
with these dictates but fails to secure compliance with his actions. The third exists where an 
actor acts in a manner inconsistent with these dictates, and yet secures compliance with his 
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actions. The mechanisms that affect the communication link (access, awareness, distortion and 
inaction) also influence the breadth of this power gap. One may increase or decrease the power 
gap by adjusting the levels of these mechanisms.  
Whilst recognising the controversy over the definition of the term corruption, this thesis 
argues that the tag ‘corrupt’ should be applied where an action (or exercise of power) and the 
gain derived therefrom breach the ideal expectations (or dictates) of a dimension in society. 
Hence, different acts may be considered corrupt depending not just on the jurisdiction and the 
time period but also on the dimension considered.  
Based on the above premises, this thesis argues that corruption sustains itself in the 
two-way relationship by exploiting the gap between the actual and institutional powers of 
actors. As mentioned above, this ‘power gap’ may be increased or decreased by the levels of 
access, awareness, distortion and inaction in the communication link. Hence, any true attempt 
to tackle corruption in this relationship must address the levels of these four mechanisms in a 
manner that reduces the power gap and avenue for corruption. The findings of the empirical 
research, which are subjected to a descriptive analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, support the 
argument put forward in this thesis.  
It is important to understand what role the law can play in tackling corruption in the 
two-way relationship. I argue in the penultimate chapter that law could have an impact on 
corruption in the two-way relationship directly or indirectly. Law directly affects corruption in 
the two-way relationship through its definition and punishment of corrupt actions. Actors who 
are adjudged to have acted corruptly by the law are subject to the force of the law. These actors 
are also likely to be subject to the force mechanisms of other dimensions to the extent that the 
law has an impact on these other dimensions. For instance, the illegality of corrupt acts and 
actors may contribute to their moral reproach and condemnation. However, by classifying an 
act as neither illegal nor corrupt, the law may inadvertently shield this act (and the actor 
responsible for it) from not just the force mechanisms of the legal dimension but also the force 
mechanisms of other dimensions. To reduce the likelihood of the law becoming an ally to 
corruption, the law should incorporate ‘codes and programmes’ that reduce the ‘horizontal gap’ 
between dimensions to the barest minimum. These codes and programmes should enable the 
law to observe and take into account the expectations of other dimensions in defining and 
prescribing punishments for corruption.  
The law indirectly affects corruption in the two-way relationship through its influence 
on the four mechanisms. The law should focus on adjusting the levels of these four mechanisms 
in a manner that would reduce the power gap and avenue for corruption. However, this is not 
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always the case as the law may inadvertently aid corruption through its effect on the levels of 
awareness, access, distortion and inaction.  
The concluding chapter calls for a shift in focus from traditional concepts such as 
monopoly, discretion, transparency and accountability to the power gap and its four 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, it recognises that this call will be more deserving of a positive 
answer after further research has been conducted on applying the power gap concept to other 
social contexts, which are different from the social context of business and the tax system in 
Nigeria.  
 
1.13 Conclusion 
Different aspects of the relationship between business and the tax system have been examined 
by academics of different fields. There has also been extensive coverage of the causes of 
corruption and its effect on tax effort, tax morale and private sector investments. Nevertheless, 
the means by which corruption sustains itself in the relationship between business and the tax 
system have not been comprehensively examined.  
This research will contribute to existing knowledge by identifying and comprehensively 
examining the mechanisms through which corruption persists in the two-way relationship 
between business and the tax system. The issues which this research will resolve and the 
information derived from the empirical study will improve current understanding of the 
dynamics of the relationship between business and the tax system and its exposure to corruption 
(as well as other societal factors, such as ethnic bias). This will aid the design of a tax system 
which strikes a balance between the potentially conflicting needs for investments and revenue 
generation in countries where corruption is endemic. This is essential in these years of austerity 
and heightened international tax competition as the need to encourage, attract and sustain 
investments remains foremost in the minds of governments of both developed and developing 
countries. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE TWO-WAY RELATIONSHIP AND THE FOUR MECHANISMS 
2.1 Introduction  
Neo-classical profit maximisation theory posits that businesses are driven by the need to make 
profit or avoid loss. Since the structure and contents of the tax system can affect the level of 
profit made or loss suffered, it follows theoretically that they can affect the operations of 
businesses.85 
The tax system may affect the level of investments, the location of investments, the 
object of investments, the choice of financing investments, the organisational structure of 
investments and the compliance attitudes of businesses. Devereaux and Griffith86 provide 
statistical evidence for the proposition that average effective tax rates affect location choices 
of businesses by examining the location decisions of US multinationals in four European 
countries between 1990 and 1994. Huizinga and others87 provide evidence that companies are 
more likely to finance investments using debt than equity in a country where the tax rate is 
high. They also show that the impact of tax rate on debt policy is higher in multinational 
companies than single companies. Golsbee88 conducted a study in the US in 1992 which 
indicates that the difference in rates between company income tax and personal income tax 
influences business decisions on whether or not to operate as an incorporated entity. The study 
shows that an increase in corporate tax rate by a tenth of a per cent decreases the share of 
incorporated companies in the total number of firms by 0.25 percentage points. There is also 
existing research indicating a negative relationship between marginal tax rates and 
compliance.89  
The tax rate, method of tax administration, double tax treaty network and tax incentives 
are some of the aspects of a country’s tax system capable of affecting the operations of 
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businesses. Hines conducted a US-centred review of existing research which suggested that 
taxation influences FDI, corporate borrowing, transfer pricing, dividend and royalty payments, 
research and development activity, exports, bribe payments and location decisions.90 The 
impact of tax policy on business investments was downplayed by Agodo.91 Existing research, 
however, shows a negative correlation between corporate taxes and inbound FDI.92 
Neumayer93 provides evidence that middle income (as opposed to low income) developing 
countries do benefit from double tax treaties entered into with the US in the form of increased 
FDI from the latter country. However, the link between tax incentives and investments is not 
clear from existing research.94 Shah,95 for example, argues that incentives have little or no 
effect on investments. This has been attributed to the grant of incentives to firms who may not 
be affected by it (i.e. the redundancy of tax incentives).  
In designing their tax systems, governments of both developed and developing 
countries attempt to strike a balance between generating revenue and fostering investments in 
accordance with extant laws. Businesses may exert political, practical and judicial influence on 
this process in order to ensure that the resulting tax system is advantageous for their operations.  
Businesses may politically influence the structure and the contents of the tax system 
through their direct and indirect interactions with the executive or the legislature.96 These 
interactions may be made through organisations set up to pursue their cause.97 Even without 
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the use of organisations, the need to foster economic growth by encouraging investments is 
enough to pressure governments into designing their tax systems in a manner that favours 
businesses.98 The strength of such influence by businesses in a polity may depend on the 
ideology of the political party in power.99  
Apart from exerting political influence, the practical realities arising from the way 
businesses operate have a considerable influence on the structure and the contents of the tax 
system. This is evidenced by the number of tax provisions enacted as a consequence of the 
operations of businesses. For instance, measures such as Thin Capitalisation rules, Controlled 
Foreign Companies rules and Limitation on Benefit clauses have been incorporated into the 
tax systems of various countries to tackle the tax avoidance activities of businesses. Thin 
Capitalisation rules100 provide that interests incurred in situations where a company is 
excessively geared will not be deductible. Its purpose is to counteract the use of excessive debt 
financing to extract profits from a given jurisdiction. Controlled Foreign Companies rules101 
attribute to domestic businesses foreign income of a related company which have not been 
repatriated in certain circumstances. Its purpose is to counteract the parking of profits in 
jurisdictions with low or no taxation. Limitation on Benefit clauses102 prevent multinational 
companies from artificially structuring their transactions to benefit from treaties which they 
would ordinarily not benefit from.  
Businesses may also challenge the legality of tax policies, laws and regulations as well 
as their interpretation and application via judicial review or other forms of civil actions. 
Decisions reached by the courts or tribunals in actions instituted by businesses have the 
potential to affect not only the tax position of these businesses but also the structure and 
contents of the tax system. In Philips Electronics UK Ltd v HMRC,103 for example, the Tribunal 
held that section 133 of the Corporation Tax Act 2010 (then sections 406(2) and 403D(1)(c) of 
the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988) was incompatible with EU law. This is because 
it unjustifiably required link companies to be UK-related (subject to UK corporation taxes) in 
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claims for consortium relief. This led to the modification of the law via section 12 and schedule 
6 of the Finance (No.  3) Act 2010 which inserts into the Corporation Tax Act 2010 section 
134A. This new provision extends the consortium relief to situations where the link company 
is established in the EEA.104  
Based on the above premises, this thesis conceives of the relationship between business 
and the tax system as a two-way relationship. This implies that while the structure and the 
contents of the tax system have the potential to affect the operations of businesses, businesses 
may also influence various facets of the tax system. 
In this chapter, I will take the analysis of the two-way relationship a step further by 
constructing a framework that makes apparent the vulnerability of this relationship to 
corruption. I will argue that understanding the relationship between business and the tax system 
requires an appreciation of the ‘communication link’ by which information is shared between 
both institutions.  
In Part 2 of this chapter, I will explore the particulars of this communication link, 
highlighting in the process the mechanics of the interactions between business and the tax 
system. In Part 3, I will apply ANT to this communication link in order to uncover the 
operations of the complex networks of human and non-human actors behind it. In Part 4, I will 
discuss four mechanisms which affect the efficacy of the communication link. They are: 
distortion of communications, deficiency in awareness, restriction of access and inaction.  
Understanding the communication link and its weaknesses provides a critical 
theoretical insight into the two-way relationship between businesses and the tax system. 
However, these can only be properly understood after an empirical study has been conducted 
as reiterated in the conclusion to this chapter.  
 
2.2 Understanding the Communication Link 
Any relationship based on interaction must depend on the efficacy of the connections through 
which information is shared by the parties to it. The two-way relationship between business 
and the tax system is not an exception. In order to fully understand this relationship, it is 
important to examine where and how both institutions interact.  
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The interaction between business and the tax system arguably takes place at four key 
‘terminals of the tax system’. Named according to their outputs, these terminals are ‘the tax 
policy terminal’, ‘the tax law terminal’, ‘the tax administration terminal’ and ‘the dispute 
resolution terminal’.  
The reference to terminals of the tax system rather than arms of government is due to 
the following reasons. Firstly, the use of the term ‘terminals’ reflects the fact that information 
is processed and shared at these locations. Secondly, not all aspects of the arms of government 
are involved in taxation. Using the term terminals therefore ensures that emphasis is placed 
only on those aspects of the arms of government relevant to the tax system. Finally, the 
functions performed at these terminals are not the exclusive preserve of the relevant arms of 
government. Dispute resolution, for example, is commonly associated with the courts or 
judiciary. However, dispute resolution in the tax system is also carried out by other bodies 
which are neither courts nor part of the judiciary. Consequently, using customary appellations 
such as the executive, legislature and judiciary would be unduly limiting.  
Business and the tax system interact through the interchange of ‘communicative action’ 
at the terminals of the tax system. The term ‘communicative action’ (Action) is used loosely105 
and means an act or utterance of a business or a terminal of the tax system capable of conveying 
information or meaning. Such an act or utterance is communicated when it is understood by a 
recipient. Therefore, a ‘Communication’ in this thesis comprises an Action by an exercising 
actor and the understanding of the said Action by a recipient actor. This is an adoption of 
Luhmann's definition of Communication, which he defined as comprising utterance, 
information and understanding.106 For instance, an arbiter’s decision (or Communication) will: 
(i) usually contain facts, laws and legal arguments (information); (ii) be conveyed in a written 
document (the utterance) and; (iii) be communicated when understood by businesses.107 
In the tax policy or tax law terminal, business and the tax system interact in the process 
of formulating policies and enacting laws respectively. A tax policy or law communicated to 
businesses has the potential to affect the way in which they operate. The tax policy or law may 
also be a consequence of political or economic pressure exerted on the relevant terminal by 
businesses leaving or threatening to leave the jurisdiction. For instance, in 2011, the UK 
government increased the Supplementary Charge (SC) on companies in the UK Continental 
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Shelf (UKCS) from 20% to 32%. This continued the trend of increasing the state's fiscal take 
from the UKCS in light of rising oil prices. This increase was made in order to provide revenue 
to compensate for the shortfall arising from the reduction in fuel duty. In justifying its decision, 
the government pointed to the different fates brought about by the rising oil price on the oil 
industry and the state at large. The government argued that whilst oil companies enjoyed 
windfall profits, the rising price of oil had an overall negative impact on the state and the public 
at large. However, the government promised to reverse the increase in the SC in the event that 
the price of oil fell below a trigger price of $75 per barrel on a sustained basis. This increment 
was heavily criticised by the companies affected, with some, such as Centrica Plc, threatening 
to pull back on investment.108 In response to the backlash, the UK government in 2012 
introduced a brown field allowance which permits a deduction of a portion of production 
income from the tax base subject to SC in relation to small or technically challenging oil fields 
to mitigate the burden of the increased SC on certain companies.109 
The leeway for interaction between business and the tax system is broadest at the tax 
administration terminal. Here, business and the tax system interact with the principal aim of 
attaining compliance with tax policies and laws. The tax system communicates to business 
through this terminal in various ways including by notices of assessment, audits, circulars and 
extra-statutory concessions. Business also communicates with the tax system via this terminal 
by different means such as by returns, notices of objection to assessment, payment of taxes and 
dialogue with tax officials.  
Any dispute which arises in the formulation or administration of a tax policy or law 
may be submitted to the dispute resolution terminal for adjudication. The decision of this 
terminal has the potential to affect both the operations of businesses and the structure and the 
contents of the tax system. By participating in a dispute before this terminal, businesses 
communicate with the tax system. The facts and arguments contained in writs, pleadings and 
addresses, for example, are powerful tools through which businesses may influence the 
decisions of the dispute resolution terminal and in turn the structure and the contents of the tax 
system.  
                                                          
108 Sylvia Pfeifer and Andrew Whiffin, ‘Centrica Feels the Heat over Tax Rise’ The Financial Times (London, 9 
May 2011) <https://www.ft.com/content/672af278-7a0b-11e0-bc74-00144feabdc0> accessed 30 May 2017. 
109 Terry Macalister, ‘George Osborne Unveils Tax Break for Older North Sea Oil and Gas fields’ The Guardian 
(London, 7 September 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/sep/07/george-osborne-north-sea-
oil> accessed 30 May 2017.  
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An Action by a business or a terminal may be understood differently by different 
recipients. For instance, the refusal by a business to comply with the tax obligations contained 
in a notice of assessment may be considered by the tax administration terminal as an 
infringement, by the dispute resolution terminal as compliance, and by the tax policy or law 
terminal as an invitation to change existing policy or law. This can partly be illustrated by the 
circumstances surrounding Vodafone International Holdings BV v India.110 This case involved 
a challenge to a tax assessment served on Vodafone by the Indian tax authorities in relation to 
its purchase of shares in a holding company in the Cayman Islands by which it acquired 67% 
interest in an Indian telecommunications company. The Indian tax authorities had assessed 
Vodafone on the basis that the latter company should have withheld capital gains tax as a result 
of this transaction. The court, however, ruled that the tax authority lacked the jurisdiction to 
impose tax on the transaction. This led to moves by the Indian government to introduce 
retrospective laws to cover transactions similar to this.111    
What then is the communication link? The communication link is the entire machinery 
through which business and the tax system interact. It encompasses the structural lines of 
Communication which pass through the terminals of the tax system connecting them with one 
another and each with businesses. The two-way relationship depends on the efficacy of the 
communication link. An effective communication link will enable the healthy flow of 
information between business and the tax system and consequently enhance the responsiveness 
of both institutions to each other. 
 
2.2.1 The Communication Route  
It is important to distinguish between the ‘communication link’ and the ‘communication route’. 
This is because the interactions that form the basis of the two-way relationship need not involve 
every terminal of the tax system. As distinct from the communication link, the communication 
route refers to the pathway of an Action from its conception to its final destination, which is 
usually the point of delivery to businesses or a terminal of the tax system. While the 
communication link remains relatively stable, the communication route varies depending on 
the form of Action involved. The chances that an Action will serve its purpose may depend on 
its communication route. This is due to the fact that different rules, personnel, practices and 
societal factors may play different roles in different communication routes.  
                                                          
110 Vodafone International Holdings BV v India 14 ITL Rep 431. 
111 See Rajendra Nayak, ‘India SC Rules in Favour of Vodafone’ (2012) 3 IT Rev 89.  
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A communication route may be direct or indirect. It is direct where the conception and 
final delivery of an Action take place at one terminal of the tax system. A grant of an extra-
statutory concession by the tax administration to businesses, for example, may take place 
through a direct communication route. It is indirect where the Action transfuses more than one 
terminal of the tax system before reaching its final destination. On the other hand, a call for a 
change in the tax rates may have commenced at the tax policy terminal but any subsequent 
change in the tax rates may be delivered to businesses by the tax administration terminal during 
enforcement. In this instance, therefore, the Action reaches businesses in its fully processed 
form through an indirect communication route.   
A single Action may trigger successive Actions by different actors in the two-way 
relationship communicated through different but connected communication routes. For 
instance, in response to pressure from businesses, the tax policy terminal may adopt a policy 
for the simplification of tax laws and forward a bill to the tax law terminal in this regard. The 
tax law terminal may in turn pass this bill into law. This law will then be forwarded to the tax 
administration terminal for enforcement. During enforcement, a dispute between the tax 
administration terminal and businesses may ensue as to the legality or interpretation of the said 
law. This dispute may be referred to the dispute resolution terminal for adjudication. 
Subsequently, the decision reached by the dispute resolution terminal may be communicated 
to the parties to the said dispute.  
Generally speaking, the form of Action employed by businesses or the tax system will 
depend on the goal intended. For instance, a business wishing to alter a decision of the dispute 
resolution terminal directly will not normally leave the jurisdiction. However, a goal may be 
achievable by utilising any of a number of Actions. The effect of an unacceptable provision of 
the law, for example, may be mitigated by communicating (or inducing the communication of) 
a tax policy, an amendment of the law, an extra-statutory concession or a decision of the dispute 
resolution terminal annulling the said provision.  
Where such an option exists, the choice of Action by a business or a terminal of the tax 
system may be influenced by their impression or prior experience of the effectiveness or other 
practicalities of the communication route relevant to the said action. Path dependence112 may 
result in the use of an Action owing to historical experience with this Action even where the 
Action is not the most efficient of the available Actions. For instance, businesses within a given 
jurisdiction may lack the requisite organisation or expertise to interact with the tax policy and 
                                                          
112 See Scott E Page, ‘Path Dependence’ (2006) 1 Quarterly Journal of Political Science 87.  
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law terminals so as to influence tax policy or law-making. Also, their demands may be too 
particularistic to be catered for by a change in policy or law. Such businesses are likely to 
engage the tax administration terminal to which they have greater access or where their 
particularistic needs can be addressed.113 
 
2.2.1.2 Weight and Reliability of Actions  
The weight of the Actions proffered by the different terminals of the tax system as measured 
by their impact on the executed (as opposed to strategic) operations of businesses varies.  
The Actions of the tax administration terminal should normally have the strongest 
impact on the executed operations of businesses where it is not overruled by the dispute 
resolution terminal. This is because there can be no guarantee that the information derived by 
businesses from other terminals would tally with that which the tax administration will deliver. 
Therefore, businesses can only speculate on the effect of the Actions of other terminals on their 
executed operations prior to their interaction with the tax administration terminal. 
Even where a decision of the dispute resolution terminal overrules an Action of the tax 
administration terminal, a further Action of the tax administration terminal may be required to 
give effect to the said decision. In this circumstance, the tax administration terminal may fail 
to take the required Action or may wrongly apply the decision. This may be an intentional 
exercise of power by the tax administration terminal, even at the risk of being in contempt of 
the dispute resolution terminal.  
The tax administration terminal may also insist that a decision of the dispute resolution 
terminal overruling its position is restricted to the peculiar facts of the dispute and refuse to 
apply it in subsequent situations involving other businesses not party to the said dispute. In this 
circumstance, a business that wishes to enjoy a similar treatment as that meted out by the 
dispute resolution terminal in the previous dispute must not only institute an action challenging 
the act of the tax administration terminal but must also prove that the facts of the present dispute 
cannot be distinguished from those of the previous one. The business may be prevented from 
instituting the action by certain barriers. Also, the specificity and technicalities involved in 
taxation may make it difficult to prove that the present dispute is not distinguishable from a 
previous one.  
                                                          
113 See James Scott, ‘Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change’ (1969) 63(4) The American Political 
Science Review 1142; James Scott, ‘The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations’ (1969) 11(3) 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 315 (the author argues that ‘influence at enforcement stage often 
takes the form of “corruption” and has seldom been treated as the alternative means of interest articulation 
which in fact it is’). 
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The decisions of the dispute resolution terminal should follow acts of the tax 
administration terminal in the hierarchy of Actions based on weight. This is because the dispute 
resolution terminal is the final interphase between business and the tax system in a small 
percentage of cases where a dispute has been brought before it for adjudication. An example 
of such cases is where the decision is declaratory as opposed to executory. A decision is 
declaratory where it establishes the rights of the parties to the dispute and requires no further 
action for its implementation. However, the ability of a business to seek a declaratory decision 
may be restricted by law.114 Nevertheless, the decisions of the dispute resolution terminal 
should have a higher impact on the executed operations of businesses than tax policies or laws 
which are more likely to be ambiguous and require further action for their implementation. 
Decisions of the dispute resolution terminal generally give weight to existing law especially in 
relation to the parties to the dispute. This is because it places a less ambiguous obligation on 
the said parties in most cases. 
Tax laws should have more impact on executed business operations than tax policy. 
This is because while both Actions are frequently nebulous and their interpretation or 
application uncertain at the point of enactment, tax laws are binding until they are repealed. 
Tax policies, on the other hand, are more or less non-binding promises which are at best capable 
of giving rise to expectations in the minds of businesses. In exceptional circumstances, a policy 
or act of the tax administration terminal may give rise to legitimate expectations. This prevents 
the relevant terminal from reneging on the policy without proper notice. Nevertheless, it must 
be established that the Action was such that it created a reasonable expectation in the minds of 
the businesses that they would be treated in a particular way and that acting contrary to this 
Action would be unjust or an abuse of power.115  
It is, however, important to distinguish between the weight of an Action as measured 
by its impact on the executed operations of businesses and the extent to which a business will 
rely on the said Action when taking strategic decisions. Actions which are predictable, 
accessible and broadly applicable are solid bases for strategic decisions. Therefore, businesses 
may be more willing to rely on a law than an act of the tax administration terminal when making 
strategic decisions where the latter Action is relatively unpredictable. This is despite the fact 
                                                          
114 See Steven Kittrell, ‘Administrative Prerequisites for Declaratory Judgements about the Tax Issues’ (1980) 
66(12) American Bar Association Journal 1570. 
115 See R (on the application of Davies) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners and R (on the application of 
Gaines Cooper) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2011] UKSC 47; R v Inland Revenue Commissioner 
ex parte Unilever Plc [1996] STC 681; R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte MFK Underwriting 
Agencies Ltd [1989] STC 873.  
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that the latter Action may have a greater impact on the executed operations of businesses than 
the former. The Actions of the tax administration are usually very unpredictable. This is partly 
due to the fact that they can be reversed by the tax administration with relative ease in most 
cases. For example, in James Couzens v Commissioner of Internal Revenue116 the US court 
held that a tax commissioner was not bound by the valuation of shares of the claimant made by 
a previous tax commissioner. The predictability of such Actions may be improved where the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation applies.117 
The interests and ‘decision frames’118 of businesses or the terminals of the tax system 
partly determine the effect of an Action on them. For instance, Actions by businesses targeted 
at securing a tax exemption are more likely to succeed where the terminals of the tax system 
place greater emphasis on fostering investment than generating revenue. Likewise, an Action 
by the terminals of the tax system targeted at securing compliance is more likely to have a 
greater positive impact on businesses that are pro-compliance. However, in both cases, the 
anticipated effect may not materialise where the recipient is improperly informed of the Action 
or misconstrues it.  
 
2.2.2 Communications as Evidence of Power 
Communication is a crucial element of the two-way relationship between business and the tax 
system. Without Communication, there can be no such relationship. It is the tool through which 
desires are expressed and demands are met. In this section, I discuss the nature, purpose and 
channels of communication in the two-way relationship. 
 
2.3 Forms of Communication 
While Actions may be oral, written or by conduct, Communications may be direct or indirect 
depending on the presence or absence of an intermediary actor between the actor devising the 
Action and the final intended recipient. Communication will be direct where there is no 
intermediary actor between the actor devising the communicative action and the recipient. It 
will be indirect where there is an intermediary actor between the main actor devising the 
communicative action and the recipient. However, an indirect Communication may take place 
through a direct communication route. Businesses, for example, may communicate with the 
                                                          
116 James Couzens v Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1928) 11 BTA 1040. 
117 See Gaines Cooper case (n 115). 
118 Decision frame refers to the interpretation which a business or a terminal of the tax system gives to available 
information. This is an application of Simon’s Bounded Rationality. See Herbert Simon, Administrative 
Behaviour: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organisations (MacMillan 1957). 
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tax law terminal using consultants representing their interests. While the communication route 
remains direct – as the Action does not pass through any additional terminal of the tax system 
– Communication is indirect as it flows through the consultants. These consultants as 
intermediaries possess their own interests and decision frames which may influence the nature 
and efficacy of the Communication. 
Communications can be distinguished based on the level of confidentiality and the 
number of intended recipients. Here, Communication can be classed into two categories. They 
are: private Communications which are directed at a particular recipient or closed category of 
recipients and are usually accorded confidentiality; and public Communications which are 
meant for the public and therefore accessible with relative ease to the public at large or a 
considerable section of it. 
Communications may be formal or informal depending on the settings or circumstances 
in which they are made. Formal communications are official communications made by an actor 
in official settings and through official channels of communication, while Informal 
communications are unofficial communications usually made in social or educational settings 
such as during seminars and conferences. 
 
2.4 Purpose of Communication 
It is pertinent to understand the purpose for which Actions may be dispatched in the two-way 
relationship. This purpose should shape the structure and contents of such Actions. In other 
words, the actors that need to be co-opted into the network which the Action represents should 
be guided by the purpose of such Actions. A failure to so consider the purpose before 
determining the constituting actors is potentially fatal to the ability of the Action to achieve its 
intended goal. For instance, where an actor seeks to overrule a law, this purpose informs both 
the processes and the nature of the Action which should be dispatched.  
There are 4 main purposes of Communications in the two-way relationship. They are 
Communication for the purpose of rule-setting, compliance (or non-compliance), scrutiny and 
appointment. These purposes are discussed individually below.  
Rule-setting is a main purpose of Communication in the two-way relationship between 
business and the tax system. Communication for this purpose is usually marked by some form 
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of negotiation. Here, the participating actors balance competing interests so as to arrive at the 
policies or laws that will govern their future interactions.119  
After the rules have been set, the purpose of Communication usually shifts to 
compliance with the said rules. At this stage, negotiation of the terms of the relationship would 
have ceased and renegotiations are usually prohibited. Any planned renegotiation requires 
reference back to the tax policy or law terminal where the law or policy was set in the first 
place. Compliance, as distinct from rule-setting, should not involve renegotiations. However, 
a distinction must be drawn between the negotiation that takes place in settling tax disputes and 
the negotiation of the applicable rules. While the rules should not be renegotiated at the point 
of compliance, the terms of settlement may be subject to negotiation. Negotiating the terms of 
settlement is akin to creating new rules to guide current or future interactions between the 
parties. In the UK’s Litigation and Settlement Strategy (paragraph 1), for instance, the 
negotiation of the law at the point of settlement is expressly prohibited.120 The actors 
communicate primarily for the purpose of understanding the extant rules as well as the factual 
circumstances to which they should be applied.  
Both the process of rule-setting and compliance are governed by certain pre-ordained 
rules against which they may be scrutinised. Scrutiny is therefore an important role of 
Communication in the two-way relationship between business and the tax system. Unlike 
Communication for the purpose of rule-setting, scrutiny does not involve negotiation or overt 
balancing of interests. Its objective is to ensure that laid down rules and processes have been 
adhered to. Nevertheless, it differs from compliance as the actors engaged in this activity are 
not burdened by the obligation to comply with the policies or laws in the instance subject to 
scrutiny. In other words, scrutiny involves a re-examination of compliance by actors other than 
those with the obligation to comply.  
Communication for the purpose of appointment is another important purpose of 
Communication in the two-way relationship between business and the tax system. This form 
of Communication often involves some form of negotiation or balancing of interests along laid 
down rules but its main purpose is to institute the holders of power to whom certain roles would 
be distributed. 
                                                          
119 For instance, regarding the negotiations that characterise the process for the formulation of laws governing 
taxation of oil producing and exploration companies in the UK Continental Shelf, see Carole Nakhle, Petroleum 
Taxation: Sharing the Oil Wealth: A Study of Petroleum Taxation Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (Routledge 
2008). 
120 See HMRC, ‘Resolving Tax Disputes: Commentary on the Litigation and Settlement Strategy’ (2013) 9 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387770/Commentary_on_litigat
ion.pdf> accessed 5 July 2015. 
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2.5 Channels of Communication  
Communications flow through the communication link that connects businesses with the four 
terminals of the tax system. There are 10 two-way channels of communication that make up 
the communication link. These channels can be divided into two broad categories. These 
categories are: Communication between the institutions; and Communication between the 
terminals.  
The channels of communication between the institutions include the channels between 
business and tax policy terminals; business and tax law terminals; business and tax 
administration terminals; and business and dispute resolution terminals.  
Communications between the institutions are commonly either for the purpose of rule-
setting or compliance. Communication for the purpose of rule-setting is commonly associated 
with the interactions that take place between businesses and the tax policy or law terminal. 
Here, the actors meet to negotiate the terms of their fiscal relationship in accordance with their 
respective interests. It is vital at this stage that the interests of all major stakeholders are taken 
into account and that the product of this negotiation process is communicated free from 
distortion. These are more likely to be achieved where the actors are fully aware of the setting 
and mechanics of the negotiation process, the actors utilise their formal and substantive access 
to this process, and the end product is communicated across the least possible number of 
terminals.  
Communication for the purpose of compliance, on the other hand, commonly takes 
place between businesses and the tax administration or dispute resolution terminal. It is crucial 
at this stage that the rules and facts required for compliance are as certain as possible. Little or 
no room should be left for renegotiation of the already fixed terms of the fiscal relationship 
between the parties.  
The channels of communication between the terminals of the tax system include the 
channels between tax policy and tax law terminals; tax policy and tax administration terminals; 
tax policy and dispute resolution terminals; tax law and tax administration terminals; tax law 
and dispute resolution terminals; and tax administration and dispute resolution terminals.  
Communication between terminals of the tax system is commonly for the purpose of 
rule-setting, scrutiny or appointment. For instance, Communication may take place between 
the tax policy and tax law terminals for the purpose of formulating rules to guide the two-way 
relationship between business and the tax system. Similarly, the tax administration terminal 
may communicate its practical experiences of the implementation of tax policy or law to the 
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tax policy or law terminals respectively so as to facilitate the process of policy or law-making. 
Also, the policies formulated at the tax policy terminal are subject to scrutiny at the tax law 
terminal and the dispute resolution terminal. Likewise, the actions of the tax administration 
terminal are subject to scrutiny at the tax policy, tax law and dispute resolution terminals. 
Finally, actors within the tax policy terminal communicate for the purpose of appointment of 
holders of power at the tax law, tax administration and dispute resolution terminals.  
 
2.6 Actors, Interests and Instruments 
In addition to examining the purposes and channels of communication, it is also important to 
examine the proponents and recipients of Communications. This is because these are the 
primary sources of the interests and decision frames that shape the nature and effect of 
Communications. This section identifies and examines the main actors in the relationship and 
in doing so considers their duties (which shape their legal interests) as well as the instruments 
by which they attain influence at a distance. 
  
2.6.1 Businesses 
Businesses are profit-making in nature. It is therefore unsurprising that profit maximisation121 
features as one of their main interests in much economic literature. In 1943, for example, 
Scitovszky described profit maximisation as ‘one of the most fundamental assumptions of 
economic theory’. In his words:  
[T]he assumption that the entrepreneur maximises his profits is based on observation and implies a 
special hypothesis concerning the businessman's psychology. It is therefore an empirical law, which need 
not apply to every businessman, and may conceivably be untrue even about the representative 
entrepreneur. Its justification lies in its usefulness, which should be enhanced by a better understanding 
of its exact meaning and limitations.122 
  
However, this section focuses on the legal duties of businesses as created by law. This is linked 
to the way these businesses are structured. 
Businesses adopt different structures with diverse legal implications. They may be sole 
proprietorships, partnerships or companies. The businesses who participated directly or 
indirectly in this research are predominantly structured as companies. This implies that they 
have legal personality. Also, their day-to-day affairs are under the control of directors who are 
                                                          
121 See Theodore Levitt, ‘The Dangers of Social Responsibility’ (1958) Harvard Business Review 41; Milton 
Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ New York Times (13 September 
1970) 33. 
122 T De Scitovszky, ‘A Note on Profit Maximisation and its Implications’ (1943) 11(1) The Review of 
Economic Studies 57, 60.  
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divorced from their true owners or shareholders in many cases. These directors, who represent 
the will, mind or ego of these businesses, are subjected to certain duties under Nigerian Law 
as stipulated in the Companies and Allied Matters Act.123 The most prominent of these duties 
is the duty to act in the best interest of the company.124 What constitutes the best interest of the 
company is potentially debatable. This debate primarily centres on the following issues: a) who 
constitutes the company; b) who decides on what is the best interest of the company; c) to what 
extent should the directors consider the interests of stakeholders including employees, creditors 
and the community; and, d) how should the directors balance long term and short term interests 
of the company?  
The term ‘best interest of the company’ was left out of the UK Companies Act 2006, 
for example, and has been described by Lowry as ‘obtuse’.125 In the phrase, ‘best interest of 
the company’, the word ‘company’ is often equated with current and future members of the 
company. For instance, Megarry J stated in Gaiman v National Association for Mental Health 
that he ‘would accept the interests of both present and future members of the company as a 
whole, as being a helpful expression of a human equivalent’.126 However, relatively recent 
modifications to the law in the UK have defined ‘best interest’ as expressly requiring the 
consideration of the interest of other stakeholders such as employees and the public at large.127 
The growing status of corporate social responsibility may further impact what constitutes the 
best interest of the company. The remits and effect of corporate social responsibility are 
disputed. Avi-Yonah, for instance, traced the history of corporate social responsibility and 
showed that the meaning of this term has shifted in a cyclical fashion over the years. Through 
these periods, he argued, the dominant conception of corporate social responsibility is the ‘real 
entity view’, as distinct from the aggregate and artificial entity view. The essence of this real 
entity view is that businesses have a social responsibility to increase their profits.128 With 
                                                          
123 See mainly sections 279, 280 and 282 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 2004 (CAMA). These duties are comparable to those applicable to directors in the UK in sections 170 to 
177 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006).  
124 Different jurisdictions have different formulations of this primary duty of loyalty of directors to the 
companies they represent. This is evident from a basic comparison of section 279 (3) of the CAMA with section 
172 of the CA 2006.  
125 See John Lowry, ‘The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap Through 
Efficient Disclosure’ (2009) 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal 615.  
126 Gaiman v National Association for Mental Health [1971] Ch 317, 330.  
127 CA 2006, s 172. For a general discussion of this, see Andrew Keay, ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate 
Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s “Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach”’ (2007) 29 
Sydney L Rev 577. 
128 Reuven S Avi Yonah, ‘The Cyclical Transformations of Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2005) 30(3) Del J Corp L 767. 
51 
 
regard to taxation,129 for example, the need to be seen as contributing a ‘fair share’ to the 
general revenue pot is increasingly important to companies within certain jurisdictions. Failure 
in this regard may lead to backlashes from the public which may in turn hurt the revenues of 
the companies concerned.130 
Businesses may be categorised based on their size or their identity. Their size may be 
dependent on the level of turnover, profits, size of their field of exploration, number of 
employees or asset base. Owing to the fact that this thesis focuses on Communication, the 
classification of businesses will be based on factors that affect their capacity to interact. The 
number of employees is a good indicator of the capacity of a business to interact with the tax 
system. This is because it roughly reflects the ability of the business to exploit expertise within 
its ranks for the purpose of such interaction. However, some businesses, such as those engaged 
in oil and gas exploration, may have large turnovers despite their limited number of employees. 
While the limited staff may adversely affect their direct communications with the terminals of 
the tax system, their large turnover provides them with the capacity to engage external 
consultants to act on their behalf. This justifies their classification as large businesses for the 
purpose of this thesis. This thesis therefore recognises two broad classes of businesses based 
on number of employees and turnover. They are small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
and large businesses. Adopting the formula for classification employed by the EU, an SME in 
this thesis is any business whose direct employees number less than 250. A large business on 
the other hand is one with employees numbering 250 or more. 
In this thesis, businesses will also be categorised as multinational or local. Multinational 
businesses are usually large businesses. It is important to make this classification because 
multinational and local companies may be subject to different legal, economic, political and 
social conditions. For instance, in addition to the local laws in their sites of operation, 
multinational companies resident in the UK and the US are subject to the Bribery Act 2010 and 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 respectively. Such domestic laws with extra-territorial 
effect governing corrupt practices have grown in popularity across Europe since the OECD 
                                                          
129 For a discussion of the relationship between corporate social responsibility and the actions of companies, see 
Doreen McBarnet, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond the Law, Through the Law, for Law: The New 
Corporate Accountability’ in Doreen McBarnet and others (eds), The New Corporate Accountability 
(Cambridge University Press 2007).  
130 Examples of such backlashes include the blockade of Vodafone stores in the UK. See Kevin Rawlinson, ‘UK 
Uncut Protesters Blockade Vodafone Stores Across Country’ The Guardian (London, 15 June 2014). For a 
discussion of the likely impact of public pressure on corporate tax behaviour, see, Scott Dyreng and others, 
‘Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behaviour’ (Fisher College of Business Working Paper No 2014-02-003) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474346> accessed 1 September 2015. 
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Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions came into effect in 1997.  
 
2.6.2 Associations and Professionals 
Businesses may interact with the tax system through the aid of associations that represent their 
interests. These associations may represent businesses in general or specific forms of 
businesses along the lines of their differing interests. In many cases, associations are better able 
to interact with the tax system owing to their ability to utilise a better level of expertise within 
their ranks. There is an ongoing debate about the impact of vibrant business associations on the 
socio-economic situation of a state. On the one hand, some (usually pluralists) argue that strong 
business associations aid the advancement of the economy by encouraging macroeconomic 
stabilisation and reform, lowering costs of information, setting standards and also fighting 
corruption, to name a few.131 Others argue based on public choice theory that the focus of such 
associations on rent-seeking as well as their collective action problems may be harmful for the 
society.132   
These associations may specialise in different forms of negotiations on behalf of 
businesses. Associations are mostly involved in the communications that take place for the 
purpose of rule-setting. Influential associations are able to ensure that the interests of the 
businesses they represent are catered for during the process of rule-setting, thereby aiding 
future compliance with the resulting rules. It is arguable that in societies where corruption is 
prevalent, business associations are less likely to thrive. This is because corruption may create 
informal channels through which businesses may influence the tax system, thereby reducing 
the need for participation in business organisations.133 Also, participation in such associations 
makes businesses more visible and, consequently, easier to extort.134 However, research by 
Duvanova135 rightly shows that, contrary to the above hypothesis, business associations do 
                                                          
131 See, for example, Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, Business and the State in Developing Countries 
(Cornell University Press 1997) 5. 
132 See John Toye, ‘Interest Group Politics and the Implementation of Adjustment Policies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (1992) 4(2) Journal of International Development 183; Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations 
(Yale University Press 1982). See also Deborah Bräutigam, Lise Rakner and Scott Taylor, ‘Business 
Associations and Growth Coalitions in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2002) 40 The Journal of Modern African Studies 
519; Arthur A Goldsmith, ‘Business Associations and Better Governance in Africa’ (2002) 22 Public Admin 
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Some Associations Contribute More than Others’ (2000) 2(3) Business and Politics 261 (for a useful view on 
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133 See Dinissa Duvanova, ‘Bureaucratic Corruption and Collective Action: Business Associations in the Post-
Communist Transition’ (2007) 39(4) Comparative Politics 441, 443. 
134 ibid.  
135 ibid.  
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thrive in corrupt environments as a means through which businesses collectively repel 
oppressive corrupt practices of bureaucrats or to fill the gap left by the absence of state 
institutions.  
Businesses or the associations that represent them may enlist consultants and other 
professionals in their bid to communicate with the tax system. This is owing to the specialist 
knowledge usually possessed by these professionals. The type of professional enlisted will 
invariably depend on the nature of the communication intended. Political analysts and lobbyists 
may be engaged to represent the interests of businesses to the tax law or policy terminal in the 
process of rule-setting. Accountants and other technical tax experts may be engaged in the 
communication with the tax administration terminal. Finally, lawyers and other experts in 
dispute resolution may be engaged in the interaction with the dispute resolution terminal.  
As experts in their fields, these professionals are more likely to have deeper knowledge 
of the processes within the terminals as well as the means for gaining access to these terminals. 
The duty of these professionals is to represent the interests for which they have been engaged. 
However, the extent to which they are able to represent these interests may be limited by extant 
laws and policies that govern the terminals alongside certain internal rules and codes of conduct 
peculiar to their respective professions. 
Professionals may either be internal or external to the business or association that 
engages them. Internal experts seem more likely to adopt the interests of the businesses or 
associations they represent than external experts. This is owing to the relative absence of 
independence in the former.  
Tax policy-makers, tax law-makers, tax administrators and arbiters also employ 
consultants and other professionals internally and externally to aid their interaction with 
businesses. These professionals increase their awareness of businesses, business activities, and 
other technical issues concerning interaction. 
Professionals also aid the spread of normative views136 on how interaction between 
businesses and the terminals of the tax system should be carried out (possibly including a role 
in preventing businesses from engaging in wrongdoing),137 as well as what the product of these 
interactions should be in an ideal situation. This heightens their importance as actors in the 
two-way relationship between business and the tax system. 
  
                                                          
136 Di Maggio and Powell (n 14) (on the role of professionals in the diffusion of norms). 
137 See for instance, Michael Davis, ‘The Special Role of Professionals in Business Ethics’ (1988) 7(2) Business 
and Professional Ethics Journal 51. 
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2.6.3 Tax Policy-Makers 
Tax policy-makers are in charge of tax policy-making. By setting tax policy, they in effect set 
the tone for future interactions between businesses and the terminals of the tax system. As 
primary rule-setters, they should possess the requisite expertise to formulate rules that are not 
ambiguous and achieve their intended goal in a manner that avoids ‘unintended consequences’. 
One example of such unintended consequences in the UK is the considerable increase in tax 
motivated incorporations brought about by the nil rate band of corporation tax.138 They should 
be aware of the interests involved as well as the means to balance them. They should also be 
aware of how past policies have fared so as to enable them to identify the positives and 
negatives of previous policy and suggest properly considered new policy.  
In many jurisdictions, tax policy-makers can be classed into two main categories: the 
civil/public servants and the ministers/representatives of government. These categories are 
considered below. 
 
2.6.4 Civil/Public Servants  
Setting tax policy is an integral part of managing the finances of the state. Thus, tax policy-
makers should be fully abreast of the state’s finances. In many jurisdictions, the task of 
determining the fine details of tax policy officially falls on civil/public servants in the 
employment of the government department in charge of finance. In Nigeria, this department is 
the Ministry of Finance. Although the Ministry of Finance has the legal duty to formulate tax 
policy, the formulation of tax policy in Nigeria has been undertaken by the Tax Policy 
Department of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) (formerly the Tax Policy Research 
and Development Department – 2004-2007). Within the Ministry of Finance, there is a Tax 
Policy Unit through which tax policy formulated by the Tax Policy Department of the FIRS is 
channelled to the Federal Executive Council for deliberation and approval.139 In the UK, this 
department is Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT).  
One flaw in centring tax policy-making in the department of finance is that this same 
department is not also in charge of the day-to-day administration of tax policies. Hence, the 
individuals within it are less likely to be aware of the practicalities of tax policy administration. 
They are also less able to draw from field experiences when formulating tax policy.140 
                                                          
138 See Vincent Oratore, ‘The Making of Tax Law’ (CIOT, 2010) 6. 
139 See Ifueko Okauru, Federal Inland Revenue Service and Taxation Reforms in Democratic Nigeria (Safari 
Books 2012) 94, 95. 
140 Tracey Bowler, ‘Tax Policymaking in the UK’ (Tax Law Rewrite Committee Discussion Paper No 8, 2010) 
<http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/dp8.pdf> accessed 5 July 2015. 
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However, this flaw can be remedied by ensuring that the channel of communication 
between the civil servants in charge of tax policy-making and those in charge of tax 
administration is effectively used. Through this channel, tax policy-makers can be made aware 
of the issues faced in practice that are relevant to the process of tax policy-making. This is the 
justification for the considerable involvement of tax officials (Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) and the FIRS) in the formulation of tax policy in the UK and Nigeria. In 
addition, the separation of tax policy from tax administration is beneficial as it ensures the 
autonomy of the tax administration, which protects it from the bureaucracy and other limiting 
aspects of civil service.141 
Civil servants are governed by codes of conduct that stipulate what is acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour. For instance, in Nigeria, the obligation of federal and state civil 
servants to abide by the Code of Conduct is enshrined in sections 172 and 209 of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) respectively. The Code of Conduct for 
these officers is stipulated in Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. Relevant 
provisions include:  
Section 1- ‘a public officer shall not put himself in a position where his personal interest conflicts with 
his duties and responsibilities.’ 
…  
Section 6(1)- ‘a public officer shall not ask for or accept property or benefits of any kind for himself or 
any other person on account of anything done or omitted to be done by him in the discharge of his duties.’   
Civil servants are not subject to election by the populace and are therefore not directly 
accountable to them. They are, however, indirectly accountable to the populace through their 
accountability to the minister in charge. Their prime interest as part of the machinery of 
government is to ensure the smooth administration of the state, and in particular the finances 
of the state, in line with the objectives or goals set by the minister in charge. 
  
2.6.5 Ministers/Representatives of Government  
While the civil servants are tasked with providing the details of tax policy, the minister or 
relevant representative of the government provides the objectives to be achieved and decides 
                                                          
141 See Robert Taliercio, ‘Administrative Reform as a Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on 
Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America’ (2004) 32(2) World Development 213; Odd-Helge Fjeldstad 
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on policy alternatives. In setting objectives and deciding on policy options, the minister 
represents the government and the state in general. In the UK, for instance, such ministers are 
responsible individually for the actions of the department under their supervision.142 This 
renders them accountable for the failures of the government department under their control. 
There is, however, no legal requirement that the minister in charge of the tax system is an 
expert in taxation or finance in general.  
In the UK, the minister in charge of finance is the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He or 
she is customarily a member of the House of Commons elected to the post to represent a 
constituency. He is an appointee of the Prime Minister and is expected to act in accordance 
with the policy adopted by the cabinet as a whole, owing to ‘the doctrine of collective 
responsibility’.143  
In Nigeria, the Minister of Finance is appointed by the President after confirmation by 
the Senate144 and need not hold any political position acquired via election. Taking the oath of 
office as a minister is in effect resignation of his membership of the National Assembly or the 
State House of Assembly.145 His or her prime allegiance is to the President, and his or her 
accountability to the populace is indirect as it is derived from the accountability of the President 
to the people. The Minister of Finance is more or less an appendage of the President and can 
be dismissed at his whim. In setting tax policy, this minister is acting under the authority and 
in the stead of the President.  
The Minister of Finance indirectly possesses considerable power over the federal tax 
authority, the FIRS. This is owing to the fact that the board of the FIRS is obliged to comply 
with any directive or order given by the minister regarding the board’s functions.146 These 
functions include providing general policy guidelines relating to the functions of the FIRS; 
reviewing and approving strategic plans for the FIRS; employing and determining the terms 
and conditions of service including disciplinary measures of the employees of the FIRS, and 
stipulating the remuneration and other work benefits of staff of the FIRS.147 
 
  
                                                          
142 Viscount Cranborne, ‘Parliamentary Resolution on Ministerial Accountability’ (Lords Hansard, Ministerial 
Accountability Col 1057, 20 March 1997) para 1; Matthew Flinders, ‘The Enduring Centrality of Individual 
Ministerial Responsibility within the British Constitution’ (2000) 6 The Journal of Legislative Studies 73. 
143 See Geoffrey Marshall, Ministerial Responsibility (Oxford University Press 1989). 
144 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN), s 147(1). 
145 See ibid s 147(4).   
146 Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act, s 51. 
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2.6.6 Tax Law-Makers 
Tax law-makers include the members of the legislative arm of government in charge of tax 
law-making. Their duty is to scrutinise tax policies before enacting them as law. In limited 
circumstances, they may introduce tax laws independent of the tax policy-maker. It is 
imperative that tax law-makers possess the time and expertise required for effective scrutiny 
of policies put before them for enactment. As rule-setters, they are also required to be aware of 
the interests of the stakeholders and how best to balance them. Tax law-makers will benefit 
from an effective channel of communication with the tax administration. This will increase 
their general awareness of the various issues surrounding the implementation of the laws which 
they have enacted in the past or will enact in the future.  
The decision-making power of tax law-makers does not lie on one individual but on a 
team of individuals made up of a given percentage of either the entire house or a committee of 
the house. Beyond scrutinising policies and enacting laws, tax law-makers also engage in the 
scrutiny of the activities of other actors in the tax system such as tax administrators. In Nigeria, 
for example, section 88(1) of the CFRN empowers the National Assembly to direct or cause to 
be directed investigation into the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or 
government department charged or intended to be charged with the duty or responsibility for 
executing or administering laws enacted by the National Assembly. Section 88(2) of the CFRN 
stipulates the purposes for which this power can be exercised, which includes to expose 
corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws.  
In the UK, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy which characterises its 
constitutional framework ensures that the UK Parliament can make or unmake any tax law148 
subject to certain restrictions. The original concept means that the laws created by Parliament 
cannot be illegal, as explained by Ungoed-Thomas J in Cheney v Conn [Inspector of Taxes]149 
thus:   
If the purpose for which a statute may be used is an invalid purpose, then such remedy as there may be 
must be directed to dealing with that purpose and not to invalidating the statute itself. What the statute 
itself enacts cannot be unlawful, because what the statute says and provides is itself the law, and highest 
form of law that is known to this country. It is the law which prevails over every other form of law, and 
it is not for the court to say that a parliament’s enactment, the highest law in this country, is illegal. 
  
                                                          
148 See Albert Venn Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan 1996) 38. 
149 Cheney v Conn [Inspector of Taxes] [1968] 1 WLR 242, 244-5. 
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Various restrictions to the original concept of parliamentary sovereignty can be traced 
to the devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, provisions of 
the Human Rights Act 1998, and the UK’s membership of the EU.150  
Although the UK practices a bicameral legislative system, only the House of Commons 
has responsibility for considering finance bills151 including tax laws. Members of the House of 
Commons are elected through a first-past-the-post system to represent the interests of their 
constituents as well as the general populace. Consequently, the governing party often possesses 
a clear majority in the House of Commons.152 This, coupled with a strong party system, ensures 
that important bills such as tax bills introduced by the governing party will most likely be made 
law with little or no amendments. The lack of scrutiny by tax law-makers is a main criticism 
of the tax law-making process in the UK.153  
Unlike the UK, Nigeria has a written constitution which considerably limits the powers 
of the legislature. Since gaining independence from the UK in 1960, and becoming a republic 
in 1963, Nigeria has had three functional constitutions – 1963, 1979 and 1999. For a major part 
of Nigeria’s independent existence, the country has been ruled by military dictators. During 
the military regimes (1966-79 and 1983-1998), the country’s constitution was suspended and 
the legislature abolished. There was also a fusion of the legislature and the executive (mainly 
under a Supreme Military Council). The military ruled using decrees and edicts.154  
As a federation, legislative powers are shared between the central government and the 
government of the constituting units or states. The CFRN distributes legislative powers 
between the federal and state legislatures through its creation of an Exclusive Legislative List 
set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the CFRN, and a concurrent legislative list set out 
in the first column of Part 11 of the Second Schedule to the CFRN. The CFRN confers 
exclusive powers on the federal legislature to legislate on matters contained in the Exclusive 
Legislative List (see section 4(2) of the CFRN). Both the federal and the state legislature have 
powers to legislate on matters contained in the Concurrent Legislative List (section 4(4)(a) and 
section 7(b) of the CFRN). However, where the federal legislature has adequately legislated on 
a matter on the Concurrent Legislative List, the state legislature is precluded from doing so 
based on the doctrine of covering-the-field. The state legislature may also legislate on matters 
                                                          
150 See Mark Elliot, ‘United Kingdom: Parliamentary Sovereignty Under Pressure’ (2004) 2 International J 
Const L 545. 
151 This includes money bills as defined in Section 1(2) of the Parliamentary Act 1911. 
152 See Philip Norton, ‘The Case for First-Past-The-Post’ (1997) 34(2) Representation 84. 
153 See, for instance, Geoffrey Howe, ‘Reform of Taxation of Machinery’ [1977] British Tax Review 97.  
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not contained in the Exclusive or Concurrent List (a notional residual list – section 4(7)(a) of 
the CFRN).155  
However, the power to legislate on taxation of incomes, profits and capital gains falls 
solely within the powers of the federal legislature or National Assembly. This matter is 
contained in the Exclusive Legislative List.156 In Nigeria, both houses of the bicameral federal 
legislature have equal responsibility with regard to enacting tax laws. The members of the 
houses are also elected to represent their constituency as well as the interests of the general 
populace. Election into the federal legislature is through a first-past-the-post system which 
often creates a clear majority in the National Assembly.157 
 
2.6.7 Tax Administrators/Officials  
Tax administrators are in charge of enforcing tax laws and policies. In the UK, for example, 
the body in charge of tax administration is HMRC. In 2005, HMRC was created by the 
Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (CRCA) as a non-ministerial body to 
exercise functions previously carried out by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue and the 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise. Its responsibilities include the collection and 
management of revenue and the payment and management of tax credits.158  
Unlike the UK’s unitary system, where tax administration is centred in HMRC, the 
federal nature of the Nigerian tax system means that the responsibility for the administration 
of taxes is shared between the FIRS, representing the federal government, and the Inland 
Revenue Service of the respective state governments. In 1993, the FIRS was created by the 
Finance (Miscellaneous Taxation Provisions) Act No 3 of 1993 as an operational arm of the 
Federal Board of Inland Revenue (itself established under the Income Tax Ordinance of 1958). 
However, its history can be traced to the Nigerian Inland Revenue Department 1943, a scion 
of the Inland Revenue Department of Anglophone West Africa.159  
While the FIRS handles the taxation of the profits of companies, including those 
engaged in the oil and gas industry, the state Inland Revenue Service administers the tax 
policies and laws applicable to unincorporated businesses. This amplifies the importance of the 
structure of the business for tax purposes as companies are likely to have more interaction with 
                                                          
155 See Lakanmi v Attorney-General Western Region (1970) 6 NSCC 143; Attorney General Ogun State v 
Attorney General Federation (1982) 13 NSCC 1, 35.  
156 See Item 59 of Pt 1 of the Second sch, CFRN.  
157 Electoral Act 2010, s 69. 
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the FIRS than partnerships or sole proprietorships. However, there is still a lack of clarity as to 
which body has the power to charge and collect consumption taxes, including VAT. The federal 
government asserts that the FIRS has the exclusive responsibility to collect consumption taxes 
including VAT. This argument is based on the interpretation of the Value Added Tax Act 
(section 40) which places this responsibility on the FIRS, and in the opinion of the federal 
government, covers the field. The Supreme Court in Aberuagba v AG Ogun State160 upheld 
this argument while declaring that sales tax by a state government was invalid. The Federal 
High Court in Mama Cass Restaurant Limited & 2 Ors v Federal Board of Inland Revenue and 
Attorney General of Lagos161 also held that VAT should be remitted to the FIRS. 
Tax administrators communicate with businesses in order to ensure the latter’s 
compliance with tax laws and policies. They also share their experience of the practical issues 
affecting the implementation of tax policy and law with tax policy- and law-makers. As a result, 
tax administrators must not only be experts in tax law and policy but must also be well aware 
of the factual circumstances arising from the activities of businesses relevant to the application 
of these laws and policies.  
The main legal interest of tax administrators as shaped by their duty is to ensure that 
tax laws and policies are complied with. This does not equate at all times to ensuring that the 
maximum amount of tax is collected. The laws empowering tax administrators often confer on 
them broad discretion regarding the way and manner they enforce tax policies and laws (by 
collecting taxes). In line with these powers, the tax administration in different jurisdictions 
often issue guidance and statement of practice especially in areas where the law is ambiguous 
or difficult to apply. However, these communicative actions must not flout the express 
provisions of the law if they are to retain their legal validity.162 In Global International Drilling 
Corporation v FIRS,163 the Tax Appeal Tribunal (TAT) in Nigeria held that a circular 
purportedly explaining a provision of the law cannot override the clear meaning of the law. 
This affirms the point that such communications would only be valid if they were in accordance 
with the law. 
As Lord Hoffmann explained regarding the UK situation in R (on the application of 
Wilkinson) v Inland Revenue Commissioners:164  
                                                          
160 Aberuagba v AG Ogun State (1985) 3 NWLR 260.  
161 Mama Cass Restaurant Limited & 2 Ors v Federal Board of Inland Revenue and Attorney General of Lagos 
(2010) 2 TLRN 1.  
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This discretion [conferred on the HMRC by section 5 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs 
Act 2005] enables the Commissioners to formulate policy in the interstices of the tax legislation, dealing 
pragmatically with minor or transitory anomalies, cases of hardship at the margins or cases in which a 
statutory rule is difficult to formulate or its enactment would take up a disproportionate amount of 
parliamentary time … It does not justify construing the power so widely as to enable the commissioners 
to concede, by extra-statutory concession, an allowance which Parliament could have granted but did not 
grant.   
 
Many tax authorities have a dedicated sub-department for dealing with large businesses 
in consideration of the huge turnover and the different risk profile of these businesses. In 
Nigeria, for instance, the Large Tax Office was established in 2004 to administer the tax matters 
of large taxpayers in accordance with this global trend. Large taxpayers constitute 10-15% of 
business taxpayers yet contribute 85-90% of the total tax revenue generated.165   
Businesses communicate more with tax administrators than any other actor representing 
the tax system. This is partly due to the fact that businesses are under a legal duty to interact 
with tax administrators. No similar duty exists with regard to the other actors representing the 
tax system.  
 
2.6.8 Arbiters 
Arbiters adjudicate on disputes between businesses and the actors within the tax system. These 
disputes may be legal or factual. A legal dispute is a disagreement concerning the status of a 
law or policy. A factual dispute, on the other hand, is a disagreement over the facts or events 
to which laws or policies will be applied. It is implicit in the nature of their role that they must 
be independent of the disputing parties and subject matter, as well as possessing clear tools and 
processes for determining the applicable law and facts.  
There are three main arbiters in the tax system of many jurisdictions. They are tax 
administrators, tribunals and courts. 
 
2.6.8.1 Tax Administrators  
Most tax disputes arise between tax administrators and businesses during the process of 
compliance. Tax administrators of various jurisdictions have internal procedures for dealing 
with these disputes. These internal processes chaired by a special group of individuals within 
the tax administration are usually the first port of call when a dispute arises. Also, a majority 
of disputes are resolved through these internal means. A guiding factor in the communications 
engaged at this stage is the need to avoid the considerable cost and time which would be 
expended if the dispute escalated beyond this stage. Therefore, both businesses and tax 
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administrators are more likely to ensure that disputes are settled at this stage. Nevertheless, 
since the Communication should be for the purpose of compliance, the negotiation of rights 
should not feature at this stage. However, the temptation to negotiate is considerable owing to 
the likely unity of interest of the parties to avoid the escalation of the dispute.  
Compared to the other actors dealing with tax disputes within the tax system, tax 
administrators are the least independent. This may cause some businesses to be dissatisfied 
with the end result of the process when the decision is not in their favour. Tax administrators 
are unlikely to proceed with the dispute where their internal process of adjudication produces 
a result that is not in their favour.  
 
2.6.8.2 Tribunals  
Where the internal dispute resolution process fails to appease both parties, the dispute is often 
referred to an administrative tribunal. The tribunals are more structurally independent from the 
tax administration than the internal process of adjudication. Concern about time and cost plays 
a major role in shaping the procedures of tax tribunals. The inclusion of tribunals in the process 
of adjudication also caters for concerns about limited access to court. Hence, the processes at 
tribunals are usually less formal and complex than courts. As a result of the simplification of 
these processes, a taxpayer is less likely to need expert representation by a legal practitioner to 
access tribunals. Order 5, Rule 1(a) of the Tax Appeal Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2010 
(Nigeria) provides that: ‘An appellant may appear for himself in proceedings before the 
Tribunal.’ Tribunals also enable adjudication by experts in tax law and accounting as well as 
other relevant professions. This distinguishes it from the courts which are mainly chaired by 
legal professionals who may or may not be experts in taxation.  
In Nigeria, the TAT was created in 2007 to replace the Body of Appeal Commissioners 
which formerly heard appeals from the internal dispute resolution process within the tax 
administration. The tribunal currently has six zones across the country. The TAT has better 
structural independence than the Body of Appeal Commissioners. One major challenge faced 
by the TAT is the uncertainty surrounding its jurisdiction to entertain tax disputes. This 
uncertainty is due to conflicting decisions by the Federal High Court in Nigeria on this issue. 
In both cases, the court was called upon to determine whether the jurisdiction of the TAT 
conferred by the Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment (Act) 2007 (FIRSEA) 
conflicts with that of the Federal High Court as conferred by the Nigerian Constitution. In the 
event of such a conflict, the jurisdiction of the TAT would be null and void. In Nigerian 
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National Petroleum Corporation v Tax Appeal Tribunal & Ors,166 the Federal High Court held 
that the TAT is an administrative tribunal and its jurisdiction does not conflict with that of the 
Federal High Court. In TSKJ II Construces Internacionals Sociadade LDA v FIRS,167 the 
Federal High Court held that the TAT is a court and that its jurisdiction conflicts with that of 
the Federal High Court. 
On the one hand, opponents of the TAT argue that section 251(1) (a) and (b) of the 
Nigerian Constitution confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court over tax disputes to the 
exclusion of any other court. Since the TAT is deemed to be a court by the FIRSEA,168 it is 
arguable that it is excluded from entertaining tax disputes by the Constitution. Also, the 
jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court by the Constitution under section 251 is 
original and not appellate. Hence, the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court will be usurped 
even where appeals from the TAT go to it.   
On the other hand, proponents of the TAT argue that unlike other equivalent provisions 
in the Constitution,169 section 251 only excludes courts and not tribunals such as the TAT. The 
fact that the TAT is deemed to be a court by the FIRSEA suggests that, in substance, the TAT 
is not a court. Most importantly, the Supreme Court of Nigeria has impliedly confirmed the 
status of a predecessor to the TAT as a mere administrative tribunal.170 Thus, the jurisdiction 
of the TAT does not conflict with that of the Federal High Court under the Constitution. The 
uncertainty over the jurisdiction may adversely affect the willingness of both tax officials and 
taxpayers to have recourse to the TAT in the event of a dispute. 
 
2.6.8.3 Courts  
The courts are a more formal avenue for tax dispute resolution and operate within the judicial 
arm of government. Where a party is not satisfied with the decision of the Tribunals, they may 
refer the dispute to a court. Nigeria practises a common law system based on the doctrine of 
stare decisis.171 This doctrine, literally meaning ‘the decision should stand’, dictates that lower 
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courts are bound to apply the reason behind previous decisions of higher courts in factual 
circumstances that are not distinguishable.  
Section 251 of the CFRN bestows exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to 
hear disputes concerning the revenue of the federal government as well as the taxation of 
companies. Appeals from the TAT lie to the Federal High Court. This is distinct from the 
procedure in the UK.  
In the UK, a two-tier tribunal system was introduced in 2009 made up of a First Tier 
Tribunal and an Upper Tier Tribunal. An appeal from the First Tier Tribunal lies to the Upper 
Tribunal on points of law alone. An appeal from the decision of the Upper Tier Tribunal also 
lies to the Court of Appeal on points of law alone. Hence, the fact finding duty lies 
predominantly with the First Tier Tribunal. The restriction of the Upper Tier Tribunal and 
courts to points of law implies that they may only overturn the decision of the First Tier 
Tribunal where the said decision contains a fundamental error of law or where the decision is 
so factually incorrect that no reasonable tribunal would have come to that decision based on 
the applicable law.172  
In Nigeria, if the law that created the tribunals had provided that appeals from the 
tribunals skipped the Federal High Court to the Court of Appeal, the said law would conflict 
with section 251 of the CFRN and would therefore be null and void to the extent of this 
inconsistency. This is because the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as stipulated in the 
Constitution would be usurped.173  
The FIRSEA stipulates that an appeal from the TAT to the Federal High Court will lie 
on point of law alone.174 However, it has been the practice of the Federal High Court to treat 
‘appeals’ from the tribunals as matters of first instance by entertaining both factual and legal 
disputes despite the appellation of the suit.  
Strictly speaking, the duty of the courts is not to create new law or instigate fresh 
communicative actions but to interpret and apply extant laws to the circumstances before 
them.175 This is particularly the case with tax laws as these involve a crucial balancing of 
interests that affect the wellbeing of the state. Tax law-making should be undertaken solely by 
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actors with the mandate to represent the state as there should be ‘no tax without representation’. 
Hence, the CFRN bestows exclusive powers to enact tax laws on the National Assembly. 
Access to courts is commonly more difficult for taxpayers than the tribunals or the 
internal dispute resolution process primarily due to the considerable costs and delay involved 
amongst other factors. Hence, the courts are usually used as a last resort by taxpayers for 
disputes that have not been dealt with to the satisfaction of the parties by other arbiters.  
Through its communicative actions, the court may give instructions to the actors on 
how best to comply with extant laws or policies, thereby furthering compliance, or review 
actions already undertaken by actors in order to determine their compliance or non-compliance 
with the extant laws or policies, that is, communicate for the purpose of scrutiny. For instance, 
in the US, the Supreme Court in Pollack v Farmers Loan & Trust Co176 struck down a law 
imposing tax on property income on the ground that such direct taxes had to be levied in 
proportion to the population of each state. This led to the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 that 
expunged the requirement that income tax should be proportionate to population.177 
 
2.6.9 Other Actors  
The above list of main actors that may operate at the terminals of the tax system is not 
exhaustive. At least three other important actors (media, civil society and international 
organisations) have not been discussed. Not only do these three actors contribute to the 
interactions between business and the tax system but they also influence the extent to which 
corruption may sustain itself in this relationship. 
The media is a tool through which businesses and the terminals of the tax system 
communicate. Businesses may express their views about the tax system and their possible 
reactions to changes made through the media. Similarly, tax laws, policies and decisions are 
often communicated to businesses through the media.  
With or without prompting by others actors in the two-way relationship, the media may 
engage in analytical or investigative journalism targeted at explaining or exposing aspects of 
the two-way relationship. Thus, the activities of the media aid awareness where the information 
disseminated is true or otherwise constitutes a major source of distortions. The media may also 
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protest against or condemn certain actions by actors in acting as a quasi-representative of the 
conscience of the people or a section of the people. 
However, the actors more likely to be regarded as true representatives of the people’s 
conscience are civil society organisations. The voices of these organisations have seemingly 
grown louder in recent times against the backdrop of the painful government decisions 
occasioned by austerity, widening inequality, and the tax avoidance activities of multinational 
and large companies. These organisations have lobbied rule-setters, run campaigns about 
aspects of the two-way relationship, and challenged actions of tax officials in court – often 
acting as meddlesome interlopers. In contrast with the media, the seeming benevolence of civil 
society organisations may conceal or discourage a critical examination of the interests they 
serve. However, Khan178 has called for the scrutiny of these interests so as to avoid the potential 
distortions of historical reality by the fixed distribution of benevolence and impropriety 
between the civil society, the state and multinational companies.  
International organisations such as the UN, OECD and IMF have heavily influenced 
domestic and international rule-setting regarding both taxation and corruption. This justifies 
their summary inclusion as main actors in the two-way relationship. 
  
2.7 Applying Actor Network Theory   
The previous section provides a superficial analysis of the communication link and uncovers 
as a result three major components of this link. These components are: businesses, the terminals 
of the tax system and Communications. This is akin to describing an airline transportation link 
as composed of passengers, airports and planes which would suffice in many instances.  
However, a deeper analysis of the communication link is required since the goal is to 
properly understand how corruption might sustain itself in the two-way relationship between 
business and the tax system. This section applies ANT in order to achieve the required level of 
analysis. As a result, it unearths the operations of certain less prominent networks of human 
and non-human actors behind the conspicuous components of the communication link.  
 
 
 
                                                          
178 See Mushtaq Khan, ‘The Role of Civil Society and Patron-Client Networks in the Analysis of Corruption’ in 
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2.7.1 Actor Network Theory 
ANT, also known as ‘the sociology of translation’,179 explores ‘the processes by which 
organisations and other phenomena are created and sustained’.180 Its principal argument is that 
every phenomenon is a product of the ‘heterogeneous engineering’ of a collection of human 
and non-human actors.181 Thus, ANT is sometimes referred to as the ‘semiotics of 
materiality’182 because it applies the concept that things are produced in associations.183  
These associations or networks are established by actors who ‘co-opt’ or ‘enrol’184 other 
actors into them. However, these other actors possess their own endogenously generated 
interests which may differ from the overarching interest of the network. The existence of these 
private (and potentially converging or conflicting) interests may create some form of resistance 
which may continually threaten to destabilise or disintegrate the entire network.185  
Networks are therefore transient and their durability dependent on the stable 
participation of actors despite their private interests. The durability of a network also depends 
on its constituting materials. However, durability is an effect (an actor) and is therefore an 
unstable product of a heterogeneous network rather than a permanent state of being.186 
ANT’s definition of the term actor distinguishes it from other sociological theories 
which limit the term to individuals, organisations or a collection of one or both. It argues that 
anything (human beings, artefacts, texts, money, culture and so on) can be actors as long as 
they are capable of action. One possible criticism of ANT is its failure to clearly define the 
term actor. This term has been defined as anything that does things.187 It has also been defined 
as a thing that possesses character.188 What is clear is that the scope of what can be an actor is 
extremely broad. 
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However, things do not become actors by their mere existence. Their status as actors is 
derived from their participation in a network. As described by Law, ‘actors are network 
effects’.189 This participation transforms them from mere actants to actors and imparts on them 
subjectivity and consciousness.190 The identity and strength of an actor also lies in the 
heterogeneity of its network.  
ANT argues that an actor, being a phenomenon, is itself a network comprising a 
heterogeneous assemblage of other actors.191 This creates the interesting enigma in which 
actors are networks and networks are actors. Consequently, new networks, being composed of 
actors, can only be built from existing networks.192  
In a new network, pre-existing actors represent the network from which they originate 
and are therefore intermediaries. An intermediary consists of anything that ‘passes between 
actors in the course of relatively stable transactions’193 and may be humans, artefacts, texts or 
money.194 Intermediaries are the principal tools though which an actor co-opts or enrols other 
actors into its network, achieves action at a distance and diminishes resistance.  
The ability of an actor to predict the interests of other actors which it intends to co-opt 
or enrol into its network is crucial. This will facilitate the fashioning of an intermediary (or 
intermediaries) capable of convincing these prospective actors that it is in their best interest to 
be part of the network.195 
An intermediary may be ‘ignored, altered, derailed, traduced, supplemented or 
appropriated’ by prospective actors in accordance with their interests.196 However, these 
distortions can be counteracted by surveillance, control and the ‘interpretive inflexibility’ of 
the intermediary in question.197  
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With increasing stability, the participating actors in a network become less visible. At 
a point, the network becomes ‘punctualised’ or ‘black-boxed’198 as a result of which observers 
will only notice a principal actor (as well as its inputs and outputs) rather than the 
heterogeneous assemblage that forms its substance. The stability of the resulting black-box is 
protected by the cost of re-opening it. 
ANT recommends that the process by which actors are co-opted or enrolled into a 
network and their private interests ordered to attain the facade of stability should be studied 
through descriptive (thick) empiricism.199 This process is termed ‘translation’.200 
 
2.7.2 Actor Network Theory and the Communication Link  
Rather than focussing on businesses, the terminals and Communications, ANT suggests that 
equal emphasis is placed on the internal and external personnel (such as tax accountants, tax 
officials, judges, legislators, tax lawyers, clerks, receptionists and lobbyists) as well as the non-
human actors (such as notices of assessment, notices of objection to assessment, files, 
pleadings, addresses, law reports, computers, offices, culture, corruption and ethnic bias) and 
the roles they play in enabling (or hindering) the interaction between business and the tax 
system.  
ANT reveals that businesses, the terminals and Actions are not just punctualised or 
black-boxed in the communication link but are also accorded a state of stability which should 
be questioned at the least. For instance, is it apt to classify the National Assembly (Parliament 
or legislature) as rule-setters in situations where they merely rubber stamp the policies put 
before them by the governing party? Are they factually more important than the governing 
party without whom the law would not exist in its current form, or even the mace or the official 
gazette – where these non-human actors are necessary for the law to take effect? Where 
businesses have the power to determine the policies, the laws, their tax liability and the 
outcomes of decisions of court, is it not apt to regard these businesses as de facto law-makers, 
policy-makers, tax administrators and arbiters? Is the tax authority not the de facto tax law-
maker, tax policy-maker, and arbiter (a sort of one-stop shop) in situations where the tax reality 
of businesses is wholly determined by the tax authority? ANT shows that these ‘principal 
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actors’ are, in fact, transient networks battling to maintain order amidst the potentially 
converging or conflicting interests of the actors in their Constitution. 
ANT reveals that the weight or reliability of an Action is not fixed. It is ephemeral and 
contingent upon the heterogeneity of its network. A law, for example, is only binding due to 
the network it represents. This law may lose its binding nature (that makes it superior to policy) 
with the loss of the support of the courts, the police force or other crucial actors in its network. 
Prior to its formulation, a prospective Action is vulnerable to the actors that pervade 
the site of its formation. It must therefore secure the participation of texts, discourses, persons, 
institutions, laws and various other actors in its network in order to safeguard its existence. The 
number of actors which must be so secured depends on the nature of the intended task. The 
more difficult the task, the more actors an Action will need to co-opt to ensure its success. On 
creation, the Action is dispatched as a black-box and its stability is protected by the costs of re-
opening it.  
However, this punctualised Action may be re-opened as it transfuses through the 
terminals in its communication route, thus exposing its weakness to the vagaries of the actors 
lurking in these terminals. For instance, tax officials and arbiters may scrutinise the text of a 
policy or law to determine its certainty, legality and enforceability. The extent and result of this 
scrutiny may be influenced by the presence (or absence) of certain actors which may not have 
been present when the policy or law was created. This scrutiny may lead to the loss of 
participating actors which are important to the success of the network which an Action 
represents. 
An Action may gain weight as it transfuses through these terminals by securing the 
allegiance of more actors, thereby enlarging its ranks. For instance, a law gains additional 
weight where its legality and scope has been confirmed by a decision of the dispute resolution 
terminal. This law is also an integral actor and intermediary in the decision made by this 
terminal.  
ANT also shows that Actions may be dispatched as intermediaries through which an 
actor may attempt to attain influence at a distance. This dispatch may be made possible by the 
presence (or absence) of certain actors in the network of the said Action. Securing 
compliance201 from businesses, for example, requires the heterogeneous engineering of an 
Action comprising other actors such as laws, institutions, procedures, money, infrastructure, 
culture, education, businesses and humans targeted at convincing these businesses that it is in 
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their best interest to partake in the network of compliance. An analogy can be drawn with the 
process by which scientists try to enrol journals into their network to ensure that their work is 
published.202 The proper understanding of the interests of these businesses will aid the use of 
the right intermediaries to achieve this task.203   
However, the recipient actors may ‘ignore, alter, derail, traduce, supplement or 
appropriate’204 an Action dispatched to effect influence at a distance in line with their own 
interests. Consequently, this intermediary may fail to achieve its goal. Influence is therefore a 
product of a transient and heterogeneous assemblage of actors which include the actors in the 
terminals of the tax system and businesses alongside the various intermediaries through which 
these actors are co-opted into the network. Influence is also an actor and an intermediary in the 
fleeting network that produces change.  
In sum, ANT unearths a complex web of interconnected actor-networks behind the 
communication link which must be studied empirically so as to understand their creation, 
expansion and durability. ANT also provides a platform through which one or more of these 
actors can be isolated and examined so as to determine their individual or collective roles in 
the network that forms the two-way relationship. 
 
2.8 Issues Affecting the Communication Link 
There are four issues which affect the efficacy of the communication link between businesses 
and the tax system and consequently the responsiveness of both institutions to each other. They 
are distortion of Communication, deficiency in awareness, restriction of access and inaction. 
These issues are discussed below. 
  
2.8.1 Distortion of Communications  
Distortion in this thesis means the alteration of a Communication as it travels through its 
communication route. This may involve the alteration of the action or utterance, the 
information contained in the action or utterance, or the understanding of this information. It 
may lead to imperfect communication which may affect the ability of an Action to have its 
desired or anticipated effect. The likelihood of distortion increases with every additional 
                                                          
202 See Callon and Law (n 195). 
203 See Valerie Braithwaite, ‘Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational Postures and Non-Complaint Actions’ 
in Valerie Braithwaite (ed), Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion (Ashgate 2003).  
204 Gherardi and Nicolini (n 196) 335. 
72 
 
terminal in the communication route as well as with the passage of time. A distortion may 
either be deliberate or non-deliberate.  
 
2.8.1.1 Deliberate Distortion 
A distortion will be deliberate where it results from the exercise of power by an actor with the 
express or implied intention to alter the Communication. Deliberate distortions are normally 
attributed to the terminals or businesses rather than the true perpetrators due to the 
punctualisation of the former. For instance, it is common for a deliberate distortion to be 
described as a decision of a court or an Act of Parliament. This has the effect of shielding the 
real actors and their private interests from scrutiny.  
The ability of an actor to distort a Communication deliberately primarily depends on 
the content and practicalities of the powers conferred on the said actor by its network. While 
legislators acting as a network, for example, usually have the inherent power (and authority) to 
modify bills presented to the tax law terminal in the process of transforming them into law, the 
authority (and to a lesser extent, the power) of tax officials or arbiters to alter the law which 
they are meant to interpret or apply is normally severely constrained.   
Generally speaking, tax officials do not have the authority to distort the law when 
applying it to a given situation. However, they may deliberately distort the law by exercising 
their power to do so. They may also deliver a new independent Action (such as granting extra-
statutory concessions or reducing their policing of the law) to businesses which may dampen 
the effect of the law. In this circumstance, the law remains undistorted and may be applied in 
this undistorted form to other businesses or to the same business on the withdrawal of the 
concession or a reversion in the policing of the law.205  
In theory, tax arbiters in common law jurisdictions can only deliberately alter a law to 
the extent that it is inconsistent with a superior law such as the Constitution. In such situations, 
these actors may extinguish this law by declaring it null and void.206 In reality, however, their 
networks often confer on them the power to distort the law deliberately even where they are 
not authorised to do so. However, this should be distinguished from situations where arbiters, 
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exercising a penchant for judicial activism, create new laws which affect the application of an 
extant law.207 These new laws constitute fresh Actions delivered to businesses through a direct 
communication route.  
Deliberate distortions may result from the manner in which an actor exercises its 
powers. A policy or law, for example, may confer on tax officials the power to decide who to 
audit or when to grant extra-statutory concessions. This policy or law may be distorted where 
this discretionary power is used as a tool for victimisation or to acquire economic rent, for 
example. Here, it is important to distinguish between an express grant of discretion and 
discretion arising from the ambiguity of the law. While distortions arising from the former are 
more likely to be deliberate, those arising from the latter are more likely to be non-deliberate. 
A General Anti-Avoidance Rule, for example, may confer discretionary powers of the former 
kind on tax arbiters. This Rule may be deliberately distorted by the manner in which it is applied 
by these actors.208 In contrast, an arbiter determining whether an act of a business constitutes 
tax avoidance by examining the meaning of the word ‘payment’ which may have been used 
ambiguously in the law will be exercising discretion of the latter kind which may lead to non-
deliberate distortion.209 
The power of an actor to alter a Communication may be constrained by other actors 
such as autonomy or corruption. Tax arbiters, for example, may be hesitant to declare a law 
null and void where they lack independence from the actors responsible for its creation.  
Businesses may also play a role in the deliberate distortion of Communications through 
the network of actors through which they interact with the tax system. Acting through 
professionals such as lawyers, accountants, economists and the press, businesses may supply 
information to the terminals of the tax system which have been doctored to enhance their 
private interests. Businesses may also lobby legislators (or any other actor) to secure the 
deliberate distortion of a bill (or any other Action) in a manner that suits them.  
Furthermore, businesses may engage in ‘creative compliance’.210 This involves the 
calculated act of taking advantage of the loopholes in the law. Here, businesses comply with 
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the letter of the law in a manner that defeats or contravenes ‘the evident intent’211 behind its 
enactment. ‘Creative compliance’ is commonly referred to as tax avoidance. This may lead to 
deliberate distortion of the law, especially where this act by businesses is accepted by the tax 
administration or dispute resolution terminal. 
Deliberate distortions are the result of an assemblage of human and non-human actors 
rather than the sole agency of humans. The legislators, tax arbiters, tax officials and businesses 
referred to above have been punctualised due to the relatively stable participation of the other 
actors in the network which they represent. These human actors are mere ’actants’ without their 
mace, documents, files, halls, rules, and clerks, to name a few complicit actors.  
 
2.8.1.2 Non-Deliberate Distortion 
A distortion will be non-deliberate where it occurs in the absence of an express or implied 
intention to alter a Communication. Non-deliberate distortions are consequences of the 
attendant problems of transferring information between actors at the different terminals of the 
tax system. These distortions take place during the process of encoding, decoding or recoding 
Actions.  
Distortions while encoding Actions are common in the tax system due to the difficulties 
involved in encapsulating an intended goal in a manner that excludes non-intended goals. Even 
where an Action is properly encoded, the resulting code may be very complex and highly 
susceptible to misinterpretation by a receiving actor. Such misinterpretations in the process of 
decoding may lead to non-deliberate distortions. The Action may have to be re-coded in a 
different language or form by an actor. This re-coding may also result in the non-deliberate 
distortion of the Action.   
Both human and non-human actors may be complicit in non-deliberate distortions. The 
storage process (files, computers, papers) and officers, for example, may be equally responsible 
for the distortions that result from the inaccurate re-coding of Actions.  
Some Actions are more susceptible to non-deliberate distortions than others. On one 
end of the spectrum, a change in the tax rate is easy to encode, decode and recode. On the other 
end of the spectrum, a law targeted at closing a tax loophole may be extremely difficult to 
encode, decode and recode, and therefore has a higher tendency to be distorted. 
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2.8.1.3 Curbing Distortions  
Distortions may be curbed where the Action is ‘interpretively inflexible’.212 However, 
interpretive inflexibility like durability is not a state of being but a product of a transient 
network of actors. For instance, while a constitutional provision which specifies the tax rate as 
10% may seem interpretively inflexible, tax officials and tax practitioners working together 
with other actors such as texts, discourses, money, laws, conventions and culture may 
repeatedly distort it. Therefore, the interpretive inflexibility of an Action can only be sustained 
by the maintenance of a network of actors that guards against its distortion.   
It is tempting to enthrone the actors at the dispute resolution terminal as ‘the 
guardians213 of the link’ whose duty it is to ensure that an Action is delivered in its pure form 
by the actors in its communication route. However, the actors at the dispute resolution terminal 
may not adequately perform this role for the following reasons. Firstly, the dispute resolution 
terminal would only come into the picture where a distortion leads to a dispute which is brought 
before it for adjudication. This only happens in a small percentage of cases. Secondly, even 
where a distortion is litigated (or otherwise brought before the dispute resolution terminal for 
adjudication), the ability of the actors within the dispute resolution terminal to affirm the 
intended meaning of an Action is questionable. This is due to the legal methods (actors) which 
may be employed by the dispute resolution terminal in resolving disputes.  
For instance, the actors at the dispute resolution terminal in common law jurisdictions 
are known to employ either a literal or purposive method of interpreting laws. The actual 
approach adopted differs across jurisdictions and over time. Where they adopt a literal method, 
these actors will accord the legislation its ordinary and grammatical meaning – as long as that 
meaning does not lead to absurdity – notwithstanding the fact that this grammatical meaning 
may be at variance with the ‘true intent’ behind its enactment.214   
Even where these actors purport to adopt a purposive approach to interpreting tax 
statutes,215 and therefore search for the intent of the legislators in passing the law, such intent 
is not always readily discernible. This is especially the case where tax avoidance techniques 
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have been employed.216 In addition, the intent of the legislators may not tally with the idea 
behind its initiation by policy-makers (or its true originators).217 Consequently, a purposive 
interpretation of a law by actors at the dispute resolution terminal may also distort it.  
Ultimately, an Action may never or no longer achieve its goals due to the distortions it 
experiences as it circulates through the communication link, thus leaving its originators 
dissatisfied. In theory, this may lead to the instigation of a new Action with the accompanying 
hope that it will achieve the set goal.  
 
2.8.2 Deficiency in Awareness  
The efficacy of the interaction between businesses and the tax system via the communication 
link depends on the level of awareness which both institutions have of each other. The tax 
system should be fully aware of the existence and operations of all businesses within its 
jurisdiction. This will enable the exercise of better judgement on the part of the tax system 
when formulating and enforcing tax policies and laws.  
Likewise, businesses should be aware not just of the existence of the various terminals 
of the tax system but also of the procedures for interacting with them. This will enable these 
businesses to interact effectively with the tax system, thereby enhancing the responsiveness of 
both institutions to each other. In ‘reality’, however, both the tax system and businesses are 
likely to be not sufficiently aware of the existence and operations of each other. 
 
2.8.2.1 Awareness by the Tax System  
The existence of businesses or business operations beyond the prying eyes of the tax system is 
somewhat inevitable. This lack of full awareness may cause the tax system to focus and 
consequently increase the burden on those businesses or business operations which are within 
its reach. 
The extent of awareness by the tax system differs from society to society. Developing 
countries are more likely to have a larger shadow economy and consequently a broader range 
of businesses operating unobserved by the tax system. A study by Schneider showed that the 
average size of the shadow economy (as a percentage of official GDP) in 2002/03 in 96 
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developing countries was 38.7%, in 25 transition countries 40.1%, in 21 OECD countries 
16.3% and in 3 Communist countries 22.3%.218 The tax systems in developed countries, on the 
other hand, are more likely to be unaware of the operations of businesses than their existence. 
Social, economic and political actors are largely responsible for the gap in awareness within 
and between countries.  
The need for awareness differs amongst the actors in the tax system depending on their 
role. Tax officials require a high level of awareness of the existence and operations of 
businesses owing to the fact that they are charged with the responsibility of applying tax 
policies and laws on a regular basis to these operations. Policy-makers and law-makers require 
a reasonable level of awareness of the types of businesses in their jurisdiction and the kinds of 
operations they undertake as this will be instrumental in the process of formulating tax policies 
and enacting tax laws respectively.  
However, the awareness requirement of tax arbiters is usually limited to the operations 
or a part of the operations of the businesses that are parties to a dispute before them. 
Nevertheless, the issue which tax arbiters may be called upon to determine may require these 
actors to be acquainted with the existence or operations of other businesses not party to the 
dispute. One such situation is where the issue for determination is whether a business applied 
the arm’s-length price in a transfer pricing dispute.  
Business, as a network comprising other actors such as tax experts, money, culture, 
laws, conventions, technology and globalisation (that is, as black-boxed), may aid the level of 
awareness by the terminals of the tax system by engaging in transparent operations such as 
complying with tax disclosure rules. Businesses may also hinder the awareness by the terminals 
of the tax system by engaging in tax avoidance and evasion practices such as transfer pricing, 
money laundering and the utilisation of offshore financial centres with bank secrecy laws. Tax 
avoidance and evasion are products of a transient network of actors comprising rules, laws, 
countries, practices, experts, monies, culture, offices, companies and so on. 
The level of awareness which an actor in the tax system has of the existence or 
operations of businesses is the product of a transient network of human and non-human actors. 
For instance, where the dispute resolution terminal adopts an adversarial method of resolving 
disputes, their awareness of businesses and their operations is limited to the information 
supplied to them by the parties to the dispute. Usually, information is first supplied to the 
                                                          
218 See Friedrich Schneider, ‘Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: What Do We Really 
Know?’ (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Economics Discussion Papers, No 2007-9, 2006).  
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lawyers by the parties to the suit or obtained by these lawyers through private investigation. 
This information is then screened by these lawyers before being reproduced in writs, pleadings 
and addresses. Their admissibility will thereafter be contested by references to rules and 
conventions as a result of which the information made available to the arbiters may be further 
limited. In the end, the amount of information available to the arbiters in this scenario is the 
product of a network comprising, at least, the following actors: businesses, lawyers, clerks, 
private investigators, writs, pleadings, addresses, rules and conventions (less the effect of 
deliberate and non-deliberate distortions).  
 
2.8.2.2 Awareness by Business  
Businesses can only actively interact with the tax system where they are aware of the existence 
of its terminals and their operations. Lack of awareness by businesses also affects the level of 
influence which businesses and the tax system can exert on each other.  
In theory, the more successful a business is, the higher the prospect that the said 
business will be aware of the existence and operations of the terminals of the tax system. 
However, the size or success of a business depends on the number of actors it can amass within 
its network. Multinationals, for example, usually employ both internal and external experts as 
middlemen in their dealings with the various terminals of the tax system and are as a result 
well informed of both the existence and operations of these terminals. SMEs, on the other hand, 
are less likely to be informed of the existence and operations of the terminals due to the size of 
their networks.  
Awareness by businesses may also vary from terminal to terminal. Businesses are more 
likely to be aware of the existence and operations of the tax administration terminal than any 
of the other terminals. This is because it provides greater scope for interaction between business 
and the tax system. Businesses are least likely to be aware of the tax policy terminal due to its 
usual lack of a fixed organisational structure and the expected low level of direct interaction 
between businesses and this terminal. Businesses are forced to interact with and therefore 
actively influence the terminals which they are aware of. This may lead to a disproportionate 
level of interaction between business and the terminals of the tax system.    
The terminals of the tax system may through their practices enhance or hinder the 
awareness of their existence or operations by businesses. Publicity campaigns (actors), for 
example, conducted by the tax administration terminals are useful in informing business of 
both their existence and their operations. Where a terminal of the tax system is distant and 
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adopts practices that are secretive, the level of awareness which businesses may have of it or 
its operations will most likely be low.  
Although the existence of the communication link is not affected by the levels of 
awareness which businesses and the terminals of the tax system have of each other, its usage 
is. Deficiency in awareness limits both the participants and the efficacy of participation in the 
interaction between the tax system and businesses, thus inhibiting the responsiveness of both 
institutions to each other.  
 
2.8.3 Restriction of Access  
Although restriction of access follows from awareness, both concepts are markedly different. 
Access as distinct from awareness refers to the ability of one institution to interact with the 
other where it is aware of the existence and operations of that other institution.  
The two-way relationship between the tax system and businesses as facilitated by the 
communication link depends to a large extent on the access of both institutions to each other. 
In reality, however, while the tax system suffers from a restriction of access to business 
operations on the one hand, businesses suffer from restriction of access to the terminals of the 
tax system on the other. These restrictions affect their responsiveness to each other. 
  
2.8.3.1 Access to Businesses 
Restriction of access forces the tax system to interact with the aspects of the operations of 
businesses it can observe or to base its interaction on a fictional representation of such 
operations. This can be illustrated using the problems of imposing income tax on the operations 
of businesses.  
The term ‘income tax’ implies that tax will be imposed on the income earned by 
businesses. This requires the maintenance of a network comprising actors which include in 
particular the income sought to be taxed. However, in order to co-opt this income into the ‘right 
network’, it is important to identify what it is, where it is located and who is responsible for it.  
The immense difficulty involved in identifying the true economic income of businesses 
has forced actors within the terminals of the tax system in various countries to construct 
fictional models of income as the tax base.219 These fictional models commonly involve a 
distinction between revenue and capital which bears no correlation with economic reality.220 
                                                          
219 See, John Prebble, ‘Ectopia. Tax Law and International Taxation’ (1991) 5 BTR 383. 
220 Prebble (n 219) 394. 
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For instance, section 27 (a) of the Companies and Income Tax Act 1990 (Nigeria) and section 
53 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009 (UK) disallow the deduction of any expenditure of a capital 
nature. The term ‘capital expenditure’ was defined by Viscount Cave in Atherton v British 
Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd221 as follows:  
When an expenditure is made, not only once and for all, but with a view to bringing into existence an 
asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of the trade, I think that there is very good reason (in the 
absence of special circumstances leading to an opposite conclusion) for treating such an expenditure as 
properly attributable not to revenue but to capital.  
  
Ideally, income tax should be imposed on the net profits of a business earned through 
its lifetime. Based on a desire to tax observable operations of businesses, actors within the 
terminals of the tax system in various countries have constructed the income of these businesses 
as being earned annually even though this does not exactly reflect reality.222 The resulting 
anomaly is mitigated through the grant of relief for losses.  
These actors in many developed and developing countries are forced to further adopt a 
system of presumptive income taxation based on which the income of a business is derived by 
the application of some abstract criteria.223 Consequently, these constructs or intermediaries 
fashioned to identify income may co-opt an actor into an income tax network which is distinct 
from the true actor (economic income) which would have been co-opted but for the restriction 
of access.  
The ability of a tax system to exercise jurisdiction over a particular income depends on 
the connection of the income or the owner of the income to the state served by the tax system 
in question. In reality, however, both the source of income and the ownership of income are 
difficult to determine. In order to overcome these difficulties, actors within the terminals of the 
tax system in many jurisdictions have adopted the concept of ‘permanent establishment’ based 
on which income will be deemed to have accrued within a particular jurisdiction where the 
income is attributable to a fixed base, dependent agent or a specified form of service or contract 
executed within the said jurisdiction.224 Yet, the adoption of this intermediary is not a complete 
                                                          
221 Atherton v British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd [1926] AC 205, 213-14.   
222 ibid. 
223 See Gunther Taube and Helaway Tadesse, ‘Presumptive Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Experience and 
Prospects’ (International Monetary Fund, IMF WP/96/5); See also, Victor Thuronyi, ‘Presumptive Taxation of 
the Hard-to-Tax (2004) 268 Contribution to Economic Analysis 101. 
224 See, for instance, Chapter 2 part 24 of the Corporation Tax Act 2010 (UK); section 13(2) of the Companies 
Income Tax Act 1990 (Nigeria); articles 5 and 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
2014.  
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panacea to the headache of attribution of income to a jurisdiction. In certain cases, it results in 
income being co-opted into the wrong network or more than one network.225 
The tax avoidance activities of businesses (as punctualised) such as transfer pricing, 
treaty shopping and thin capitalisation further restrict the access of the tax system to their 
income. In response, actors within the terminals of the tax system in many jurisdictions adopt 
even more obscure legal constructs or intermediaries such as the Controlled Foreign 
Companies Rule226 or the arm’s-length standard of transfer pricing227 with which they attribute 
ownership of income to businesses in a manner which is often divorced from the economic 
reality of the situation. Consequently, businesses and income are sometimes co-opted into an 
income tax network to which they do not belong due to restriction of access. 
  
2.8.3.2 Access to the Tax System  
Although businesses may be aware of the existence and operations of the terminals of the tax 
system, their access to these terminals may be restricted by certain social, political, legal, 
economic or psychological actors. These actors constitute barriers to the interaction between 
business and the tax system. Where the levels of access to the different terminals of the tax 
system differ, this may lead to a lopsided state of interaction between businesses and these 
terminals.  
It is pertinent to distinguish between formal and substantive access of businesses to a 
terminal of the tax system. While a business may have unrestricted formal access to a terminal, 
this access will not be substantive where the Action tendered by the said business is not 
accorded due consideration by relevant actors within the terminal. This is, however, 
irrespective of whether the said Action is accepted or rejected.   
The potential barriers to access are wide-ranging. A barrier may be consequent upon 
the status of businesses, the modus operandi of a terminal or a combination of both categories 
of actors. The culture, language, level of education, or the financial status of businesses may 
constitute barriers to their access to the terminals of the tax system. A negative perception of a 
terminal (about the fairness of its Action, for example) on the part of businesses may form a 
psychological barrier to their interaction with it.  
                                                          
225 See Mary Bennet and Carol Dunghoo, ‘The Attribution of Profits to a Permanent Establishment: Issues and 
Recommendations’ (2005) 33(2) Intertax 51. 
226 See, for instance, Part 9A of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010. 
227 See article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (n 224). 
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The procedure for interaction with a particular terminal may be too complex or involve 
a high financial cost. Furthermore, access to the terminal may be hindered by its geographical 
location.  
The impracticability of interacting with all businesses within its jurisdiction during a 
given process may force a terminal to formally restrict access to it by specified criteria. The 
dispute resolution terminal may, for example, require ‘locus standi’ as a precondition for 
interaction. Locus standi means that a party instituting a suit must have sufficient interest in its 
subject matter.228 Likewise, the tax policy or law terminal may restrict access to it during 
consultations based on size, nature or mobility of businesses. Such criteria will formally 
exclude non-qualifying businesses from the process and may not ensure that the businesses 
interacted with represent the different kinds of businesses within the jurisdiction of the tax 
system.  
In sum, the restriction of access between businesses and the tax system hinders the 
interaction between both institutions or alters the terms of such interaction. It therefore affects 
the efficacy of the communication link and the responsiveness of both institutions to each other. 
 
2.8.4 Inaction  
The final mechanism which affects the usage of the communication link and consequently the 
relationship between business and the tax system is inaction or inactivity by the actors in the 
said relationship. Even in the absence of challenges brought about by the levels of access, 
awareness and distortion of Communication, there will be no effective Communication 
between businesses and the actors representing the tax system if actors do not dispatch Actions. 
For example, actors within the tax law terminal and the policy terminal may not formulate laws 
and policies. Businesses may not take steps to comply and tax administrators may do nothing 
to secure their compliance. Inaction may be tied to other underlying challenges relating to 
access, awareness and distortion. For instance, business may refuse to interact with a terminal 
due to the fear of reprisals. This is particularly the case when businesses are expected to interact 
with the dispute resolution terminal. Certain businesses may fear that contesting an issue with 
the tax officials may result in increased audits, thus leading to the exposure of ‘skeletons in 
their cupboards’. 
                                                          
228 See R v Felixstowe JJ, ex parte Leigh [1987] 1 All ER 583; Ade Adesanya v President of the FRN (1981) 2 
NCLR 388.  
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Inaction may constitute action in relation to the endogenous interests of the actor 
concerned. It is therefore important to distinguish inaction by an actor and the state of being an 
actant. In the former, the inaction of an actor is the feature that guarantees its participation in 
an actor-network. For instance, non-compliance may result from inaction by the tax officials 
secured by the business through the dispatch of certain intermediaries sufficient to convince 
the said tax official that inaction is in its best interest. Inaction also encompasses some form of 
wilful delay in taking action. In essence, delay signifies the inability or failure to take action 
(inaction) at the appropriate time. Periods of orchestrated delay may be instrumental in 
achieving influence or attaining certain desired results.   
Like distortion, awareness and access, the levels of inaction in the communication link 
are a product of transient networks of actors. The participating actors are potentially broad and 
their interests diverse. Hence, the creation, growth and durability of these networks are proper 
subjects of an empirical study.  
 
2.9 Conclusion  
Business and the tax system are parties to a two-way relationship in which the tax system may 
affect the way businesses operate while businesses may influence various facets of the tax 
system. This relationship is based on interaction and therefore presupposes the existence of a 
communication link between both institutions.  
In this chapter, I have explored the operation of this communication link with the aid 
of ANT. I have also identified distortion of Communication, deficiency in awareness, 
restriction of access and inaction as four prime mechanisms that may affect the efficacy of the 
communication link and consequently the responsiveness of business and the tax system to 
each other.  
A superficial observation of the communication link fails to reveal certain important 
human and non-human actors that may play a part in the relationship between business and the 
tax system. However, applying ANT unearths these hidden players and as a result exposes an 
interconnected web of actor-networks behind the communication link. ANT also shows that 
the actors that constitute the communication link are not stable. Rather, they constantly battle 
to maintain order and the façade of stability in light of the potentially conflicting interests of 
actors in their network. These actors may determine or result from the levels of distortion, 
access, awareness and inaction between business and the tax system. They will be better 
understood after an empirical study of their nature, their interests and the processes by which 
they strive to maintain order. 
84 
 
By unearthing the otherwise hidden actors, ANT also provides a suitable platform 
through which one or more of them may be studied empirically in a bid to decipher their 
individual and collective roles in the network that constitutes the two-way relationship between 
business and the tax system. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE POWER GAP, CORRUPTION AND THE FOUR MECHANISMS 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the relationship between business and the tax system is a two-way 
relationship as both institutions have the potential to influence each other. The nature and extent 
of this two-way relationship depends on the channels through which both institutions interact, 
or the ‘communication link’. Diagrammatically, the communication link can be presented as 
follows.  
 
  
 Figure 1 Communication Link 
The attempts at attaining influence made through these channels of communication do 
not take place in isolation. They are guided by prevailing norms and their inherent limitations. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with unravelling these norms, their inherent limitations and their 
relationship with the communication link so as to provide support for the central argument of 
this thesis.  
In this thesis, I inquire into the means by which corruption sustains itself in the 
relationship between business and the tax system. I argue that corruption achieves this by 
exploiting the gap between the ‘actual’ and ‘institutional’ powers of actors. I define the 
institutional power of actors as that which accords with the institutional limits of their social 
setting. An actor’s actual power, in contrast, refers to that which he may exercise in any given 
circumstance through the dispatch of communicative actions. 
Therefore, in this chapter, I intend to resolve five main conceptual difficulties with this 
argument. The first difficulty involves explaining the sources and nature of the institutional 
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limits to the power of actors. Understanding the dynamic and multidimensional nature of these 
limits is crucial to my thesis because it enables a proper understanding of the contrast between 
an actor’s actual and institutional powers. It also introduces the second difficulty, which 
involves explaining the ‘power gap’ and its mechanics. I argue that this power gap is increased 
or decreased by the levels of four mechanisms – access, awareness, distortion and inaction. The 
third challenge is the difficulty encountered by scholars and international organisations in 
distinguishing corrupt acts from those that are not corrupt. This distinction enables the proper 
identification and understanding of the phenomenon under consideration, and is therefore 
crucial to the analysis of the persistence of corruption in the two-way relationship. The fourth 
challenge involves establishing the relationship between the limits to power placed by the 
institutional settings and corruption. Finally, this chapter will examine how the four 
mechanisms (access, awareness, distortion and inaction) affect the power gap and avenues for 
the sustenance of corruption in the two-way relationship.  
 
3.2 Institutional Limits to Communicative Actions 
If an examination is carried out on any field of endeavour, there is usually in existence certain 
rules or norms through which social order is achieved. These rules define, constrain and enable 
actions. They do not, however, exist in a vacuum. They are often associated with a source or 
reference point at the societal level, which will be termed ‘dimensions’ for the purpose of this 
thesis.  
The nature of the rules (from which certain expectations are derived) invariably 
depends on the state of development in the society under consideration. This ranges from a 
society of primitive hunters and gatherers to a technologically advanced modern society. The 
pressures of modernisation, for example, force human actors to arrange themselves in groups 
in pursuit of varied goals. Consequently, rules or norms are created or evolve to guide this 
pursuit or avoid violence. The survival of a rule is dependent on the presence of sufficient 
private or social enforcement mechanisms to guarantee its institutionalisation. With the 
institutionalisation of a rule, the said rule attains an objective status independent of the actors 
responsible for its creation. As the rule endures, the circumstances surrounding its creation or 
evolution become more silent and the rule exudes a false aura of stability (the rules are in fact 
unstable, and the potential for contestations remains despite the aura of stability). This is 
required to scare off potential contestations of its validity. Understanding rules, expectations 
and their associated dimensions require a deeper explanation of their origin and evolution. 
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3.2.1 Origin and Evolution of Rules, Expectations and Dimensions 
There are different accounts of the origin and evolution of rules. The most popular of these is 
the contractarian view commonly associated with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.229 Hobbes230 
attributed the creation of rules to agreements by actors that involved the shedding of some 
rights to ensure that violence is averted in the state of nature. According to Hobbes,231 in a 
world inhabited by self-interested individuals guided primarily by their subjective notions of 
right and wrong, there is a tendency for these individuals, acting rationally, to barter certain 
rights in return for peace and order. This approach to the evolution of rules by Hobbes is 
distinguishable from that espoused by Locke. Locke232 traced the evolution of rules to 
agreements entered under the aegis of certain God-given laws of nature to which men are 
ordinarily subject. For Rousseau,233 however, rules originated from agreements to protect the 
property rights of individuals in an unequal world.  
While the above accounts place emphasis on an agreement between individuals, 
alternative accounts such as that proposed by Hume234 attribute the formation of rules and 
norms to repeated interaction between actors in the field. The rules spring up spontaneously as 
a result of these repeated interactions after periods of trial and error by the actors. As a result, 
the actors become accustomed to and expectant of particular ways of acting when faced with 
certain problems.  
Following this line of spontaneous emergence of unintended rules of the game, Adam 
Smith235 in examining the origin of economic and political rules argued that the resulting rules 
competed with other extant rules. As a result of the competitive process, the more efficient 
rules are selected over the less efficient ones.  
Unlike Smith, Spencer236 recognised that the competitions that lead to the emergence 
of a dominant rule are not between the rules but between societies. For Spencer, ‘functional 
differentiation’ occurs as societies develop over time. These societies rival one another through 
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230 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Bobbs-Merrill 1963) 142; Richard Tuck, Hobbes: Leviathan (Cambridge 
University Press 1991). 
231 Hobbes (n 230). 
232 Leo Strauss, ‘Critical Note: Locke's Doctrine of Natural Law’ (1958) 52 The American Political Science 
Review 490; John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett (ed), Cambridge University Press 1988). 
233 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Penguin 1968) 10; David Lay Williams, Rousseau’s Social 
Contract (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
234 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (LA Selby-Bigge and PH Nidditch (eds), Clarendon Press 1978). 
235 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Liberty Classics 1976) 163, 
164. 
236 Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology (Archon Books 1969). 
88 
 
wars, for example. The result of the rivalry depends on the efficacy of their respective adopted 
rules. Some societies triumph as a result of the strength of their rules and pass these rules to 
later generations through inheritance.237  
The above views paint a picture of coordination between the actors of the adopting 
society regarding a particular rule or norm. A rule is adopted in each case to serve the interests 
of the collective. However, theories on the evolution of norms put forward by Marx238 and 
Weber239 paint a different picture – one of internal conflicts between the actors or classes of 
actors in a particular society.240 The rules that emanate are therefore the products of a power-
play guided by the conflicting interests of the actors or classes of actors in these societies.  
Some relatively modern accounts of the evolution of norms bear a resemblance to those 
expounded above. Popular amongst these modern accounts is that postulated by Hayek. For 
Hayek, rules are unplanned products of the agency of actors and their continued existence 
depends on their ability to survive the existing competitive mechanism for the selection of 
norms.241  
In sum, rules seemingly evolve in different ways depending on their nature and the 
social context. It is common to identify two classes of rules based on the way they evolve.242 
The first class includes rules that are the direct products of human design which may or may 
not involve the rationalisation of challenges faced in a given social context. The second class 
includes rules that evolve naturally following the repeated process of interaction between actors 
in the field. It is, however, often difficult to place a given rule in one or the other class.243 This 
is because the right placement may change depending on the time and features observed as 
crucial to the creation of the rule. Consequently, it may be better to understand these classes of 
rules as opposing ends of a spectrum and place the evolution of rules within this spectrum. For 
instance, the abolition of slavery should be located somewhere in the spectrum between human 
design and a natural process of evolution.  
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Rules may also be divided into two categories based on the support provided to the rule 
by the state. These categories are formal and informal rules.244 Formal rules, on the one hand, 
are those that are officially backed by the state. Informal rules, on the other hand, are backed 
by society without direct involvement of the state. In early research, major focus was placed 
on understanding the role of formal rules in society. However, informal rules have gained 
recognition as a major player in relatively recent times.245 Attempts by domestic and 
international organisations to improve various facets of society through reform of formal rules 
while paying limited or no attention to informal rules, failed to yield the desired results. This 
contributed to the realisation of the importance of informal rules to the growth and success of 
economies. As North explained, ‘the outcomes of revolutionary changes will depend on the 
ongoing tension between informal constraints and the new formal rules’.246 Informal rules may 
complement, substitute, undermine or compete with formal rules.247 This is dependent on the 
existence, completeness, goals and effectiveness of the relevant formal rules. Also, changes in 
formal rules may affect informal rules and vice versa.248  
Nevertheless, focusing on formal and informal rules hinders a deeper analysis of the 
expectations inherent in these rules as well as the various dimensions in society to which they 
may be linked. Such a focus also complicates the understanding of the relationships between 
different formal and informal rules in the society. In line with the aim of this thesis, therefore, 
rules will not be examined based on their levels of formality or informality. Rather, this thesis 
will examine rules based on their respective fields and functionality. This approach is justified 
because regardless of the origin or backing of a particular rule, rules are attributable to different 
fields or dimensions in modern societies. Also, the existence of these rules is maintained by, 
and appreciated based on, the functions they perform and the force mechanisms existing within 
these fields or dimensions.  
Therefore, in this thesis, rules and their inherent expectations are classed as legal, 
political, economic and moral. However, the dimensions to which these rules may be ascribed 
are not exhaustive. Their number in a given society depends on the extent of functional 
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differentiation that has occurred over time. However, this thesis will only focus on four 
dimensions that are directly relevant to corruption and the relationship between business and 
the tax system: legal, economic, political and moral dimensions.  
Within the legal dimension are soft and hard rules (and expectations) that influence 
whether an actor has acted legally or illegally. The rules (and expectations) operative in the 
economic dimension influence the making or receipt of payments by actors in a field. The 
identity and tenure of holders of power are regulated by rules and expectations ascribable to 
the political dimension of society. The rules and expectations associated with the moral 
dimension influence our understanding of right and wrong (good and bad) in society.  
One may question whether these mentioned dimensions are truly separate from or 
independent of one another. This is because the rules in each dimension seemingly possess the 
capacity to influence the rules in other dimensions. For instance, to the extent that the rules and 
expectations of the legal dimension inform what is legal or illegal, they may also inform our 
understanding of what is right or wrong. In other words, the rules that influence legality also 
possess a moral normative value. Likewise, these rules may determine who makes or receives 
payments. The substantive content and associated expectations of these rules do not always 
have fixed membership of any given dimension. Also, their membership and nature may 
change depending on the dimension under which they are considered. Considering that one 
may influence or shape others, is there a need to separate these rules into dimensions? The 
justification for the separation is predicated on the following premises. Each dimension 
determines its substantive content independently. As a result, a rule or action that is perfectly 
valid in one dimension may be invalid in another. Even where the same rule is considered in 
more than one dimension, the manner and result of such consideration may differ.  
 
3.2.2 Rules, Actors and Expectations 
When a rule is institutionalised within a given field or society, the rule attains an existence 
independent of the individuals in that field or society. For instance, laws created by the 
legislature become independent of the actual legislators that created them. Over time, the 
conflicts of personal interests and compromises that led to the creation of the said rule become 
silent. Although institutionalised rules exist independent of actors, they remain powerless in 
their applicable fields or society without the involvement of these actors. For these rules to 
have effect, an actor must recognise their existence, internalise them or apply them in the field 
or society.  
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It is arguable that institutionalised rules do exist in their pure or right form. It is this 
pure or right form that actors in the field should recognise, internalise or apply. However, the 
process of recognition, internalisation or application is potentially flawed. This is due to its 
susceptibility to distortions arising mainly from the decision frame and interests of the actors 
involved in the process. Such distortions are even more likely where the rule is indeterminate 
or ambiguous. For example, a police officer may arrest a person based on his conviction that 
an illegality has occurred. However, this conviction may be the direct result of a complete 
misapprehension of what the law truly is. 
There is a need for a second order observation249 in the recognition, internalisation or 
application of institutionalised rules. The actor must observe what the rules state about a given 
action. To produce the effect in its pure form, the actor’s observation of the rule’s observation 
must be accurate. However, the potential for inaccurate observations is real.  
Rules, by their very nature, require actors to comply with their dictates. Whether or not 
this requirement will be met depends on both the persuasiveness of the institutional 
mechanisms supporting the rule and the willingness of the actors to submit to the said rule. Di 
Maggio and Powell250 argue that rules constrain actors to act in line with their dictates by being 
coercive, by their normative value or by mimesis. Coercion, which is commonly associated 
with the law, involves the application of force to ensure compliance. Force is not necessarily 
physical. It refers to any factor that increases the cost of resistance of the actor to the norm.251 
With or without force, institutionalised rules may be normative; in which case, they secure 
compliance by speaking to the actor’s belief that an action should be followed.252 Mimesis, in 
contrast, refers to situations where compliance is secured with the dictates or expectations 
inherent in a rule, although neither by force nor based on a normative realisation, but simply 
as a result of the imitation of other actors in the field, especially in situations of uncertainty.253  
While recognising the meaning given by rules to actions, the role of actors in shaping 
and giving meaning to rules must not be ignored.254 This is because the relationship between 
actors and rules is bidirectional. Even beyond contributing to the meaning of rules, an actor 
                                                          
249 This is based on Niklas Luhmann’s modification of Spencer-Brown’s explanation of observations as 
including a distinction and an indication. See George Spencer-Brown, Laws of Form (Allen & Unwin 1969); 
Niklas Luhmann, Observations on Modernity (Stanford University Press 1998).   
250 Di Maggio and Powell (n 14). 
251 ibid. 
252 ibid. 
253 ibid. 
254 See Lauren Edelman and others, ‘The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational 
Myth’ (1999) 105 American Journal of Sociology 406 (explains the role which organisation and professions 
may play in shaping the meaning and import of an existing law).  
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may appropriate rules for his own cause. In other words, rules may be reduced to intermediaries 
through which an actor achieves influence at a distance. For instance, a policeman may secure 
compliance with his arbitrary exercise of force against a suspect and resist protest from 
onlookers through the appropriation of the law into the network that produces this effect. In 
this case, while the legal rule may be construed as constraining the actions of the onlookers, 
the actions of the policeman can be interpreted as constraining the intended impact of the legal 
rule.   
Rules inherently embody expectations regarding actions. For rules to attain social order, 
actors in a field or society should expect other actors to comply with their dictates. To the 
extent that rules are pure in their objective form or that actors expect others to comply with 
their dictates in their pure and objective form, the expectations emanating from these rules may 
also be regarded as ‘pure’ or ‘ideal’.  
However, as previously discussed, the recognition, internalisation and application 
process of rules is potentially flawed. As a result, what a given actor will consider to be pure 
expectations may be manifestly impure. Impure expectations may have significant effects, 
especially where they are shared by an actor or group of actors that possess the power to give 
effect to them. Thus, the expectations of a powerful section of society may be at variance with 
the rule from which they should emanate. This variance can be ascribed to the inability of a 
rule to self-enforce its ‘true’ expectations. 
 
3.2.3 Legality of Communicative Actions  
In dispatching a communicative action intended to attain influence at a distance, an actor in the 
two-way relationship between business and the tax system seeks to express power which he 
may possess. Therefore, the true extent of the power of actors in this relationship can be 
measured using their communications as evidence. Certain limits may be placed by the law on 
the exercise of this power. Hence, it is proper to assess the legality of communicative actions 
in order to understand the scope of the ‘legal power’ that can be exercised by a given actor 
within the legal dimension of a given social context.  
While the analysis of the legality of communicative actions is important, it is also 
important to recognise other dimensions within which meaning may be accorded to these 
communicative actions. Based on the four main institutional dimensions outlined in this 
chapter, one should also consider the efficiency (economic dimension), the political expediency 
(political dimension) and the morality (moral dimension) of communicative actions.  
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In this section, however, I focus on the legality of communicative actions, owing to the 
fact that law can be seen as the foremost institution through which social order is achieved. I 
analyse for the purpose of illustration the legality of communicative actions, highlighting in 
the process the instances in which one communicative action, or evidence of power, may 
conflict with another. 
In many cases, the legality of communicative actions will be clear and undisputed. For 
instance, policies and laws are binding and must be complied with by businesses, tax 
administrators and arbiters, as well as other actors to whom they are addressed. To be legally 
valid, the acts of tax administrators and arbiters must give effect to these laws and policies. 
However, the legality of communicative actions becomes more complex and uncertain where 
a conflict exists between two or more communicative actions. This conflict may exist between 
rules, between the rules and acts implementing them or between acts of implementation.  
 
3.2.3.1 Conflict between Rules  
The main categories of rules are tax laws and tax policies. A conflict may exist between rules 
of the same category or rules of different categories. Where the conflict is between rules of the 
same category (that is, between two laws or two policies) the subsequent rule will usually 
prevail as a direct or indirect amendment of the former rule. However, where the former rule 
is superior in hierarchy to the subsequent rule, the provisions in the subsequent rule that are 
inconsistent with the former rule will be void to the extent of this inconsistency. 
For instance, due to the sovereignty of the UK Parliament, a subsequent law will usually 
prevail over a former law where there is an inconsistency. This is due to the application of the 
‘doctrine of implied repeal’.255 Based on this doctrine, the subsequent law is deemed to have 
impliedly repealed the older law. This, however, does not apply to special categories of laws 
or constitutional statutes that are superior in nature such as EU law.256 This doctrine of implied 
repeal applies in a similar fashion in Nigeria. A major example of a superior law which negates 
the application of the doctrine of implied repeal in Nigeria is the CFRN. Any later law which 
violates the provisions of the constitution is null and void.257 
Where there is a conflict between a law and a policy, the law prevails regardless of 
which predates the other. In certain limited instances, other actors may be empowered by tax 
                                                          
255 Vauxhall Estates Ltd v Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 KB 733; Ellen Street Estates v Ministry of Health 
[1934] 1 KB 590. 
256 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195. 
257 CFRN, s 1(3). 
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law-makers to enact subordinate legislation. A subordinate (or delegated) legislation must be 
consistent with its parent law to be valid.258 
 
3.2.3.2 Conflict between Rules and Actions implementing them 
A conflict may exist between a communicative action that sets a rule and one that implements 
it. Since the implementation should comply with the rule, it follows that an act which 
contravenes a rule it purports to implement is, legally speaking, null and void. Therefore, an 
action of the tax administration or a decision of the arbiters will be invalid where it conflicts 
with the rules it seeks to implement.259 This remains the case if the action contradicts a rule 
other than that which it is meant to implement, in so far as that rule remains valid.  
 
3.2.3.3 Conflict between Actions implementing a Rule  
Two communicative actions purporting to comply or secure compliance with rules governing 
the fiscal relationship between business and the tax system may conflict. This may involve two 
actions by the tax administration, two decisions of the arbiters, or an action by the tax 
administration and a decision of the arbiters.  
Where there are two conflicting communicative actions targeted at compliance, the 
legally valid action is the one that complies with the law or policy to be implemented. This will 
usually be the case irrespective of the timing of the communicative actions. This permits tax 
administrators to issue fresh communicative actions in accordance with the law that conflict 
with previous communicative actions that are inconsistent with the prevailing law. However, 
the ability of tax administrators to vary their previous communicative action in this manner 
may be limited by certain laws or policies governing their operations. In Nigeria, for example, 
certain laws place time limits on the ability of the tax authority to vary its previous 
communicative action in the absence of fraud or other vitiating factors.260 
In certain circumstances, both conflicting actions of the tax administrator may comply 
with the relevant rule. This is usually the case where the actions in question are products of an 
exercise of discretion by the tax administrator. In this case, the one later in time still prevails 
prospectively. However, this most recent communication will usually be unable to have 
                                                          
258 See R v Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and Regions ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2000] 1 All 
ER 884. 
259 See Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147; Attorney General, Bendel State v 
Attorney General Federation (1982) All NLR 85. 
260 See for example, Companies Income Tax Act 1990, s 66. 
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retrospective effect save where there is some other justifiable basis for the shift in position by 
the tax authority.  
Where there is uncertainty concerning which of two or more conflicting actions of tax 
administrators accords with the law that they seek to implement, then the legal validity of the 
conflicting actions can only be determined by referring the matter to a tribunal or court. The 
court has a constitutional duty to resolve such uncertainties. Prior to this reference, the legal 
validity of the conflicting communicative actions remains questionable.  
Where the conflicting communicative actions are decisions of arbiters and there is a 
lack of clarity about the action that complies with the applicable law or policy, the legally valid 
decision depends on the hierarchy of the arbiter making the decision as well as the timing of 
the decision.  
Where the doctrine of stare decisis applies, arbiters are bound by decisions of a higher 
panel. Therefore, where an arbiter of a higher position in the hierarchy makes a decision which 
conflicts with that of an arbiter in a lower position, the former prevails over the latter regardless 
of when the decisions were made. Where the conflicting decision of an arbiter in a higher 
position in the hierarchy is later than that of an arbiter in a lower position, the former decision 
is deemed to have overruled the latter. Where the conflicting decision of the higher arbiter 
precedes that of the lower one, the latter is deemed to be made per incuriam and is liable to be 
declared void.261  
Where the conflicting decisions emanated from arbiters of the same level in the 
hierarchy, the litigant may rely on any of the conflicting decisions when presenting its case 
before a court. However, in the Nigerian legal system, the court or tribunal has an option to 
follow the decision that is later in time.262 
Where the conflict is between an action of tax administrators and a decision of an 
arbiter, and there is uncertainty about which of the two upholds the law or policy to be 
implemented, the decisions of arbiters should prevail. This is because of the constitutional role 
of arbiters as dispute resolvers in the event of such ambiguity. If the decisions of arbiters do 
not prevail in these circumstances, the purpose of their existence will be greatly undermined.  
The potential for conflict can be illustrated using a dispute between the FIRS and certain 
oil companies in Nigeria over the rate of tax relief for investments in natural gas liquefaction.  
                                                          
261 See Dalhatu v Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt 843) 310; Dairo v UBN PLC (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt 1059) 99. 
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 The Petroleum Investment Allowance dispute 
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To attract investment to the production of liquefied natural gas, the Nigerian 
government in 1999, through the then President Olusegun Obasanjo and Finance Minister 
Adamu Ciroma, promised in a budget proposal to increase the Petroleum Investment 
Allowance (PIA) from 5% to 30%. The PIA is a statutory provision.263 Thus, any increment 
should be by the amendment of the law. The proposed amendment of the law never 
materialised.264 However, the companies involved computed their tax liability with PIA at 30% 
for a considerable period of time. Following a change of government and an audit of these 
companies, this anomaly was discovered. The Chairman of the FIRS inquired from the new 
President, Umaru Musa Yaradua, about the steps to take. Yaradua responded that the 
companies should be taxed in accordance with the law (see letter above). Additional 
assessments were served on these companies. The companies then instituted an action in court 
challenging the additional assessments (PIA case).265  
A similar issue arose with the grant of the ‘Pioneer Status Incentive’ to companies in 
Nigeria under the Industrial Development (Income Tax) Relief Act 1971. This Act provides 
for the grant of a tax holiday to companies involved in activities regarded as pioneering for an 
initial period of 3 years, which could be extended for a further maximum period of 2 years. 
However, there was also controversy over the grant of this incentive to certain companies, such 
as oil exploration and production companies, which did not engage in activities that would 
ordinarily be classed as pioneering or nascent. For administrative convenience, the 
administrative body responsible for this process – the Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission (NIPC) – granted this relief for a straight 5 years to several companies. This 
practice continued for about 14 years. Following the fall in oil prices and the pressure to 
generate tax revenue, the NIPC issued letters to these companies purporting to reduce the 5 
year grant to 3 years, irrespective of whether the companies concerned were yet to enjoy or had 
                                                          
263 See Petroleum Profits Tax Act 1990, sch 2, para 5. 
264 In order to encourage participation in its marginal field program, the Nigerian government similarly promised 
marginal field operators a preferential tax rate of 55%. This is yet to be enacted, thus creating some factual 
uncertainty around the tax rate applicable to these companies. However, the legal position remains that the 
statutory rate should apply until the government codifies the promise. See Deloitte Nigeria, ‘Pioneer Status and 
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Companies Income Tax Act (as distinct from Petroleum Investment Allowance under the Petroleum Profits Tax 
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already enjoyed the relief for the full 5 years. The FIRS also issued additional tax assessments 
to these companies for the two years in respect of which the grant was withdrawn (PSI case).266  
This PIA case illustrates the potential for an actor to exercise power which exceeds legal 
limits and for this exercise to persist for a period of time unchallenged. Although the statute 
remained the determinant of the applicable rate of PIA, the companies exercised an actual 
power to claim the rate specified in the budget proposal.  
This PIA case also illustrates the potential variance between the legal and economic 
expectations. It is arguable that the ideal expectations of the economic dimension in the instant 
case justifies the companies’ claim for the increased rate of PIA; to the extent that the increased 
rate of PIA leads to increased investment and tax revenue in the long run. An argument, 
however weak, can also be made that denying the businesses the benefits of the increased PIA 
after they made investments (and incurred sunk costs) on this basis is unfair (fairness being an 
expectation of the moral dimension of society).  
More importantly, concerns about efficiency and fairness are not exclusive to the 
economic and moral dimensions of society respectively. Even the legal dimension may possess 
‘codes and programmes’ that balance legal rules against the potentially competing demands of 
efficiency and fairness. One such code is the doctrine of legitimate expectations. This was a 
major ground for the action instituted by the companies. 
 
3.2.3.4 Legitimate Expectations 
The legality of communicative actions in the event of a conflict depends on the hierarchy of 
the action in question and its timing. Nevertheless, equity may intervene through the doctrine 
of legitimate expectations to vary this. As a result of such intervention, a seemingly inferior 
action may be validated retrospectively in certain defined circumstances. These circumstances 
include situations where the inferior action constitutes a clear and unambiguous representation 
that creates a legitimate expectation, which should be protected by law in the interest of 
fairness. This will usually apply where the recipient of the communication has acted to his 
detriment as a result of the communicative action.  
The doctrine of legitimate expectation is a relatively recent development in the 
jurisprudence of UK and Nigeria.267 It is commonly employed in administrative law but it is 
                                                          
266 This was the PSI case. See Deloitte Nigeria (n 264). 
267 Its origins can be traced as far back as the 18th century protection by the courts of a litigant’s expectation of a 
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gradually growing in prominence in the realm of taxation. The remits of its application is yet 
to be fully defined in both jurisdictions.  
The doctrine of legitimate expectation is an instrument of the dispute resolution 
terminal. Hence, any business seeking to benefit from its application must first gain access to 
the court, tribunal or other arbiter capable of applying the doctrine. 
This doctrine is based on the general premise that a taxpayer’s legitimate expectation 
is to be taxed in accordance with the law.268 Its application depends on the particulars of the 
communicative action under consideration. These particulars include its clarity, scope and 
effect on other actors; the means through which it was dispatched; and the strength of the action 
with which it conflicts.  
A taxpayer seeking to evoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation in respect of any 
communicative action must establish that the message it contains is ‘clear, unambiguous and 
devoid of relevant qualification’.269 Therefore, a communicative action capable of more than 
one interpretation constitutes a weak platform on which to base this doctrine.270 
Certain legally valid communicative actions may be too strong to be defeated by the 
application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. A statutory or constitutional provision 
cannot be easily discountenanced on the basis that a contrary communicative action by tax 
policy-makers, tax law-makers or tax administrators created certain expectations in the minds 
of taxpayers. Here, a distinction can be drawn between communicative actions that fall within 
the legal discretion of the actor and those that flout the express provisions of the law. While 
the former may constitute a valid basis for evoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the 
latter may not.271 
Where the communicative action is dispatched in an informal setting, it usually carries 
less weight than formal communications.272 Likewise, a communicative action that is produced 
by a process vitiated by some form of impropriety is less able to give rise to legitimate 
expectations.  
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Legitimate expectation is less likely to be successfully evoked where the 
communicative action is private (that is, when it is meant for a specific recipient or category of 
recipients) than when the communicative action is public (that is, when it is meant for a broad 
range of recipients or the public at large). As Bingham LJ noted, ‘a statement formally 
published by the Inland Revenue to the world might safely be regarded as binding subject to 
its terms, in any case falling within them’.273 Evidence that the communication was made to 
the intended recipient indirectly rather than directly may weaken a plea for the application of 
the doctrine of legitimate expectation. For instance, a taxpayer may not be able to evoke 
successfully the doctrine where he has not received the representation directly from the tax 
authority, even though he received it through an external adviser.274 
Also, the court is likely to consider the effect of the application of this doctrine on other 
stakeholders. Where the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation will give rise to 
unfairness if the interests of other stakeholders (such as competing businesses) are taken into 
account, the court will be less likely to apply the doctrine. 
In sum, the doctrine of legitimate expectation balances the dictates inherent in legal 
rules against legal expectations of efficiency and fairness. The legal concern for efficiency, on 
the one hand, may justify deviation from rigid rules in certain circumstances. The legal concern 
for fairness, on the other hand, may operate to prevent a return back to the rule, also in certain 
circumstances.  
The illustration above and discussion of legitimate expectations should guide our 
understanding of the succeeding sections. The operative question remains: how does an actor 
sustain an exercise of power that contravenes the ideal expectations of a social setting for a 
period of time?  
 
3.3 The Power Dynamics in the Two-Way Relationship 
This section discusses the power dynamics in the two-way relationship. It begins by justifying 
the meaning of the term ‘power’ adopted in this thesis. Thereafter, it explains the power gap 
and its correlation with the levels of access, awareness, distortion and inaction in the two-way 
relationship. 
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3.3.1 Understanding Power 
Like most sociological concepts, power has proved very difficult to define in a universally 
accepted manner. This is partly due to the fact that the meaning of this concept varies depending 
on the context in which it is used. As Haugaard explained, power is a ‘family resemblance 
concept’.275 This implies that across the different contexts in which this concept may be 
employed, the term ‘power’ has certain similarities and differences like the members of a 
nuclear family.  
This thesis seeks to understand and apply power in a social context. However, this does 
not eliminate the considerable difficulties in defining this term as evidenced by the often 
conflicting understandings of it put forward by sociologists. These conflicts can be ascribed to 
the different purposes for which the term is considered.276  
Morriss, for example, adopted a linguistic approach in analysing the term. Hence, he 
drew a distinction between power and ‘its nearest synonym’, influence.277 He explained that 
previous students of power278 have failed to draw this distinction owing to their obsession with 
power as existing in relations. As a result, they had limited the scope of power to the ability of 
A to make B do X, which is more akin to influence than power. He called for the recognition 
of ‘power to’ as a capacity of actors, which is distinct from ‘power over’ that exists in relations 
between two or more actors. Haugaard identified four different ‘language games within which 
the power debate has taken place’. Each language game potentially possesses their 
understanding of the term. These language games are ‘normative political theory of the 
analytical conceptual variety’, ‘political theory building of non-conceptual variety’, ‘social 
theory of modern orientation’ and ‘social theory of postmodern orientation’.279 
Morriss also argued that power differs from the ‘vehicles’ or ‘resources of power’ on 
the one hand, and the ‘exercise of power’ on the other hand. To buttress his point, he drew an 
analogy between power and the solubility of sugar. He pointed out that sugar remains soluble 
irrespective of whether it is ever placed in water. Likewise, an actor possesses power 
irrespective of whether he ever puts it to use. He also pointed out that the elements within sugar 
                                                          
275 He quoted the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Basil Blackwell 1958) 32. 
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that confer on it the quality of solubility (‘the vehicles of its solubility’) differ from the plain 
fact that sugar is soluble. Likewise, the vehicles of power are distinct from power as a capacity 
or disposition of actors.280 
This approach can be distinguished from that employed by Lukes. Unlike Morris, Lukes 
was concerned with identifying the ‘locus of power’ for the purpose of ascribing practical, 
moral or political responsibility. Therefore, the distinction between the exercise of power and 
power as a capacity was of little importance to Lukes. Lukes argued that there is an inextricable 
link between power and responsibility.281 Power resides where there is responsibility. Lukes 
therefore posited that an actor has power in relation to a particular outcome where this outcome 
can be linked directly to his action or inaction. However, Lukes was hesitant about attributing 
power to ‘structures’ as distinct from human agency. Thus, for Lukes, power does not lie in the 
collective of human actions and machinery that contribute to a given outcome. Lukes argued 
that ascribing power to these structures will enable actors to shirk responsibility.282 Hayward, 
in contrast, points out that where the goal is to address the source of undesirable outcomes, it 
is imperative that responsibility and power are placed not only on human agency but also on 
structures. This will encourage productive thinking and action on ways to amend these 
structures that contribute to undesirable results.283  
From the above, it is clear that Lukes and Morriss agree that power can be located 
within an actor. However, owing to the different purposes for which they utilised the term 
‘power’, they disagreed on the utility of a distinction between power and its exercise. Other 
sociologists, especially Foucault, have distanced themselves from the point of agreement 
between Lukes and Morriss. They have instead argued that power does not inhere in the actor 
but in the relations between one actor and another.284 For Foucault, for instance, ‘power is not 
something that is acquired, seized or shared, something one holds on to or allows to slip 
away’.285  
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Unlike Lukes and Morris, Foucault was concerned with the effect of power on the 
subject. For Foucault, there can be no power without the presence of at least two actors: the 
actor seeking to exercise power and the potential recipient of this exercise. Foucault argued 
that power cannot exist without the possibility of resistance from the actor over whom power 
is being exercised. Unlike Morris, Foucault does not give weight to the distinction between the 
terms ‘power to’ and ‘power over’. He argues instead that power is always exercised over 
another. Foucault also argued that power ‘exists only when it is put to action’, unlike Morriss 
who separates the exercise of power from power as a capacity.286 
While it is difficult to discountenance the existence of ‘power to’ where power is 
understood from a linguistic perspective, this is not the case where power is understood in a 
social context. In a social context, ‘power to’ only exists to the extent that the actor over whom 
power is exercised or the potential for resistance is ignored. The existence of this other actor 
becomes more apparent where the understanding of the term ‘actor’ is broadened to include 
non-humans and materialities as postulated by Latour and Callon.287 Simple examples of 
‘power to’ such as Mr A sitting on a chair takes on new meaning as power exercised over the 
chair.  
This thesis is concerned with the power that exists in the relationship between the actors 
representing business and the tax system. Therefore, understanding power as existing in 
relations between actors is more pertinent. It suffices, as a starting point, to define power for 
the purpose of this thesis as the ability of A to make B do X.  
However, this definition of power is in dire need of expansion if it is to serve any useful 
purpose for this thesis. Both A and B exist within a social environment that gives meaning to 
or otherwise enables or constrains their actions. Often, in attempting to exercise power over B 
to do X, A would source support from this very social environment. This support may take the 
form of knowledge that is taken for granted, systems of thoughts/beliefs, habitual practices or 
texts. Thus, it is beneficial to include the social environment as a representative actor enabling 
or constraining the exercise of power.  
The social environment will in most cases possess its ‘ideal (pure) expectations’ 
regarding the actions of both A and B. The nature and content of these ideal expectations are 
usually heavily contested. Nevertheless, they should be taken into account if the goal is to 
understand the capacity of A to make B do X.  
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It is helpful to draw an analogy at this point with the relationship between a business 
and a tax official in a normal setting. Let us assume that the prevailing expectation in this 
setting is that the business must comply with the content of a notice of assessment served on it 
by the tax official to the extent that this notice complies with the law. Limits are placed by the 
law on the notice of assessment to ensure that the tax official does not wantonly abuse the duty 
to comply owed by the business. In this relationship, four possible actions can be identified. 
They are: action in accordance with the ideal expectations of the social environment enshrined 
in the law (I); action in accordance with tax official’s interests (TI); action in accordance with 
the business’s interests (BI); and the actual action of the tax official (i.e. notice of assessment) 
which the business is expected to comply with in accordance with the dictates of the social 
environment (A).  
Ideally, all four possible actions should be in agreement. In other words, the notice of 
assessment or action would agree with the ideal expectations of the social environment (the 
law), as well as the interests of the tax official and business. This births a power relationship 
between the tax official and the business in which consent by the business to the notice of 
assessment is very likely. Protest against the notice of assessment, on the other hand, is very 
unlikely and would be illegitimate since the notice of assessment accords with the ideal 
expectations of the social environment (the law). In the unlikely event of non-consent or protest 
by the business, both the social environment and the tax official should be capable of 
administering sufficient force through an adequate ‘force mechanism’ to secure compliance by 
re-aligning the actions of the business with the demand in the notice of assessment.  
However, where issues with access, awareness, distortion and inaction affect the 
communication link, and in particular arise in the channel of communication between the tax 
official and business through which an attempt at the exercise of power is expressed, a power 
relationship in which there is agreement between the ideal expectations (I), the action of the 
tax official or exercising actor (A), the interests of the tax official or exercising actor (TI) and 
the interests of the business or recipient actor (BI) is less likely. These issues contribute to the 
existence of 11 additional power permutations represented in the table below. 
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S/N PERMUTATIONS 
1 I, A, TI, BI  
• All four actions are in agreement  
• Consent to the action and ideal by the business and the tax official respectively is 
likely 
• Protest by the business and the tax official against the action and ideal is unlikely 
• Any protest will be illegitimate 
• Third party involvement is not usually required to enforce the ideal 
2 I, A, TI 
• The ideal expectation, the tax official’s action, and the tax official’s interest are in 
agreement  
• These three actions do not agree with the interests of the business 
• Consent of the tax official is likely while consent of the business is unlikely 
• Protest by the tax official is unlikely while protest by the business is likely 
• Any protest by the business is illegitimate  
• The tax official is likely to seek to enforce the action and ideal in the event of protest 
by the business  
• Third parties are usually not required to enforce the ideal 
3 I, A, BI 
• The ideal expectation accords with the tax official’s action and the business’ interest 
• These three actions do not accord with the tax official’s interest 
• Consent by the tax official to the ideal is unlikely 
• Consent by the business to the ideal and action is likely 
• Protest by the tax official against the action or the ideal is likely 
• Protest by the business is unlikely 
• The tax official is unlikely to take steps to enforce the action or ideal in the unlikely 
event of initial non-compliance by the business 
• Any protest by the tax official will be illegitimate 
• Third parties are usually not required to enforce the ideal 
107 
 
S/N PERMUTATIONS 
4 I,TI, BI 
• The ideal expectation accords with the interests of the tax official and business 
• These three actions do not accord with the Action taken by the tax official 
• Consent by the tax official and the business to the ideal is likely 
• Consent by the tax official and the business to the action is unlikely 
• Protest against the action by the tax official and business is likely while protest 
against the ideal is unlikely 
• Third parties are usually not required to enforce the ideal 
5 A, TI, BI 
• The action accords with the interests of the tax official and business 
• These three actions do not accord with the ideal 
• Consent by the business and tax official to the Action is likely 
• Protest by the business and the tax official against the action is unlikely 
• Protest against the Action will be legitimate as it contravenes the ideal 
• Third parties are usually required to defeat the Action or prevent compliance with it 
6 I, A 
• The ideal accords with the tax official’s Action  
• Both the ideal and Action do not accord with the interests of the tax official or 
business 
• Consent to the Action by the business or tax official is unlikely 
• Protest against the Action by the business or tax official is likely 
• Protest will be illegitimate 
• Third parties may be required to checkmate the likely collusion between the business 
and the tax official to defeat compliance with the ideal or Action 
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S/N PERMUTATIONS 
7 I, TI 
• Only the tax official’s interest accords with the ideal 
• Both the tax official’s Action and the business’ interest do not accord with the ideal 
• Consent by the tax official and the business to the Action is unlikely 
• Protest against the action by the business and the tax official is likely 
• Protest will be legitimate 
• Third parties may be required to notify the tax official of the inconsistency between 
the action and the ideal; especially where the business does not protest against the 
action 
8 I, BI 
• Only the business’ interest accords with the ideal 
• Both the tax official’s interest and Action do not accord with the ideal and the 
business’ interest 
• Consent by the tax official to the ideal is unlikely 
• Consent of the business to the ideal is likely 
• Consent to the Action by the business is unlikely 
• Protest by the business  against the Action is likely 
• Protest will be legitimate 
• Third parties are usually not required to enforce the ideal 
9 A, TI 
• The tax official’s Action accord with the tax official’s interests 
• They do not accord with the ideal or the interests of the business 
• Consent by the tax official to the ideal is unlikely 
• Consent by the business to the ideal and the tax official’s Action is also unlikely 
• Protest by the business against the action is likely  
• Protest will be legitimate 
• Third parties are usually not required to enforce the ideal 
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S/N PERMUTATIONS 
10 A, BI 
• The tax official’s Action accords with the business’ interests 
• They do not accord with the ideal or the interests of the tax official 
• Consent by the tax official to the ideal is unlikely 
• Consent by the business to the Action is likely 
• Protest against the Action by the business is unlikely 
• Protest against the Action by the tax official (by failing to enforce it, for example) is 
likely and will be legitimate 
• Third parties will not be required in most cases (save where the tax official fails to 
protest against the Action) 
11 BI, TI 
• The interests of the business and the tax official are in agreement, though with 
nothing else 
• The business and the tax official are unlikely to consent to the ideal or the Action 
• The business and the tax official are likely to protest against the Action  
• Protest will be legitimate 
• Third party involvement is usually required to prevent collusion between the business 
and the tax official against the ideal  
12 No Agreement 
• None of the four potential actions are in agreement  
• Consent to the ideal by the tax official is unlikely 
• Consent by the business to the action is also unlikely 
• Protest by the business against the tax official’s action is likely  
• Protest will be legitimate 
• Third party involvement is not usually required to defeat the action  
 Permutations of the exercise of power 
 
The tax official’s power in the circumstances depends on his power relationship with 
the social environment, which enables his action, as much as it depends on his relationship with 
the business over whom he seeks to exercise power. While his relationship with the social 
environment determines the likely Action he will take, his relationship with the business (as 
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well as the business's relationship with the social environment) directly determines the success 
or failure of such Action. 
Where the tax official consents to the boundaries of the power conferred on him by the 
social environment, he will most likely seek to act within these boundaries. This will usually 
be the case where the dictates of his social environment accord with his interests in the 
particular circumstances. However, the tax official may seek to resist the dictates or confines 
of his social environment where his interests conflict with these dictates. This ambition of the 
tax official may be curtailed by the application of force or the increase in the cost of resistance 
by the social environment. The extent to which the social environment can increase the cost of 
resistance and the response of the tax official to this increased cost of resistance will determine 
the ambits of the tax official’s actions.  
In certain circumstances, the tax official’s action may neither accord with his interests 
nor the dictates of his social environment. One such circumstance is where the tax official acts 
against his interests while labouring under a misapprehension of the demands of his social 
environment. For instance, it may be in a tax official’s social interest to issue a notice of 
assessment to members of his community that requires them to pay the least possible amount 
of tax. The tax official, erroneously believing that his legal duty is to demand the highest 
possible amount of tax (as a result of a distortion of the communication between the tax law 
and the tax administration terminals), may issue a notice in a manner that neither accords with 
the law nor with his interests in the circumstances.   
When a business receives the action of a tax official, the business may either consent 
to or resist this action. The business’s consent may be based on either its acceptance of the 
action itself or the social environment enabling that action. Where the business’s consent is 
based on the action, it is unlikely to scrutinise the congruence between the action and the 
dictates of the social environment. This makes possible a scenario in which the business 
consents and consequently complies with an action that runs contrary to the ideal expectations 
of the social environment against which that action should be defined.  
In contrast, where the consent of the business is owed to the social environment, it is 
more likely that whatever action taken by the tax official will be scrutinised by the business to 
ensure that it is consistent with the dictates of this social environment. Where it is found to be 
inconsistent with the social environment, protest or resistance by the business will be very 
likely.  
In the event of protest or resistance to the action by the business, the success of the 
action will depend on the effectiveness of the force mechanisms which the tax official can 
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employ. Where the action of the tax official contradicts the dictates of the social environment, 
it will be difficult (if not impossible) for him to seek assistance from the force mechanisms of 
this social environment in securing compliance with the action. He will most likely only be 
able to rely on the force which he can muster without the aid of the particular social 
environment whose dictates his action has contravened.  
It is therefore apt to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate protest. Legitimate 
protest occurs where the action of the tax official conflicts with the ideal expectations of the 
social environment. Depending on the power relationship between the tax official and the social 
environment enabling his action, this action would usually be unable to achieve its outcome in 
the event of legitimate protest. Illegitimate protest occurs where the business resists an action 
by the tax official which accords with the ideal expectations of the social environment. In this 
case, both the force mechanisms of the tax official and the social environment can be called 
upon to secure compliance by the business. 
Business may be unwilling to protest against an action that goes against the ideal 
expectations. This will usually occur where such action aligns with the business’ interests. 
Here, third parties may instigate resistance and apply force to prevent the action from 
succeeding. This may involve either an attempt to defeat the action or prevent compliance with 
same. Likewise, the tax official may fail or be unwilling to apply force to secure compliance 
with an action that accords with the ideal. Here again, third parties will be required to directly 
or indirectly instigate sufficient force to ensure compliance. 
 
3.3.2 The Power Gap 
The efficient operation of the power relationship between the business and the tax official in 
the traditional setting described above primarily depends on four mechanisms. Firstly, there 
must be full awareness of the ideal expectations, the interests of the tax official and the 
business, the actions of the tax official, and the response of the business.  
Full awareness of the ideal expectations of the law and the actions of the tax official is 
important in determining the legitimacy of protests. Full awareness of the interests of the tax 
official will also help fashion the force mechanism through which the costs of resistance to 
dictates of the social environment can be increased.  
Likewise, full awareness of the response of the business is crucial to determining the 
legitimacy of the application of force. Knowledge of the interests or desires of the business will 
also help fashion the force mechanism through which the costs of its resistance to legitimate 
action can be increased.  
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Secondly, full access to the machinery through which protests can be made as well as 
the machinery through which force can be administered is crucial. Where no such machinery 
exists or access to it is limited, the operations of the power relationship may be considerably 
affected. 
Thirdly, the meaning and nature of actions, responses and the ideal expectations must 
not be distorted. Any distortion of meaning may affect the determination of the legitimacy of 
protests as well as the application of force; these may in turn affect the operations of the power 
relationship.  
Finally, full awareness, unrestricted access and the absence of distortion affect the 
capacity for action and are not determinative of action in itself. The business (and all interested 
third parties) may be fully aware of the inconsistency between an action and the ideal and have 
access to a protest mechanism that operates without distortion of meaning but yet may not 
protest against that action. Likewise, the tax official (and other interested third parties) seeking 
to exercise power over the business may be aware of resistance and have access to an adequate 
force mechanism that also operates without distortion and yet may not apply force to secure 
compliance.  
The effect of the possibility of inaction is that a gap between the actual and institutional 
power of actors may still exist even where there is full awareness, full access and no distortion. 
This indicates that deficiencies in awareness, restriction of access and distortion of 
Communications only increase the potential/capacity for a gap between the actual and 
institutional powers of actors. Action or inaction, in contrast, determines the width of this gap.  
How then can the power gap be defined or explained? A power gap exists where the 
actual powers of an actor as conferred upon him by the prevailing circumstances in his social 
environment either exceeds or falls below his institutional powers. In the individual channels 
of communication between business and the tax system, the social environment confers powers 
on one actor to act in a manner with which the other actor should comply subject to certain 
constraints. Therefore, a power gap will exist where the actor upon whom power is conferred 
is:  
1) unable (or fails) to act in the manner prescribed by the social environment;   
2) able to act in the manner prescribed by the social environment but unable (or fails) to 
secure compliance from the recipient actor; or 
3) able to act in a manner that the recipient actor complies with but which contravenes the 
dictates of the social environment. 
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Deficiency in awareness, restriction of access, distortion of communication and 
inaction play considerable roles in bringing about the power gap in these instances. The forms 
of power gap are examined in greater detail below with the aid of the PIA case discussed above. 
The overarching question remains: how were the companies able to continue claiming PIA at 
a rate contrary to the provisions of the law for a considerable period of time? 
 
3.3.2.1 Power Gap 1 
An actor seeking to exercise power may be unable to act in the manner required by the social 
environment owing to his unawareness of his obligation to act, the processes involved in taking 
action or the ideal expectations of the social environment. Unawareness of the obligation to act 
will usually be rare owing to the fact that the obligation to act follows one’s appointment as an 
actor. Unawareness of the ideal expectation is more likely, especially where the said 
expectations are contested, volatile or uncertain.  
Where these ideal expectations emanate from the legal dimension of the social 
environment, one can assume that they will be relatively certain. This is especially the case 
where these legal expectations are enshrined in a manner that is easily accessible to the actor 
seeking to exercise power. Even the dictates of the legal dimension of the social environment 
may be difficult to decipher. This will be the case where these dictates are encapsulated in texts 
that are ambiguous or technical in nature as is common within tax jurisprudence.  
The ideal expectations of the political dimension are often contested and not easily 
accessible owing to their residence in the hearts and minds of the individuals with the power 
to enthrone actors. The collective wishes/demands of these individuals (usually the electorate 
or interest groups in a functional democracy) are characteristically difficult to determine prior 
to action. These demands are also very volatile and may not represent the best interests of the 
state.  
The expectations of the economic dimension are frequently volatile owing to the 
changing economic/market conditions on which they are usually based. For instance, the price 
of oil may fluctuate from month to month making it difficult for tax policy-makers to make tax 
policies which take into account the price of this commodity without damaging the much-
needed stability of the tax system.  
The inability to act in the manner prescribed by the social environment may be due to 
the lack of access to the machinery for action. This includes any infrastructure without which 
action will be impossible. This invariably depends on the channel of communication and the 
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nature of the action in question. Finally, a deliberate decision against an attempt to exercise 
power by an actor who is expected to exercise power may cause the power gap. 
In the PIA case, law-makers had the power and duty to scrutinise the activities of the 
tax administration and business through the relevant channels of communication to ensure 
compliance with the law. The failure to utilise these powers is a form of power gap, which 
allowed the continuation of the state of affairs in which PIA was claimed at the wrong rate. 
This failure may be attributed to the lack of awareness or inaction on the part of the law-makers. 
  
3.3.2.2 Power Gap 2 
Even where the actor seeking to exercise power acts in a manner that complies with the ideal 
expectation, compliance with such action by the recipient actor may not be forthcoming. This 
may result from a state of affairs in which the recipient actor is unaware (or deficiently aware) 
of the action or the ideal expectations of the social environment. It may also result from the 
lack of access to an efficient force mechanism through which compliance may be secured in 
the event of resistance. Distortion of the action, ideal expectation or response during the process 
of applying force may create this form of power gap. Here again, a voluntary decision not to 
access the force mechanism (where same is present and accessible) may be the cause of this 
form of power gap.  
In the PIA case, the Petroleum Profit Tax Act constituted a demand for compliance 
directed at the tax administrators and businesses to collect and pay taxes respectively. Failure 
to comply with this demand is a form of power gap 3. This failure may be ascribed to a lack of 
awareness of the activities of the businesses on the part of the tax administrators, inaction or a 
deliberate distortion of the law. 
  
3.3.2.3 Power Gap 3 
A power gap may be created despite compliance by the recipient actor if the action by the 
exercising actor contravenes the ideal expectations of the social environment. This state of 
affairs may come about as a result of the recipient actor’s lack of awareness of the dictates of 
the social environment. Such lack of awareness may prevent the said recipient actor (or 
interested third parties) from instigating legitimate protests on the grounds of the inconsistency 
between the action and the dictates of the social environment. Even where the recipient actor 
(or an interested third party) is aware of the inconsistency between the action and the ideal 
expectations, lack of access to an efficient protest machinery may lead to this form of power 
gap.  
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Also, where there is full awareness and access by the recipient actor and interested third 
parties, a distortion of the action, response or the ideal expectations during the process of 
protest may also bring about this form of power gap. Finally, this form of power gap usually 
arises where the exercising and recipient actor collude to defeat the ideal. 
In the PIA case, businesses complied with a proposed tax policy that contravened a law. 
This is a form of power gap 3 as there was compliance with an illegitimate demand. This may 
have been due to unawareness on the part of the businesses or a distortion of the law.  
In summary, understanding power gap and its mechanisms provides a good foundation 
for understanding the means through which corruption may sustain itself in the two-way 
relationship. This assertion will become clearer after the analysis of corruption undertaken 
below. 
  
3.4 Understanding Corruption: A Process Definition 
The term ‘corruption’ has proved difficult to define in a universally accepted manner. Like 
power, corruption has been said to have a family resemblance.288 This connotes that the term 
corruption applies to a long list of actions that may be viewed differently depending on the 
temporal and spatial context. These acts, which may be referred to collectively as the 
‘corruption complex’,289 may include nepotism, bribery, neopatrimonialism, embezzlement 
and illicit campaign financing. 
Part of the controversy in defining the term relates to its application. Corruption may 
apply either to individual acts or entire systems. Early expositions by political philosophers 
such as Aristotle290 applied this term not to particular transactions, events or persons but to 
entire systems of law or governance. They conceived corruption as the ‘disintegration of the 
beliefs upon which a particular system rests’, or ‘the general disease of the body politic’.291 
This is markedly different from how the term is conceived by many relatively modern 
academics. Based on their observations of the developments in society, these relatively modern 
academics place more emphasis on corruption as a transaction perpetrated by either a lone 
individual or a collusion of two or more such individuals.  
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This somewhat reflects the different underlying challenges addressed by these scholars. 
The ancient scholars were challenged by the injustice ostensibly legitimised by systems of law 
and governance that had gone awry.292 In contrast, these modern scholars (especially those that 
theorised about the occurrence of the term in post-colonial times) are primarily concerned with 
the inability of seemingly progressive reforms or extant systems to produce positive results 
owing to corruption perpetrated by individuals in their dealings with other individuals.    
Nevertheless, both ancient and modern scholars have undertaken a disproportionate 
analysis of corruption as a problem of the public realm of society.293 This neglect of corruption 
in the private sector can be ascribed to the absence of clearly sourced public obligations on 
private sector actors, which is otherwise somewhat intrinsic to the popular understanding of 
the term. In recent times, however, an increasing volume of research has focused on corruption 
in the private sector.294 This may be a partial reflection of the growing role of the private sector 
in shaping human existence globally and the consequential increase in the recognition of public 
obligations of private firms. These obligations include those owed to shareholders, employees, 
consumers, suppliers and, most importantly, the communities that harbour them. This thesis 
focuses on the considerable potential for corruption in the relationship between actors in the 
private sector and their counterparts in the public sector. There are discourses on this in the 
works of scholars irrespective of their prime focus. 
One approach to understanding this complex phenomenon has been to identify different 
gradients of corruption. In this regard, a distinction has been drawn between political and 
bureaucratic corruption; petty and grand corruption; and need/survival based and greed based 
corruption. As their names imply, political corruption refers to that perpetrated by elected and 
appointed political office holders while bureaucratic corruption refers to that undertaken 
mainly by bureaucrats. Grand corruption refers to corruption of high economic or social 
significance and is usually perpetrated by political office-holders or senior bureaucrats. In 
contrast, petty corruption refers to corruption of low economic or social significance. It 
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commonly occurs within the bureaucracy and amongst low-level public sector officials.295 The 
distinction between need/survival corruption and greed based corruption is predicated on the 
motivation for engaging in the act. Corruption will be need/survival based where the individual 
undertook the act out of financial or social necessity. It will be greed based in the absence of 
such financial or social necessity.296 
Nye297 defined corruption as a ‘behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a 
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique), pecuniary or 
status gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence’. This definition recognises deviance and illicit gains as constituting parts of 
corruption. However, it remains silent on the motivations or processes involved in corruption. 
Punch,298 in contrasts, outlines various actions or omissions which may be classed as corrupt 
based on the impropriety of the process or the end result. In his words: ‘when an official 
receives or is promised significant advantage of reward (personal, group or organisation) for 
doing something that he is under a duty to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do, for 
exercising a legitimate discretion for improper reasons, and for employing illegal means to 
achieve approved goals’.299   
Modern academics and international organisations alike have come to accept a less 
controversial (minimalist) definition of corruption as workable for research. By this definition, 
corruption is the abuse of power (or entrusted authority) for private gain.300 However, this 
definition serves as a mere starting point for understanding the term corruption and its 
contextual differences.301 It does not effectively delineate actions which fall within and without 
the boundaries of this term. The often cited definition also primarily caters for the 
individualistic and not the systemic notion of corruption. This is because, with systemic 
corruption, the concern is not an abuse or misuse of power by actors but the state of existing 
systems in a society.  
Intrinsic to the modern understanding of corruption described above are the concepts 
of abuse of power and illicit gain. These concepts are not only context laden but also potentially 
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difficult to apply without inconsistency even within a given context. It is therefore pertinent to 
subject them to deeper analysis.   
 
3.4.1 Abuse of Power 
The presence of the element ‘abuse of power’ in the definition of corruption indicates that 
corruption is in effect an exercise of power. It also discloses that attached to this power is an 
expectation regarding how it should be exercised. Corruption occurs where this expectation has 
not been met. It is therefore worth asking what these expectations are, how they are established 
and how they evolve over time. As Scott stated,302 ‘corruption, we would all agree, involves a 
deviation from certain standards of behaviour. The first question which arises is, what criteria 
shall we use to establish those standards?’ 
It is widely accepted that these expectations may vary depending on the jurisdiction and 
time period under consideration.303 For example, between the 15th century and 18th century in 
Western Europe, the demarcation between public and private property was unclear. Public 
officials utilising their power in a manner that would benefit them privately was widespread.304 
This is not the case in present day Western Europe partly due to the clearer demarcations 
between the private and the public spheres of life. Likewise, what is corrupt may vary across 
jurisdictions. This can be seen in the different levels of acceptance (from a legal perspective) 
of campaign financing by companies seeking favourable government policies in different 
jurisdictions.305  
However, the recognition of the differences in the meaning of corruption does not 
preclude the appreciation of the broad similarities in the said meaning across time and 
jurisdictions. The direct embezzlement of funds by government officials, the award of 
government contracts to inept family members, and the insistence by private officials on the 
receipt of financial remuneration as a precondition for the provision of public services are some 
examples of corruption which may transcend time and jurisdictions to a considerable extent. 
However, acknowledging the differences and similarities in the meaning of corruption across 
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time and jurisdictions barely contributes to the resolution of the fundamental question about 
expectations and corruption.  
The importance of the source of expectations cannot be overemphasised. It is also 
crucial that these expectations are clear so as to reduce the difficulty in determining whether 
they have been breached.  
 
3.4.1.1 Law, Public Interest and Public Opinion 
Three possible sources of these expectations can be identified in the existing literature. They 
are: the law, public opinion and public interest.306 Of these three, law seems the most supported 
source of expectations. Public interest and opinion have been criticised for their 
indeterminacy.307 A given state may have conflicting public interests.308 Also, the public 
interest of a state may differ depending on the perspective of the actors taken into 
consideration.309 Similarly, public opinion can hardly be measured with pinpoint or even 
workable accuracy.310 It is also susceptible to rapid change depending on the event under 
consideration and other events occurring around it.311 
It is commonly believed that the law should reflect the expectations of the society 
regarding permissible actions. Where the law describes an act as corrupt, it should follow that 
the said action is corrupt within the society which the law governs.312 However, a singular 
focus on law as the measure for abuse or deviance should be questioned. Proponents of such 
singular focus may argue that, relative to other possible determinants, law is easily accessible 
and represents in most societies the expressed collective wish of its people. Also, using law as 
the barometer for corruption provides an alleged violator the protections and assurances 
inherent in the notions of fairness and justice, which are part and parcel of a legal system guided 
by the rule of law.313 However, some scholars recognise the failures of law to capture popular 
perceptions of the people, its tendency to legitimise seeming wrongs or render illegitimate 
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seeming rights, and its rigidity (when flexibility is required) as factors that justify the 
insufficiency of law as a sole determinant of corruption. 
Ackerman, for example, identified a scenario where an actor may have acted corruptly 
from a legal perspective but may not be considered corrupt from a moral perspective. This 
scenario involved the payment of a bribe by an individual in a Nazi concentration camp to an 
officer for the release of the individual and his young family.314 
Therefore, the question whether the term ‘corruption’ should or should not be applied 
to acts other than those which the law expressly describes as corrupt or not corrupt remains an 
important part of this debate. These acts may fall into three main categories. These categories 
are acts which are not expressly corrupt but illegal; not expressly corrupt and legal; and not 
expressly corrupt and in respect of which the law is silent. 
  
3.4.1.1.1 Not Corrupt but Illegal 
In a given jurisdiction, there may be no laws that designate the offering of bribes to government 
officials as corrupt. However, these acts are against the law. Does the failure to tag the act as 
corrupt absolve the same from the label of corruption – even though that act in question (as 
bribery does) leads to private gains to the officials involved? Put differently, is the illegality of 
an action sufficient to render that action corrupt (breach of expectations) if it also accords 
private gains to the public official, even though the act is not expressly tagged corrupt by 
positive law? 
 
3.4.1.1.2 Not Corrupt and Legal  
This relates to seemingly corrupt actions which are legalised by the law. Does the legalisation 
of a seemingly corrupt act absolve the said act from the tag of corruption? For instance, a law 
may make it mandatory for only a given set of individuals with connections with the 
government to be given employment. Does this legal backing prevent this act from being 
corrupt, despite the fact that employment on this basis seems like nepotism? 
Not considering this act as corrupt creates room for bias in the analysis by giving 
privilege to those with power to set the law over others. These powerful actors may influence 
                                                          
314 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study of Political Economy (Academic Press 1978). This situation has 
also been described as a ‘noble-cause corruption’ – See Geoffrey M Hodgson and Shuxia Jiang, ‘The 
Economics of Corruption and the Corruption of Economics: An Institutional Perspective’ (2007) 41(4) Journal 
of Economic Issues 1043.  
121 
 
the state of the law to ensure that their likely actions are both legal and not corrupt despite their 
resemblance to corruption.  
 
3.4.1.1.3 Not Corrupt and Silent 
The law does not cater for all actions or inactions of individuals. For instance, due to the faster 
pace of technological advancements, certain actions may exist that the law has not provided 
for (by terming them corrupt, illegal or legal). Can these actions be corrupt and if so, when will 
they be?  
The presence of these different categories partly reveals the insufficiency of the law in 
fully capturing the essence of corruption. Therefore, it is arguable that other possible standards 
should be applied in determining what is or is not corrupt. Also, it is pertinent to ask whether 
these other standards should be applied independent of, or in conjunction with, the law.  
Considering public interest or public opinion independent of the law, for example, will 
relegate the law’s designation of an act as corrupt or illegal to the extent that it does not 
influence the standards set in accordance with public interest or public opinion. In other words, 
law becomes at best an input in determining what the public interest or opinion is about the act. 
Public interest or opinion may also step in where the law is silent or unclear about the 
act, or merely classifies the act as illegal. Likewise, law may augment public opinion or interest 
where the latter is unclear or ambiguous.  
Considering the public interest or opinion in addition to the law raises the issue of how 
conflicts should be resolved between these standards. In the event of a conflict, which standard 
should be given priority? On the one hand, it can be argued that the law should be given priority 
because it is central to the functioning of society. On the other hand, it can be argued that the 
law exists for the protection of the public interest or as a rough reflection of public opinion. 
Therefore, the law should be subservient to these measures where a conflict exists.  
 
3.4.1.2 Expectations and the Dimensions of Society 
Rather than focus on law, public interest and public opinion, I argue in this thesis that the 
expectations that guide the definition of corruption may be sourced from different dimensions 
within a given society. These dimensions are the legal, political, economic, cultural, theological 
and moral dimensions, to name but a few. The number of dimensions will depend on the 
maturity of the society as a reflection of the extent of the functional differentiation that has 
occurred within it over time.  
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Each of these dimensions is capable of different expectations which may be observed 
by individuals both within and outside a social setting. However, not every dimension is 
directly important to the relationship between business and the tax system. This relationship is 
legal as it is facilitated by both hard and soft laws. It is economic judging from its prime purpose 
of generating revenue while attracting, encouraging and sustaining investments. It is political 
as it involves the empowerment of actors for the achievement of legal and economic goals. It 
is also moral to the extent that fairness and reasonableness are fundamental to the structure and 
contents of the said relationship.  
It is therefore arguable that the legal, economic, political and moral dimensions are 
directly relevant to the two-way relationship between business and the tax system. Some 
dimensions may also be indirectly relevant to this relationship through their impact on fellow 
dimensions. The moral dimension, for example, is indirectly relevant to the extent that it has 
an impact on the law or on the economic or political circumstances of the actors involved.  
In understanding corruption, therefore, it is important to inquire into what legal, 
economic, political and moral expectations guide or should guide the exercise of power by 
actors. Where an actor breaches these expectations and other elements of corruption are 
satisfied, then such an actor can be said to have acted corruptly within the dimension under 
consideration.  
However, the dictates of these dimensions may conflict. The expectations of the legal 
dimension may differ from that of the economic or the political. For instance, an illegal act 
may meet the ideal economic expectations even more so than an alternative act which meets 
the legal expectations. The expectations of a given dimension may also be corrupt when 
considered in light of the expectations of another. Where the expectations of a given dimension 
are corrupt when viewed from the lenses of a different dimension, corruption may be described 
as systemic in the former dimension. Here, corruption is ostensibly applicable to the rule rather 
than a deviation from it.315 
The legal, political, moral and economic expectations exist in their pure form 
independent of the actors in the two-way relationship. The perspectives of these actors are only 
relevant to these expectations to the extent that they form part of the internal codes and 
programmes from which expectations are sourced within a particular dimension. For instance, 
a tax policy-maker’s perspective on the law does not form part of or equate to the law until this 
                                                          
315 Christoph Stefes, ‘Measuring, Conceptualising and Fighting Systemic Corruption: Evidence from Post-
Soviet Countries’ (2007) 2(1) Perspectives on Global Issues 1, 7. 
123 
 
perspective is transformed into law via the legislative process. Likewise, a judge’s 
interpretation of the law is not the law until the point where it is accepted as law by the codes 
and programmes that determine what law is and what law is not.  
Nevertheless, these expectations are only relevant to the interactions between actors in 
the two-way relationship through the observations (or attempts at observation) by the actors. 
Hence, the perspectives of these actors on these expectations are crucial to the two-way 
relationship. However, it is important to distinguish the expectations of a dimension and an 
actor’s observation of these expectations as both may differ. The difference may result from 
the incompleteness of information available to the actor or an improper analysis or 
understanding of the available information.  
Regarding corruption, an actor may describe an act as corrupt or not corrupt based on 
the actor’s observation that the act breaches the expectations of a dimension in society. An 
actor’s choice of dimension may be influenced by his interests, decision frame or the general 
institutional setting within which he operates. For instance, judges are more likely to observe 
the expectations of the legal dimension when officially describing an act as corrupt or not 
corrupt. Politicians, in contrast, may be more concerned about how the action is perceived by 
the electorates or other actors with the power to determine their position of power.  
 
3.4.1.3 Social Expectations and the Institutionalisation of Corruption 
Beyond the observable expectations of these dimensions are the social expectations of actors 
in the two-way relationship. These social expectations arise from the regular interaction 
between the actors guided by the expectations of the different dimensions. The classification 
of an act as corrupt or not corrupt should not be made in light of these social expectations. This 
is because the mere fact that an act is ‘socially expected’ does not mean it is not corrupt.  
An act may be corrupt when judged in light of the expectations of a dimension of a 
society but may still be socially expected. An illustration can be made using the payment of 
bribes to tax officers. The individuals paying and receiving the bribe may recognise their 
actions as corrupt based on their appreciation of the expectations of a dimension of the society. 
Nonetheless, they may see the actions as expected in the circumstances. Where it is socially 
expected in a particular setting, corruption may eventually become institutionalised. Corruption 
is institutionalised where it develops its own machinery for enforcing compliance with its 
dictates.  
Like the expectations of the dimensions, social expectations can be observed by the 
actors in the two-way relationship. However, the observations of the social expectation by an 
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actor may differ from the expectation itself. Also, different actors may reach different 
conclusions about what the social expectations are in a given setting. 
  
3.4.1.4 Understanding Expectations 
As discussed above, different dimensions have potentially different expectations about how an 
actor in the two-way relationship should exercise power. Each dimension may possess 
expectations about whether an act should be taken but may also be silent regarding the act. In 
the situation where the dimension is silent about an act, the act cannot be said to be corrupt 
under the said dimension. However, the act may be corrupt when examined in light of the 
expectations of other dimensions.  
As aforementioned, it is pertinent to ask how these expectations are formed and how 
they change over time. With the legal dimension, the expectations are embodied in the statutes, 
case law and other rules (internal codes and programmes) that form the legal system. These 
rules are relatively rigid and accessible. As these rules change, the expectations of the legal 
dimension change as well.  
The expectations of the economic dimension encapsulate various norms that govern the 
economic goals of the tax system. An act will be an abuse where the act defeats or possesses 
the potential to defeat these economic goals. As the economic goals of the tax system within a 
given jurisdiction and time period change, the expectations about the actions of actors within 
this system will also change.  
The expectations of the political dimension include the written and unwritten rules 
which affect the likelihood that a given actor in the two-way relationship will hold, retain or 
express power. Actors in the two-relationship are empowered to act by other human and non-
human actors. Certain expectations exist which regulate whether the empowered actor may 
retain this position of power. In a democracy, for example, a tax policy-maker may have 
attained this position via an election. This position of power comes with certain expectations 
about how power should be exercised. Where these expectations are breached, the electorate 
may recall the said actor or otherwise prevent his retention of this position at the next election. 
It is this electorate that decides whether the power which they have accorded the individual has 
been abused for corrupt private gains within the political dimension. They also decide the 
repercussions of such a breach of expectations.  
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Due to the different sources of expectations across the various dimensions in a given 
society, a ‘horizontal gap’316 in the limits set to the action of an actor by the different 
dimensions may exist. This horizontal gap is also reflective of the different pace at which the 
expectations of these dimensions develop. 
For instance, the payment of bribes to a tax official to facilitate the performance of his 
duties may fall short of the legal expectations of the setting as enshrined in the law. It may, 
however, enhance the economic goals of the tax system if this payment incentivises lowly paid 
tax officials to work harder to ensure quality service delivery;317 enables businesses to avoid 
cumbersome bureaucratic regulations;318 or ensures more efficient prioritisation of tax 
officials’ workload319 or distribution of public services, licences and permits. For example, 
Beck and Maher argued that bribery may be akin to a competitive auction especially where the 
ability to pay a bribe is reflective of the talent of the payee.320 In other words, it may yet accord 
with the expectations of the economic dimension. However, these arguments do not take into 
account the fact that tax officials may artificially create inefficiency such as administrative 
delays in the system so as to extract bribes.321 Also, the illegality of actions may force actors 
to only deal with those they trust. This may create further inefficiencies in the system which 
fall short of its economic goals.322  
Also, a defensive breach of legal expectations may accord with moral expectations in 
an environment where breaches are widespread; legal force mechanisms are either ineffective 
or non-existent; not engaging in the breach will cause serious harm to the actor involved; and 
engaging in the breach will not cause harm to innocent third parties.323   
However, the expectations of one dimension may influence those of other dimensions. 
This influence is not direct. For example, the economic expectations of the exercise of power 
                                                          
316 Helen Bakker, ‘Corruption and Legitimacy: An Institutional Perspective’ in Helen Bakker and Nico Nordholt 
(eds), Corruption and Legitimacy (SISWO Publications 2000). 
317 David Bailey, ‘The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation’ (1966) 19(4) The Western Political 
Quarterly 719; Colin Leys, ‘What is the Problem about Corruption?’ (1965) 3(2) The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 215. 
318 Leff (n 42); Samuel P Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press 1968); 
Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Laurent Weill, ‘Is Corruption An Efficient Grease?’ (2010) 38 World Development 
2449; Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Khalid Sekkat, ‘Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?’ 
(2005) 122 Public Choice 69. 
319 Lui (n 42). 
320 Paul J Beck and Michael W Maher, ‘A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets’ (1986) 20 
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321 See Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama; An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol 2 (Pantheon 1968).  
322 See M Shahid Alam, ‘Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment’ 
(1989) 48 American Journal of Economics and Sociology 441.  
323 Gregory Kavka, ‘When Two ‘Wrongs’ Make a Right: An Essay on Business Ethics’ (1983) 2 Journal of 
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in the two-way relationship only affect the legal expectations to the extent that the former forms 
part of the internal codes and programmes of the latter. Likewise, the law becomes a mere 
cost/benefit input in computing whether an act falls short of the economic expectations of a 
given setting.  
The recognition of different dimensions should not unduly downplay the role of the 
legal dimension as the prime source of ideal expectations in modern societies. However, this 
premier role is not necessarily due to the assertion that the expectations of the legal dimension 
are more representative of justice and fairness, neither is it necessarily due to the assertion that 
these expectations are better tools for achieving sustainable and inclusive development. Rather, 
it owes to the fact that the legal dimension is often more gifted in three important areas. These 
areas are certainty or clarity of source, the presence of interpreters and the likely availability of 
institutionalised force and protest mechanisms. 
Social expectations may arise from the interaction which actors have with other actors 
in the field. Each actor possesses his own capital and pursues his own goals in line with his 
endogenously generated interests based on his social positioning in the setting. The pursuit of 
different goals, presence of varied interests and the possession of different capitals all 
contribute to the creation of social expectations in the two-way relationship.  
The expectations of the dimensions and the social expectations of the setting enjoy an 
interesting relationship. Social expectations may influence the expectations of the legal, 
economic and political dimension in at least two ways. Firstly, there is the likelihood that an 
actor’s observation of the expectations of these dimensions may be tainted by social 
expectations. Secondly, social expectations may bring about changes in the expectations of 
these dimensions. The expectations of the legal dimension as enshrined in statutes and case 
law, for example, may be targeted at reflecting social expectations and may therefore shift in 
line with them.  
Social expectations may also be influenced by the expectations of these dimensions in 
similar ways. An actor's observation of these social expectations may be affected by the said 
actor’s observation of the expectations of the different dimensions. The expectations of the 
economic, political, moral and legal dimensions may also contribute to the formulation of the 
social expectations within a setting. 
  
3.4.2 Corrupt Gain 
A crucial element of the popular conception of corruption is the idea that private gain should 
accrue directly or indirectly to the perpetrator. The term private gain is commonly accorded a 
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broad definition. It has been held to encompass all forms of gain, whether financial or social, 
accruing to the actor personally or to any other individual sufficiently close to him. This wide 
definition makes it imperative that the term gain is qualified. This is vital if a distinction is to 
be maintained between corruption and other acts of malfeasance.  
Nevertheless, limits to the definition of the nature of the gain (as distinct from the nature 
of the act) are important because an actor will in most cases derive some form of gain from his 
actions. For instance, a policy-maker may gain from the policy he formulates in terms of public 
support in an election irrespective of the virtue of the policy.  
One may ask whether the occurrence of an abuse of power is sufficient qualification for 
the gain. If this is the case, once there is an abuse, and any private gain accrues to the actor, 
then the act is corrupt. However, this blurs the distinction between a general abuse or misuse 
of power and corruption, considering the broad definition of gain. The need for a gain may be 
eliminated where the abuse of power itself is considered a corrupt private gain accruing to the 
public official concerned. Where the intention to abuse is not taken into consideration, this 
approach potentially eliminates the distinction between abuse of power and corruption. 
However, it is recognised that the act and the gain in certain instances may be inextricably 
linked. In such cases, qualifying the act as corrupt necessarily qualifies the gain as corrupt. One 
such instance is the embezzlement of public funds. 
An additional qualification which may be sufficient to distinguish corruption from an 
abuse of power is the mental element often attached to corruption. Unlike a general abuse or 
misuse of power, an act may only be corrupt where the accrued gain was a motivation for the 
action in the first place.324 Kleinig, for example, made such motivation the focal point when 
defining police corruption as an act ‘with the primary intention of furthering private or from 
the consideration of personal or political gain’.325 However, it may be difficult to establish that 
such motivation exists in a given case and not in another. Establishing this motivation will be 
relatively easy where the actor expressly demands or accepts the gain as a precondition for the 
action. It becomes less clear where the gain accrues to the actor after the performance of the 
required action without such an explicit demand. Nevertheless, a mere expectation of a gain 
may be insufficient as such an expectation may be present in certain seemingly non-corrupt 
acts. In the case of a non-benevolent policy-maker, for example, his desire to increase his 
                                                          
324 Intention has been identified as an integral feature of corruption. See, for instance, Robert C Brooks, ‘The 
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support by the electorate may be an a priori incentive for his actions, yet his actions may be 
better classified as an abuse of power and not corrupt.   
In this thesis, I argue that a distinction should be drawn between a corrupt action and a 
mere abuse of power by qualifying the gain itself rather than merely focusing on the mental 
element. In this case, a corrupt gain becomes a necessary element of corruption in addition to 
an abuse of power. As with the definition of abuse, it becomes necessary to identify a standard 
through which corrupt gains can be distinguished from non-corrupt gains.  
Here again, expectations emanating from the dimensions in a given society can be 
helpful. Certain gains may flout these expectations, thereby making them corrupt. For instance, 
the law may expressly prohibit the accumulation of certain gains by public officials. Therefore, 
such gains will be corrupt when accumulated. However, the law may merely state the level of 
gain which should accrue to a public official without expressly or implicitly prohibiting the 
further acquisition of gain. This silence of the law may indicate that such gains are not corrupt 
within the legal dimension, and therefore an act targeted at their accumulation through an abuse 
of power will not be corrupt within the said legal dimension. However, this should be 
distinguished from situations where the law expressly describes an act as corrupt irrespective 
of the nature of the gain accumulated. Here, the express classification of the act as corrupt 
renders redundant an analysis of whether the act and the gain accruing therefrom breach the 
expectations of the legal dimension. Such acts are automatically corrupt within the legal 
dimension regardless of the results of such analysis. 
The social expectations regarding gain may differ from the expectations of the 
dimension through which they may be observed. The accumulation of gain by a given actor 
may be socially expected but may yet be corrupt in light of the expectations of different 
dimensions in the society.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, corruption will be understood in light of the 
expectations of the legal, political, moral and economic dimensions in a given society and at a 
given time. For an action to be corrupt, the action must be an exercise of power which falls 
short of the expectations of a dimension in a given setting. The gain accruing from the abuse 
of power must also fall short of the said expectations of the same dimension under 
consideration. This is despite the fact that the action in question or the gain accruing therefrom 
may accord with the social expectations of the setting. 
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3.5 Corruption and the Power Gap 
Corruption may exist at three strata relevant to the two-way relationship. These strata include 
the expectations of the dimensions, the actions, and the social expectations. In this section, I 
will examine how corruption may sustain itself at these strata by exploiting the power gap in 
the two-way relationship (as increased or decreased by the levels of awareness, access, 
distortion and inaction). 
  
3.5.1 Corruption and the Expectations of the Dimension 
As already discussed, the expectations of a dimension within a society may be corrupt when 
judged from the lenses of a different dimension. The sustenance of corruption at this stratum 
is largely due to the absence of direct communication between the different dimensions. 
Borrowing the description of Luhmann in his theory on social systems, these dimensions are 
‘cognitively opened but normatively closed’.326 This implies that while they are capable of 
observing the happenings in other dimensions, they independently determine their own rules, 
expectations and development trajectory. This is in addition to the absence of a free flow of 
information between the various dimensions.327 For instance, changes in the economic 
expectations of the tax system are determined by the internal rules of the economic dimension. 
These changes are not automatically reflected in the legal and political dimensions in the same 
terms as they are in the economic dimension. These changes may only be reflected in these 
other dimensions to the extent that they are observed as part of the latter’s internal codes and 
programmes. Hence, the law may legitimise actions which owing to changes in the economic 
dimension are inherently corrupt while the economic dimension may legitimise actions which 
if undertaken contravene the law in a manner describable as corrupt.  
The existence of the different dimensions depends on the ability of each dimension to 
maintain its boundaries using its binary codes.328 Where a dimension fails to so maintain its 
boundaries, it may be taken over by or subsumed into other dimensions. The expectations of 
one dimension ordinarily counts as mere noise to the other dimension. However, this noise may 
be sufficiently loud enough to irritate the other dimension to action. As a result, in limited 
circumstances, ‘structural coupling’ may occur. This signifies that two dimensions may be 
                                                          
326 See Gunther Teubner, ‘Introduction to Autopoietic Law’ in Gunther Teubner (ed) Autopoietic Law: A New 
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sufficiently tied together on an issue to the extent that they are similarly affected by changes 
on that issue. However, despite structural coupling, the different dimensions internally 
determine the trajectory of the change.329  
The failure of the law to develop in line with goals of the economic dimension may 
lead, for example, to the improper development of property rights which is sufficient to 
distinguish the public domain from the private domain.330 The lack of a legal distinction 
between the public and private may entrench a state of affairs in which the legal expectations 
are economically corrupt.  
In light of the four operating features, the mismatch that sustains the corruption of the 
expectations of a dimension may be ascribed to the following:  
- lack of direct access of one dimension to another; 
- lack of awareness by one dimension of developments in another; 
- distortion of the expectations of one dimension when taken into account as an input in 
another dimension; 
- inaction (to the extent that a dimension fails to change its expectations in light of the 
expectations of another).  
 
3.5.2 Corruption and Social Expectations 
Where the breach of expectations of a dimension continues unabated over time due to lack of 
awareness, restriction of access, distortions or inaction, corruption may become socially 
expected by actors in the field. The social expectation of corruption may breed more corruption 
to the extent that it affects future actions of actors. This may lead to a vicious cycle which may 
in turn reify the institutionalisation of corruption. Institutionalisation of corruption may also 
lead to systemic corruption. This will occur where social expectation of corruption is absorbed 
by the expectations of a dimension.   
Contrarily, the institutionalisation of corruption may increase awareness of the corrupt 
act. Where such institutionalisation does not also cloud the expectations of the dimensions of 
the environment by which the act is adjudged corrupt, this awareness may lead to increased 
efforts to tackle corruption. Hence, the institutionalisation of corruption may counter-
intuitively lead to its reduction in a given setting. 
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3.5.3 Corruption and Actions 
Corruption, an exercise of power, exploits a gap between the actual and institutional powers of 
actors. This gap reflects the failure or refusal of an actor to act in light of the expectations of a 
particular dimension. It is also indicative of the absence of an effective mechanism through 
which the expectations of a dimension may be enforced.  
There are four categories of actions which constitute an expression of power and which 
may fall short of the expectations of a dimension. These actions are the setting of an agenda 
for compliance (rule-setting); demanding compliance or complying (compliance); scrutinising 
compliance (scrutiny); and appointment. Each action is an exercise of power between an 
exercising actor and a recipient actor.  
Corruption at the level of individual actions may be classified into two main categories. 
The first category involves collusion between the exercising actor and the recipient actor. 
Collusion may either exist between actors within the tax system (in which case it may be 
classified as internal/organised corruption) or between a representative of the tax system and 
businesses (in which case it may be classified as external/individual corruption).331 In the 
second category, no such collusion exists. 
Where there is collusion by the actors to act in a manner that breaches the expectations 
of a dimension, third parties may intervene to ensure that the expectations are not breached. 
However, these third parties must be aware of the fact that the expectations have been or will 
be breached. They must also have access to a protest mechanism through which the breach may 
be publicised, as well as a force mechanism through which the cost of resistance to the 
expectations by the colluding actors may be heightened in order to prevent further breaches. 
The protest and force mechanisms must be free from distortion. Such distortion may relate to 
the action or the expectations which the action should satisfy. Finally, inaction on the part of 
the relevant third parties or the protest/force mechanisms may ensure the sustenance of the 
breach of expectations.  
Where there is no collusion, the recipient actor (as well as third parties) may also protest 
against the attempt to exercise power in a manner that breaches the expectations of the 
dimension. The occurrence of corruption will be minimised where there is awareness that the 
attempt at the exercise of power breaches the expectations of the dimension; access to an 
effective protest/force mechanism; absence of distortion in the protest/force mechanism; and 
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resistance of the temptation for inaction on the part of the recipient actor (third parties and the 
force/protest mechanism).  
Therefore, in cases of collusion or non-collusion, the power gap needed for the 
sustenance of corruption will therefore be widened or limited depending on the: 
- level of awareness by the recipient actor or interested third parties that the action breached 
the expectations of the dimension; 
- level of access to an effective protest/force mechanism; 
- level of distortion in the force/protest mechanism; and 
- level of inaction by the recipient actor, interested third parties or the protest/force 
mechanism.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out to resolve certain conceptual difficulties with the model. I examined 
the potential for the existence of a gap between the actual and the institutional powers of actors 
in the two-way relationship between business and the tax system. I argued that this gap is 
increased or decreased by the levels of distortion, awareness, access and inaction that plague 
the ‘communication link’ between both institutions.  
I analysed the meaning of corruption and examined the process definition of the concept 
to be applied in this thesis. Based on this process definition, an act will be corrupt where both 
the communicative action and the gain accruing to the actor therefrom breach the ideal 
expectations of a given dimension in society.  
I pointed out that corruption may exist at three strata (dimensions, social expectations 
or individual actions). In each case, corruption sustains itself in the relationship between 
business and the tax system by exploiting the power gap as widened or limited by the levels of 
access, awareness, distortion and inaction in the two-way relationship.  
This chapter provides the final aspect of the model which would be subject to further 
scrutiny through the remainder of this thesis using the data derived from the empirical study. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSINESS AND THE TAX 
SYSTEM: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS (1) 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis aims to understand the mechanisms through which corruption sustains itself in the 
relationship between business and the tax system. It is predicated on the assumption that by 
subjecting the two-way relationship to scrutiny, it is possible to identify the gaps that corruption 
might exploit.  
Empirical research was conducted of the two-way relationship in the Nigerian social 
context where corruption is reputedly rife. This chapter presents the first part of the findings of 
this empirical research. It contains a descriptive analysis of the research participants’ views on 
the two-way relationship between business and the tax system.  
It begins by recognising the importance of a good relationship to businesses. It also 
explains the differences between the experiences and actions of small and local businesses, on 
the one hand, and large and multinational businesses, on the other hand. It then reveals that the 
two-way relationship is plagued by issues with awareness, access, distortion and inaction at 
every terminal of the tax system and explains how these issues might influence the width of 
the gap between an actor’s actual and institutional powers. The penultimate section discusses 
other actors who may also influence the width of the power gap through their actions or 
inactions. This leads to the conclusion which contains an overarching summary of the 
researcher’s take on the two-way relationship in the Nigerian social context. 
  
4.2 Maintaining a Good Relationship 
Some participants commented that maintaining a relationship with the actors representing the 
tax system is key for businesses and the tax professionals that represent them. One of these 
participants explained the importance of a relationship with the tax administration in the 
following words: 
Of course, you cannot be a successful tax practitioner without interacting with the FIRS. You should 
work with them, understand them and know how they eat and drink. (DK) 
 
This need to maintain an amicable relationship extends beyond the tax officials. 
Businesses should also maintain a good relationship with tax policy-makers as explained by a 
participant thus:  
There is a need to have a good relationship with the tax policy-makers. When you don't have a good 
relationship with them, it presents its own challenge … That relationship in this environment makes a lot 
of difference. (DO) 
 
134 
 
Building an amicable relationship may help avoid delays in dealing with requests made 
by businesses to the actors representing the tax system. This was pointed out by another 
participant in the following words:  
Well generally, even for the tax policy-makers as well, relationship is key. If you have good relationship 
with those guys, they may go out of their way to fasten the speed at which they respond to the policy 
requests you have made. So, relationship is very key in liaising with them. (IE) 
 
Businesses also turn to these relationships in situations where they are faced with 
ambiguity, arbitrariness or oppression. A good relationship may ensure that a business avoids 
the adverse exercise of discretionary power by the actors representing the tax system, as a 
participant explained:  
Based on the way tax law is, a number of things are left to the tax man's discretion. You don't want to 
confront them so that when it is time for them to apply their discretion, they will not apply it to your 
detriment. You always want to be on the side of the tax man. As it is, either because of cultural 
perceptions or out of fear, in Nigeria and in this organisation, we try to avoid any face-off or conflict 
with them. (MA) 
 
Informal relationships may give businesses security against certain challenges faced 
when handling their tax affairs and are often utilised by those that have access to them. 69.16% 
of the survey respondents indicated that, where wronged or faced with a challenge when 
handling their tax affairs, small businesses rely on informal relationships always, very often or 
sometimes. 41.12% indicated that small businesses rely on informal relationships in this 
manner either always or very often. This is higher than the percentage of respondents who 
indicated that small businesses may take other listed steps either always or very often, such as: 
go to the legislators (1.87%); go to the media/press (3.74%); go to enforcement agencies 
(4.67%); go to Ministry of Finance officials (10.28%); go to court/TAT (6.48%); do nothing 
(27.88%); go to their representative body (19.63%); go to persons with influence (27.61%); or 
go to superior tax officials (33.96%). This indicates that relying on informal relationships is a 
highly utilised means through which small businesses deal with challenges faced when dealing 
with the tax system. 
57% of the respondents indicated that in the same circumstances large businesses rely 
on informal relationships always, very often or sometimes. 21.49% of these respondents 
indicated that large businesses rely on informal relationships either always or often. This 
suggests that small businesses are more likely to rely on informal relationships than large 
businesses.  
However, maintaining a good relationship may come at a cost. Certain businesses may 
ignore or forgo their rights to protest against wrongs on the altar of maintaining the said 
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relationship. Even beyond tax-related matters, the general closeness of businesses with the state 
may deter such protests as a participant explained in the following words:  
[Businesses] are not likely [to take action against a tax official]. In Nigeria, you don’t fight the 
government. Most of them depend on the government for their business. Most of my clients just let go 
most times. As you can’t fight the government, let’s engage them; rather than go to court to pursue 
redress and ensure punishment for the erring official. (AF) 
 
Failure or unwillingness to protest in line with the limits of the institutional settings is 
an example of a power gap which corruption might exploit in sustaining itself in the 
relationship between business and the tax system. This is because it creates room for the success 
of an illegitimate demand or exercise of power. 
In contrast, some businesses are frightened by the prospect of a relationship with tax 
officials. A relationship may lead to greater awareness of the business and its activities on the 
part of the tax officials, which may have adverse consequences for the business. This is 
especially the case where the business is wary of the power imbalance in its relationship with 
tax officials. Such businesses may worry that tax officials who are more aware of their activities 
may seek to exploit them where they are non-compliant or frustrate them where they are 
compliant. One participant explained this phenomenon in the following words:  
In Nigeria today, the closer you get to the tax official, the more problems you experience. … The closer 
you are to them, the more problems it creates, because they do not base their analysis on the factual. All 
they are interested in is creating problems that lead to discussion so that subsequently it will result in 
some form of payment. This is a big problem in Nigeria and it is really discouraging taxpayers. (AE) 
 
4.3 Small Businesses vs Large/Multinational Businesses  
The level of interaction between a business and the tax authority is influenced by the visibility 
of the said business. In an ideal setting, the tax authority should be aware of both the existence 
and activities of all businesses within its jurisdiction. The lack of visibility of certain businesses 
is an indication of a deficiency in awareness, which may extend the power gap. The deficiency 
in awareness may also result in an uneven spread of tax burden between businesses with a good 
relationship with the tax authority and those that are beyond their prying eyes. 
Businesses that are less visible can afford to avoid building a good relationship with the 
tax authority. However, for large and multinational businesses, building a relationship of some 
kind is not only key but also in practice unavoidable. In explaining the different challenges in 
interacting with large and small businesses, a tax official commented as follows:   
Like yesterday, I was in training with the tax controller in Lagos here. In fact, he is the man in charge of 
[a company’s] tax issues. I noticed that he was in constant communication with their tax manager to 
bring the returns; that they [the tax authority] are already waiting …. The problem we have sometimes 
is bringing those small-small businesses into the tax net. For the big companies, it is consistent, effective 
and productive communication. (BI) 
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The experiences and actions of small and local businesses differ from those of large 
and multinational businesses when it comes to interaction with the tax system. The responses 
of participants suggest that small and local businesses are less likely to be aware of the tax laws 
as well as the procedures for protest in the event that an actor representing the tax system 
commits a wrong. While 6.36% of the survey respondents classified the awareness of small 
businesses as high or very high, 72.73% of the said respondents classified the awareness of 
small businesses as either low or very low. The awareness level of local businesses as indicated 
by the majority of survey respondents is very similar. Only 9.35% of respondents classified the 
awareness of local businesses as high or very high, while 69.16% of respondents classified 
their awareness as low or very low. This is in stark contrast with the respondents’ description 
of the awareness of large and multinational businesses. 65.14% of respondents indicated that 
the awareness level of large businesses was either high or very high. Only 1.83% of respondents 
indicated that the awareness level of large businesses was low or very low. For multinational 
businesses, 88.18% of respondents indicated that their awareness level is high or very high, 
while 3.46% of respondents indicated that their awareness level is low or very low.  
The creation of separate communication channels for businesses depending on their 
size by tax authorities around the globe may contribute to the difference in experience between 
large businesses and SMEs. This approach is usually justified on the basis that businesses of 
different sizes have different tax challenges which are better handled separately. The state also 
generates a disproportionate amount of tax revenue from large and multinational businesses. 
When a new policy or bill is to be introduced, participants at the stakeholder forums held by 
the tax offices are usually large or multinational businesses or tax consultants. As a participant 
noted:  
I am not sure what the criteria is; but what I find when I attend those forums is, there are a lot of 
multinationals. … I think they always invite guys that are registered in the large tax office because, really, 
probably 80 per cent of tax revenue comes from those companies. They try to engage guys that are 
registered in the large tax office. Many of them are multinationals; but you do have some of the Nigerian 
big businesses there. (SA) 
 
Where large and multinational businesses participate more in the process for the 
formulation of policies and laws, they are more likely to be aware of the laws and policies 
emanating from this process. The difference in the levels of participation may indicate that 
small and local businesses have restricted access to the relevant terminal. These businesses 
may feel they lack substantive (as distinct from formal) access to these forums. Some of these 
businesses may be unaware of the existence of the opportunities to interact with the tax system. 
137 
 
Also, some businesses may be aware and have full access but may yet be unwilling to 
participate. This unwillingness indicates inaction.   
Beyond participation, many interviewees commented that multinational and large 
businesses are more likely to be compliant with their tax obligations. As a participant 
explained:  
What you find is most of the multinationals don't have the culture of doing that [not complying]. They 
will either find a way of proving that their debt is less than that or probably pay it. Nigerian businesses 
to be honest are not that disciplined. Those guys are more likely to negotiate with the tax authority. 
Because the truth is, from a compliance perspective, multinationals are way more compliant than 
Nigerian businesses and this is in terms of obvious compliance. So of course it’s not that all 
multinationals are compliant. Multinationals could do things that are wrong unknowingly such that they 
are unwittingly robbing the government of tax revenue but generally they are way more compliant than 
Nigerian businesses. The average multinational will pay the personal income tax of their employees in 
full but the average Nigerian businesses would not …. So if you go to the average guy that works for a 
Nigerian business and ask him what his tax rate is, he will tell you 5 per cent or 5000 Naira which could 
come to 1 per cent of his total package. Meanwhile as a minimum you should be paying about 20 per 
cent of your salary as taxes. (SA) 
 
When asked whether large businesses are more likely to comply with their tax liabilities 
than small businesses, 90% of the survey respondents either agreed or strongly agreed. 
Similarly, when asked whether multinational businesses are more likely to comply with their 
tax obligations than local businesses, 81% of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed.  
Compliance is an exercise of power that is legally, morally and economically expected 
of actors in the tax institutional setting. That certain businesses are more compliant on average 
than others is an indication of the extent of the power gap in the relationship that the tax system 
has with both classes of businesses. The power gap in the relationship with multinationals and 
large businesses as a result of the higher levels of compliance is likely to be lower than it is in 
the relationship with their local and small counterparts, if all other factors are assumed to be 
equal.  
In the opinion of some participants, the difference in attitude of both categories of 
businesses extends to situations where multinational companies are provided with the 
opportunity to pay less tax than they should, out of negligence by the actors representing the 
tax system. As a participant pointed out: 
[If required to pay less tax due to negligence by the tax authority], well, I will imagine some companies 
especially those affiliated with the US SEC companies will like to pay the additional money. There are 
many others that will just carry on. If such negligence comes to our attention, we will bring it to their 
attention so they can pay. I am very sure that for the ones affiliated to the American SEC companies or 
the US companies, they have some strict rules and would always pay what they should pay. They will 
always pay their additional taxes. Some of the local companies may be happy that such negligence 
occurred. If it came to our attention as tax advisers, we will always bring it to their attention and leave 
them to make the decision. (DA) 
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Put differently, even where the initial demand falls short of the ideal expectations of 
the institutional setting and may accord with their interests, more multinational businesses than 
local ones are willing to close the potential increase in the power gap by responding in a manner 
that accords with the ideal expectation rather than the demand of the exercising actor. This 
willingness to meet the ideal level of compliance may be due to the business’ realisation of the 
long term benefits and power gains of compliance. 
Since multinational and large businesses are more likely to comply, they are less likely 
to be hindered from protesting by previous non-compliance unlike local or small businesses. 
As a participant commented:  
Like I said, companies with foreign backgrounds cry out more irrespective of if it is corruption or 
anything. The Nigerian companies: because they say he who comes to equity must come with clean 
hands, so most companies that feel that they are not even so clean may not cry out. Because, you will 
feel like perhaps crying out will expose other things that they have not found out. (IE) 
Non-compliance is an indication of a power gap. It also widens the power gap further 
by preventing recipient actors from resisting or protesting against an illegitimate exercise of 
power. This power gap may continually widen in a vicious cycle starting with non-compliance, 
then followed by an illegitimate demand, and then with further non-compliance and so on. In 
the process, the business is further pushed away from the ideal by the increment in its ‘proper’ 
liability (especially where interests and penalties are charged – together with a potential for 
imprisonment for the commission of a crime). This is worsened as the tax authority is entitled 
to revisit previous non-compliance brought about by fraud or corruption indefinitely, due to an 
exemption to the statutory limits on this basis.332 Businesses, in this situation, may in effect be 
rendered hostages to their previous malfeasance.   
The survey results support the assertion that small businesses are less likely to protest 
where wronged or faced with a problem. For instance, 60% of survey respondents indicated 
that small businesses are likely to do nothing in these circumstances always, very often or 
sometimes. The percentage of respondents indicating that large businesses will do nothing 
always, very often or sometimes was just 14%. The difference in potential response between 
small and large businesses is consistent across the formal means of protest including going to 
court/TAT. 93.52% of respondents indicated that large businesses will go to court always, very 
often or sometimes, as against 21.29% for small businesses.  
Some participants suggested that the difference in the propensity for multinational 
companies to protest against a perceived wrong compared to that of small and local businesses 
                                                          
332 See Companies Income Tax Act 1990, s 66. 
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may be the result of a difference in experience or background. For instance, regarding protests 
by instituting actions in court, one participant commented as follows:   
The multinationals also tend to be more inclined to go to courts. Nigerian companies generally want to 
settle things out of court. But if I look at a lot of the cases that have gone to the tribunals – that have gone 
as far as the High Courts or Court of Appeal – they are all cases involving multinationals. We can say 
the multinationals are more comfortable probably because of their background where in their country 
they are very happy to go and see what the judge has to say. I think the active people are really the 
multinationals. It is either the multinationals in the oil and gas sector or the multinationals in the 
manufacturing sector. It is mostly the big businesses. (SA) 
 
From the above quotation, past or background experience ostensibly plays a role in 
shaping human action. The difference in such experience between businesses as a result of their 
different institutional environments may be partly responsible for their attitudes towards 
protest. This is despite the fact that in many other respects both the multinational and local 
businesses share similar legal, moral, political and economic institutional obligations as they 
operate in the same domestic settings where attempts at illegitimate exercises of power may 
take place.  
Where protest involves going to court, an important consideration is the amount of 
money at stake as explained by a participant thus:  
Most companies [that go] to the tribunal, to maybe try and have judgement in their favour, consider the 
liability involved. If it is huge and they don't agree with the position of the revenue, then they go to the 
tribunal; but when it comes to those small income earners and individuals, it is hard to get them to go to 
the tribunals. (MU) 
 
Multinational or large businesses are more likely to be parties to tax disputes involving 
large sums of money. Hence, they have a greater incentive to interact with the dispute 
resolution terminal than local or small businesses. Certain issues are identifiable from this 
dynamic. Firstly, the difference in power resources (or constituent actors in their network) 
makes it more likely for multinational and large businesses to institute actions in courts or 
tribunals. Secondly, there may be an issue with access to a protest mechanism through which 
businesses may seek redress. In the event that their claims are not sufficiently large enough to 
support a case in court or at the tribunal, businesses may be said to lack substantive access to 
a protest mechanism if there is no other mechanism through which their concerns can be 
addressed. Finally, one may recognise a horizontal institutional gap between the expectations 
of the economic dimension and that of a legal or moral dimension. The expectations of the 
economic dimension, with its focus on efficiency and effectiveness, suggests that businesses 
should not protest through the courts where such a step is not economically viable despite a 
potential legal or moral expectation and power to do so. 
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One participant captured the issues discussed above by attributing the difference in 
likelihood that large or multinational businesses will protest compared to small or local 
businesses to their respective economic, social and political capitals. These often manifest in 
the levels of awareness of these businesses. According to this participant:  
I think it will be a selective reaction [to a perceived wrong] because it depends on who has the financial 
muscle and who has the political capital or social capital to be able to confront the tax administrator. I 
know they will like to bamboozle their way and threaten you but most Nigerians don't know the tax laws, 
so how will you respond? How will you react? It will be a selective reaction. For the big businesses, they 
know what is at stake and they have in-house tax consultants. Most companies, except the big ones, don't 
have in-house tax officers or tax analysts that actually have a grip of the tax laws to be able to respond 
to such abuse of power. (OI) 
 
Where businesses are faced with negligence by the actors representing the tax system, 
their responses may be influenced by the internal and external measures to which these 
businesses are subject. Multinational companies are more likely to be subject to more advanced 
internal and external measures as pointed out by a participant thus:  
I don’t think all businesses are likely to react this way [protest in the face of negligence]. I think given 
my experience what you refer to as international companies because of the higher or more stringent 
requirements they are subject to locally in their base countries will more likely react in that way. Local 
companies or those that are with small or limited governance structures will take it in their stride or find 
a way round the negligence. (DO) 
 
Here, the difference in the legal institutional mechanisms to which both classes of 
businesses are subject is represented as vital. While large and multinational businesses may be 
subject to varied and stronger institutional force mechanisms capable of ensuring that their 
actions and reactions fall within the institutional limits, this cannot be said for small and local 
businesses.  
As it pertains to corruption, multinational companies may be subject to domestic laws 
with extra-territorial effect in their home countries. Some participants directly related their 
impression of the difference in attitude between multinationals and their local counterparts to 
these laws. For instance, one participant explained thus:  
The big business are listed on the stock exchange and they are already caught up in the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA). They cannot afford to aid and abet a corrupt official in Nigeria because: number 
one, it is going to be a smear on their reputation and it is also going to affect everything about them, their 
capital, [and] their share price. So they have a lot more to lose. They will react more. But when you talk 
about some companies here in Nigeria, when you talk of corruption, it is a give and take thing. If I find 
out that you are corrupt and you are asking for money to be able to help me deal with the issues of tax 
liability, an average business will be willing to settle with peanuts and not go through the whole hog of 
compliance; if it is just going to give it some reprieve. For them, I would say that a corrupt tax official, 
they wouldn't mind. But for the big businesses, they have more to lose so they will react. (OI) 
 
However, these foreign laws with extra-territorial effect in form do not contain more 
stringent obligations than the domestic laws on corruption in Nigeria to which both 
multinational and local businesses are subject. The likely difference is that the legal and other 
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force mechanisms in the case of the foreign companies are duplicated and seem to be more 
effective. That is, they are more likely to reveal inconsistencies between actions and ideal 
expectations, more frequently activated against erring actors, and freer from distortions. 
Finally, non-compliance may lead to damage to reputation. The fear of damage to 
reputation may account for the difference in attitude between large/multinational businesses 
and small businesses. Large/multinational businesses are more likely to be concerned about 
potential damage to reputation due to non-compliance than small and local businesses. 
  
4.4 The Tax Law Terminal  
Some participants commented that their interactions with the tax system are adversely affected 
by the state of the Nigerian tax laws and the inactivity of the tax law-makers. Unlike in 
comparable jurisdictions in Africa and around the world, the Nigerian law-makers rarely 
modify existing tax laws. The laws governing taxation of companies engaged in the exploration 
and production of oil and gas has, for example, received relatively few amendments since its 
enactment in 1959. This is despite the dynamic nature of the oil and gas industry and its 
surrounding socio-economic and geo-political circumstances. As explained by a participant:  
There is also the issue of how up to date the law is. The tax laws in Nigeria tend not to have been updated 
on a regular basis. The fact that some of the laws are outdated makes it a bit of a challenge interacting 
with these law makers (DO) 
 
The relative inaction in the tax law terminal can be ascribed to various factors. These 
include the lack of tax consciousness on the part of the tax law-makers (they are not even 
taxpayers), military rule for most of Nigeria’s independent existence, and the absence of 
sufficient political, legal or economic pressure on law-makers.  
Tax consciousness is an issue of awareness. They are not tax conscious in the sense that 
they are not aware of the extant policies and laws, the nature of amendments required and the 
importance of an efficient tax system to the operations of the state. In comparison with other 
prominent actors representing the tax system, participants stated that tax law-makers have the 
lowest level of awareness. This was explained by one participant thus:  
It [the level of awareness] becomes worse with tax law-makers [compared to policy-makers]. There are 
no specific tax law-makers in Nigeria. When tax law issues come up, they try to take it in their stride and 
try to get to know more about it. That presents its own challenge. So for tax law-makers you have to start 
from ground zero and do a lot of education but in a very nice way otherwise they will feel insulted and 
quite unwilling to work …. It is basically about education. They don't know it; we know it. So we need 
to start explaining to them, providing implications and scenarios for them to be able to cross that bridge 
and be on the same page before we begin to have a meaningful communication. (DO) 
  
This is supported by the results of the survey. Only 37.14% of the survey respondents 
classified the level of awareness of law-makers as high or very high compared to 88% for FIRS 
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officials, 66% for state tax officials, 50% for Ministry of Finance officials, 67% for the courts 
and 90% for tax tribunals.  
Some participants opined that tax law-makers merely regurgitate what is presented to 
them by the FIRS and tax policy-makers. A participant explained thus: 
Because I believe most of the people there are not tax people, they do not understand it. It is whatever 
FIRS wants them to do that they do. So for me, interacting with them, they won’t understand these issues 
you are even raising. So for me, I try to avoid it. (OLA) 
 
The modification of existing laws is clearly not an ideal legal expectation. It may, 
however, be an ideal moral or economic expectation. It is a moral expectation where it is unfair 
or inequitable for the laws to remain in their unmodified state. It is an economic expectation 
where changes in the economic circumstances of the state, both domestically and 
internationally, should push the legislators to change the law.  
The lack of sufficient pressure on tax law-makers to act is indicative of the breakdown 
in institutional mechanisms. For instance, since the amendment of the law is not a justiciable 
legal obligation of law-makers, an actor cannot take legal action to compel them to act. Also, 
Nigeria is a rentier state as most of its revenue is derived from the exploration and production 
of oil and gas. As a result, there is a perception amongst many within it that the state need not 
rely on tax revenues. It may take a massive drop in the price of oil (such as what is currently 
taking place) to push the state apparatus to emphasise the need to generate more tax revenues 
through an efficient system of taxation. Despite the growing maturity of the relatively nascent 
democracy in Nigeria, the law-makers remain sheltered from political pressure. There is a 
general deficiency in awareness of and restriction of access to their communicative actions. 
More so, the challenges faced by the electoral system333 make it difficult for those who want 
to vote out non-performing politicians to do so. Even where the above is not the case, many 
Nigerians are also not tax conscious. This reduces the likelihood that law-makers would be 
held accountable for their inability to modify existing tax laws.   
The actual or perceived inactivity of the tax law-makers causes other actors to 
circumvent the tax law terminal where possible. For instance, tax policy-makers in Nigeria 
effected major changes to the tax circumstances of companies in the oil and gas industry in 
order to encourage investment in the face of falling oil prices in the 1980s via a Memorandum 
of Understanding. In 2011, they also introduced Transfer Pricing Regulations to govern 
transfers between related companies. Partly recounting the circumstances leading to the 
introduction of Transfer Pricing Regulations in 2011, one participant commented as follows:  
                                                          
333 Rotimi Suberu, ‘Nigeria’s Muddled Elections’ (2007) 18(4) Journal of Democracy 95. 
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If you have been following the news, transfer pricing has become a big issue, it is either Action Aid is 
writing something or NGOs are talking of Mopani mines. And because a lot of other tax agencies are 
interested, they felt … we need to get involved …. When they wanted to introduce formal provisions, 
they could not go through the legislative process because it would have delayed them. They are legislators 
that don't understand what it is: some of them will have their own personal interest; some of them will 
be influenced by other people that don't want the law to take effect. They just looked at the environment 
and said: what can we do within our power? They looked at the law. They have an anti-avoidance 
provision that says, FIRS has the power to make adjustments if it can be proved that [transactions are 
not] at arms-length;334 and they said if you have this in the law already, there is another piece of the 
legislation that says FIRS has the power to give guidelines to give effect to the law.335 Why don’t we just 
do that since that is within our powers? For that, we just need to convince the Ministry of Finance. So 
they came up with regulations for transfer pricing that will say that each company that has related party 
transactions, these are the information you need to provide to us every year. This is the analysis you need 
to show us to convince us that you transacted at arm’s-length. In some countries these things are in the 
law. They are part of the law. In Nigeria, trying to put it in the subsidiary legislation would have been a 
very long thing [would have been difficult]. The guys at the FIRS just looked at what they could do 
within their powers … The legislators are concerned about other things. Whatever laws that come from 
them are always suspect. (SA) 
 
Where the powers of the tax law-makers are usurped as a result of their inactivity, it 
can be described as a distortion of the identity of the actor holding power. The accompanying 
danger may lie in the over-concentration of powers in certain actors. This is a cause of concern 
as the tax law-makers’ role extends to scrutiny of tax policy-makers and tax administrators. 
Where they have failed to exercise their primary powers, they may also fail to exercise their 
powers of scrutiny.  
One participant pointed out that tax law-makers give a disproportionate amount of 
attention to scrutinising awards of contracts and to performing other similar oversight functions 
compared to the attention given to amending and reviewing tax laws. While attempts by the 
FIRS and policy-makers to instigate amendment of the laws or the enactment of new laws are 
often unsuccessful, interaction is often instigated by the law-makers regarding the general 
management of the FIRS rather than the specific needs of the tax system. In the words of the 
participant: 
Sometimes, we are told that he [The Chairman House Committee on Finance] is in Revenue House to 
check FIRS. They don’t come in respect of their core functions …. They don’t often come because they 
have a constitutional responsibility to change the law …. If there [are] irregularities in awarding a 
contract, ‘trouble don start’. ‘Wahala has started’ [there will be trouble]. They want to report the chairman 
to the EFCC [body responsible for prosecuting financial crimes]. People try to protect interests. The 
interaction is not really based on their core functions rather their oversight functions because that is where 
they may likely go back to their states a better person in terms of finances. (BI) 
 
                                                          
334 See section 22 of the Companies Income Tax Act 1990 which states:  
Where the Board is of the opinion that any disposition is not in fact given effect to or that any 
transaction which reduces or would reduce the amount of any tax payable is artificial or fictitious, it 
may disregard any such disposition or direct that such adjustments shall be made as respects liability to 
tax as it considers appropriate so as to counteract the reduction of liability to tax affected, or reduction 
which would otherwise be affected, by the transaction and any company concerned shall be assessable 
accordingly.  
335 See FIRSEA, s 61. 
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This is an example of a situation in which interests control actions. The extent and 
direction of scrutiny as suggested by the participant is influenced by the interests of the law-
makers. This leads to inaction regarding the performance of the neglected duties. 
Some participants commented that even where tax law-makers enact laws, businesses 
and tax professionals are often not adequately consulted beforehand. Owing to their poor 
awareness of the tax laws and peculiarities of various industries, the end product is also often 
riddled with inconsistencies. 
The inactivity of the tax law-makers preserves outdated laws sometimes borrowed from 
other jurisdictions without clear application to the circumstances in Nigeria. One participant 
complained that borrowing laws without ensuring that they fit into the context to which they 
are to be applied may create interpretation problems, thus:  
We must start from the laws – the applicable laws; how useful are they? Most of time they just copy. 
There is an applicable law in the UK; you just copy it. There is a particular provisions of the law we don't 
understand today. If I give you these provisions of the law, you will give it a different interpretation. 
Everybody that reads it gives it a different interpretation. These provisions have been interpreted 
severally in such a way that makes the taxpayer to pay more than what he is supposed to pay. Well, we 
have to start from there. We have to take a look at our laws. Our laws have to make more sense. I will 
refer you to a particular provision of the Companies Income Tax Act, section 19. It discourages 
investment. The way it is being interpreted by the courts. It will make you not want to invest money in 
Nigeria. You will not want to be a shareholder. That section will have the effect on the dividend you will 
be receiving from the company you are a shareholder in. (MU) 
 
Section 19 of the Companies Income Tax Act 1990 is a prime example of a provision 
of the Nigerian tax law which has remained problematic for stakeholders. This section provides 
as follows:  
Where a dividend is paid out as profit on which no tax is payable due to:  
(a) No total profits; or  
(b) Total profits which are less than the amount of dividend which is paid, whether or not the 
recipient of the dividend is a Nigerian company,  
Is paid by a Nigerian company, the company paying the dividend shall be charged to tax at the rate 
prescribed in subsection (1) of section 40 of this Act as if the dividend is the total profits of the company 
for the year of assessment to which the accounts, out of which the dividend is declared, relates. 
  
This section provides for excess dividend taxation. In summary, it mandates that any 
dividend paid by a Nigerian company which exceeds its taxable profits for the relevant year 
should be subject to tax as the profits of the company for that year. The problem with this 
provision is that it does not make an exception for dividends paid out of retained earnings 
already subject to tax in previous years; franked investment income exempted from further 
taxation by section 80(3) of the same Act; and capital gains already subject to capital gains tax. 
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This provision is particularly damaging to holding companies and can have a detrimental effect 
on investments as it leads to double taxation.  
The TAT gave a literal interpretation of this provision in Oando Supply and Trading 
Limited v Federal Inland Revenue Service.336 The tribunal held that dividends paid out of 
retained earnings that have already been subject to tax remained taxable under this provision if 
they exceed taxable profits for the year. This decision contradicts an obiter dictum of the 
Federal High Court in Oando Supply and Trading Limited v Federal Inland Revenue Service337 
which suggests that dividends paid out of retained earnings that have already been taxed should 
not be subject to tax under section 19.  
Both the FIRS and accounting firms have made requests to the tax law-makers for years 
to bring clarity to this issue by amending this provision. In spite of the potential detrimental 
effect of this provision to the Nigerian economy, the law-makers are yet to act.338  
Vague or ambiguous laws heighten the risks faced by taxpayers and adversely affect 
their attitude towards compliance.339 They are also detrimental to the efficient functioning of 
the tax system as pointed about by another participant thus:  
Sometimes the laws they make are not clear. They are not clear. They are vague; so it is subject to diverse 
interpretations. So, it exposes the client to risk depending on what interpretation holds sway. So they 
need to be clearer in the laws they make…Because you need more efficiency in the tax system- you need 
companies to be sure of what exactly, what taxes they should make provisions for and exactly what taxes 
they should pay; and it makes the businesses more efficient to run. (YE) 
Many participants in the first phase of the empirical study identified the vagueness or 
ambiguity of tax laws as a challenge. However, only 29% of the survey respondents agreed 
with the proposition that Nigerian tax laws are vague. Rather, 53% of respondents disagreed 
with this proposition. This suggests that while certain aspects of Nigerian tax laws are vague, 
the laws as a whole are not vague or ambiguous.  
Vague or ambiguous laws create difficulties for both taxpayers and the tax professionals 
they consult for clarification. Owing to vagueness or ambiguity in the law, tax professionals 
commonly render parallel advice to taxpayers about the law as they see it on the one hand and 
the interpretation of the tax authority on the other hand, leaving it to taxpayers to decide which 
option to follow depending on their aggressiveness or conservativeness. This was pointed out 
by a participant in the following words:  
                                                          
336 Oando Supply and Trading Limited v Federal Inland Revenue Service (2013) 11 TLRN 169. 
337 Oando Supply and Trading Limited v Federal Inland Revenue Service (2009) 1 TLRN 61. 
338 See Taiwo Oyedele, ‘Still on Excess Dividends Tax: Why is the National Assembly Slow to Act’ (2014) 
<http://www.pwc.com/en_NG/ng/assets/pdf/tax-watch-september-2014.pdf> accessed 5 May 2015. 
339 James Alm and others, ‘Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance’ (1992) 82 American Economic 
Review 1018. 
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You find a lot of times when we are advising clients we have things like, this is what the law says, this 
is how the FIRS interprets it. So depending on whether you want to be conservative or aggressive you 
can take either position. When we advise clients we always have things like: in theory this is what the 
law says and in practice this is what happens. (SA) 
These difficulties are worsened by the variance in perspective of tax officials and 
taxpayers when applying the law. Some participants accused tax officials of holding on to 
interpretations that suit their goal of maximum revenue generation so as to hit the revenue 
targets in their key performance indexes. They also accused tax officials of perceiving 
taxpayers as criminals, tax avoiders and tax evaders before the fact. One participant explained 
this in the following words:  
Perceiving the taxpayers as criminals – that is the impression they have. To them any company that is 
filing an assessment is trying to hide something. (MU) 
 
Such preconceptions may lead to distortions resulting from inaccurate interpretation of 
communicative actions or the improper exercise of power by tax officials wrongly motivated 
by the desire to amend a perceived wrong.  
Ambiguous laws may also give tax officials increased (yet unintended) discretionary 
powers. Discretionary powers enable corruption to linger even in the presence of strong 
institutions. This is due to difficulties pertaining to awareness. Where an actor has broad 
discretionary powers, it becomes difficult to determine whether the said actor has exercised 
this power in a manner that is consistent with the dictates of the institutional settings. This 
heightens the possibility of covert distortions of the law. 
The responsibility for resolving the ambiguity in laws often lies with the court (apart 
from the law-makers themselves). However, the process of deciphering the right meaning of 
the law is fallible and may lead to further distortions (rather than prevent distortions). Even 
assuming that the courts had the skills and tools to identify the right meaning of these vague or 
ambiguous laws, in an environment where both the taxpayer and the tax authority are unwilling 
to submit disputes to the court, such vague provisions are bound to remain unresolved for long. 
As discussed below, many respondents reported the unwillingness of actors to submit disputes 
to courts. Hence, the courts with power to resolve this problem may also have no access to the 
communicative action it is meant to interpret. 
 
4.5 The Dispute Resolution Terminal  
The dispute resolution terminal comprises both internal and external dispute resolution 
mechanisms. In Nigeria, recourse to the TAT, an administrative tribunal set up as the first step 
in the process for the resolution of tax disputes outside the tax administration, has been 
147 
 
negatively affected by two main factors. These factors are the ongoing debates about its 
constitutionality and lack of clear independence from the tax authority. These and other general 
issues that bedevil the formal dispute resolution system in Nigeria hinder the TAT from 
effectively achieving its goal of increasing access to the external dispute resolution terminal.  
The external dispute resolution mechanism is a key instrument of protest in the 
relationship between business and the tax system. The restriction of substantive access to this 
mechanism is therefore likely to extend the power gap in the two-way relationship. This is 
because owing to such restrictions actors may either fail to protest where protests are ideally 
expected or comply with an illegitimate demand by an exercising actor. Currently, it is mainly 
patronised by large or multinational companies, especially those in the oil and gas industry. The 
various issues that specifically affect the dispute resolution terminal are analysed in turn below 
from the perspective of the participants in this research. 
  
4.5.1 Independence and Objectivity of the Tax Appeal Tribunal 
One crucial feature that gives credibility to the external dispute resolution mechanism (and 
justifies recourse to it after attempts at resolution by the internal dispute resolution mechanism) 
is its perceived and actual objectivity – and independence from the tax administration in 
particular. From the responses of many participants, the dispute resolution terminal seemingly 
faces a crisis of credibility owing to its perceived lack of objectivity and independence from 
the tax administration. This has led to applications by businesses before this tribunal and the 
courts seeking a declaration that the tribunal’s alleged lack of independence breaches the 
business’ fundamental human right to fair hearing340 and renders the tribunal unfit to entertain 
tax disputes.  
Commenting on the independence of the Tribunal from the FIRS, one participant stated 
as follows: 
The tribunal itself is a creation of the ministry of finance and this money you are recovering is supposed 
to be payable to the ministry of finance – payable to the federal government of Nigeria. So at the end of 
the day, you normally find it difficult to get justice. If you want to get justice so far as tax issues are 
concerned, be ready to go from the TAT to the Supreme Court. So, that is one of the difficulties we have 
in settling disputes … It is a big problem. So what we normally do when we are being instructed by our 
client; we make them to realise that this is what is going to happen. You may not win here …. They are 
appointed by the minister and will want to give decisions that are favourable to the state; so just have 
that at the back of your mind, be ready to appeal. When you go to the tribunal, you go to tribunal with 
the mind-set that you are going to a place where they have already made up their mind to rule against 
you. I have that mind-set and that is the way I see them. (MU) 
 
Another participant described the problem as mainly an issue of perception or image thus:  
                                                          
340 See TSKJ 11 (n 167); NNPC v TAT (n 166).  
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In fact, until about a year ago, they were housed in the same office as the FIRS. That presents an image 
issue about their objectivity in decision-making. I mean given that their principal could be a party in tax 
disputes presents a challenge for us. (DO) 
 
This sentiment is also recognised by some tax officials. As one tax official commented:  
Going to the TAT is like a ‘case closed’. They [taxpayers] see it as an extension of the revenue. The 
argument is broad. The FIRS takes general instructions relating to policy from the minister. The minister 
sets up the TAT, that is, officially. Practically, FIRS takes care of the TAT in terms of payment of their 
allowances and other things. Some taxpayers know this arrangement and that has affected their opinions 
about the TAT. That is why a committee is set up to look into the challenges of the TAT and how it can 
be resolved. (BI) 
This concern about objectivity can be extended to the high courts. They are seen by 
some as agents of the state government despite the constitutional recognition of the 
independence of the judiciary.341 This is what a participant had to say about this:  
Let’s take Lagos State for example, if you are having a tax dispute with Lagos, the court with the 
jurisdiction to entertain the dispute was the High Court before they amended the law. If you take Lagos 
State tax authority to the High Court, you will also encounter the same problem you encounter in the 
TAT. Because the Lagos state High Court, to him, you are trying to rob the state. (MU) 
 
4.5.2 Tax Expertise of Judges/Commissioners  
On this issue, the opinion of participants seemingly contradicts the results of the survey. 83% 
of the survey respondents rated TAT members’ level of awareness of Nigerian tax laws as 
either high or very high, while this percentage in relation to court judges was 67%. The 
difference between the court judges and the members of the TAT reflects the fact that the TAT 
is a specialist court. These percentages are considerable when compared to those of other 
participants (Small Businesses 6%; Large Businesses 64%; Multinational Business 87%; Local 
Businesses 9%; FIRS 88%; State Tax Officials 66%; Legislators 37%; and Ministry of Finance 
Officials 50%).  
However, in the opinion of many participants, the courts and the TAT suffer from a 
dearth of judges and commissioners knowledgeable in tax law. This has led to clearly incorrect 
and inconsistent decisions, which in turn dampen the faith that both businesses and the tax 
authority have in the external dispute resolution mechanism. It is noteworthy that the 
participants who complained about the arbiter’s knowledge of the tax laws are those who go to 
courts or tribunals to resolve disputes. This will usually be multinationals, large businesses and 
the FIRS. Hence, their complaint is based on a relative assessment of knowledge. Secondly, 
the TAT and court are in the eyes of many ‘the guardians of meaning’. Thus, a higher level of 
knowledge is expected of them. Finally, in many cases, the estimation of their knowledge 
would be based on this expectation rather than experience. 
                                                          
341 CFRN (n 144) s 17(1)(e).  
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Knowledge of the law is an issue of awareness. Their lack of awareness creates 
uncertainty in the system and empowers actors seeking to distort it. An actor seeking to exceed 
its institutional powers may take advantage of the court’s deficiency in awareness. Individuals 
willing to protest against such illegitimate actions may be prevented from doing so due to the 
uncertainty of the arbiter’s decision. The impact of wrong and inconsistent decision-making by 
the courts is worsened by the fact that any decision rendered by the courts enjoys a presumption 
of regularity. The Nigerian Evidence Act 2011, s 168(1) states that ‘when any judicial or 
official act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that 
formal requisites for its validity were complied with’. This is supported by the common law 
maxim, omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta which means ‘all things are presumed 
to have been rightly and regularly done’.342 As one participant succinctly explained:  
If, for instance, the TAT gives a ruling negligently, it does not deviate from a ruling, it is still a ruling. 
(DK) 
While wrong decisions constitute distortions, inconsistent decisions give room for more 
distortions and awards additional discretion to actors empowered to give effect to these 
decisions. The presumption of regularity gives these inconsistent decisions validity, albeit 
temporarily.  
The lack of judges with adequate knowledge of tax law is due to a combination of 
factors. Firstly, tax law is a relatively new area of legal practice in Nigeria. Until recently, 
taxation was widely considered the preserve of accountants. As a result, there is a limited pool 
of active tax legal practitioners. Secondly, the majority in this limited pool are unwilling to join 
the bench due to the relatively lucrative nature of private tax practice. Thirdly, members of the 
TAT are political appointees. Also, the procedure for their appointment is not subject to any 
formal process of scrutiny.  
Different participants had accounts of instances where the lack of awareness or 
ineptitude of a tax judge led to a perceived miscarriage of justice. One participant, for instance, 
complained as follows:  
I have had a particular case where the court in a state in Nigeria passed a judgement that I expect every 
tax practitioner to know that such judgements are completely wrong. When such judgements are passed, 
it creates chaos in the tax system. For example, an issue relates to withholding taxes. Withholding tax is 
driven by the resident address of the vendor. A vendor who doesn't live in a particular state even though 
he transacts business in that state is not obliged to pay withholding tax to that state. The courts in one of 
the states passed a judgement expecting that withholding taxes should be paid to the state because the 
vendor transacted business in the state. It makes a mess of the tax system. (CO) 
 
                                                          
342 Ogbuanyinya v Okudo (1990) (No 2) 4 NWLR (Pt 146) 551, 570.  
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A different participant also recounted a case of ineptitude on the part of a tax 
commissioner which affected the said commissioner’s awareness of the facts and arguments 
before the TAT, thus:  
There was a judgement that was delivered against me. After the judgement was delivered the judge was 
trying to tell me why he delivered the judgement. 'How can you tell me this, how can you declare 
dividends and you will not be taxed on the dividends; it is not allowed', he said. I said, ‘no my lord, we 
are not saying that we would not pay tax. We actually paid tax’. I referred him to a particular page. ‘We 
paid tax. We are saying that the tax we have been assessed to pay is not what we are supposed to be 
assessed to pay. That we are supposed to pay tax at the rate of 10 percent and we have been assessed to 
pay that tax at the rate of 30 percent’. ‘Did you write that in your written address’, he asked. I said yes. I 
referred him to the particular page. The judge advised me to go and appeal and that he did not see that. 
Those that are to adjudicate do not have the knowledge of tax …. (MU) 
 
Another participant also had a similar story of lack of awareness of tax laws by judges:  
I can say about 97 percent of those adjudicating on tax know nothing about tax. They are just there to 
hold the job; that is the way I see it ... 99 percent of the time we file cases against the FIRS, we lose. And 
I am not mad, I cannot be going to court all the time fighting the same principle of law and you say I am 
wrong. At the Federal High Court level there is a judgment that just came out on SAIPEM and people 
are afraid but to me that judgment was badly written. … If the judge had analysed the issue he may have 
come to the same conclusion, but as a student of tax for example, if you are reading that judgment, you 
won’t learn anything because the judge didn’t say anything. She kind of muddled up everything and I 
am sure you will find she didn’t have sufficient training in tax. (OLA) 
 
It is believed by some participants that some judges dismiss tax cases on preliminary 
or non-tax grounds due to their inability to understand tax issues. A participant commented as 
follows along these lines:  
At the tribunals, there is a dearth of tax judges so to say. Sometimes, you have some of the tribunals 
being headed by people who have general knowledge in law and not necessarily tax. So sometimes, they 
don’t take the difficult route of getting to the root of the issues. Sometimes, if your opposite in the 
litigation brings an issue of jurisdiction, a lazy tribunal will just accept that there is a jurisdiction problem 
and your case will be thrown out. You need to go to the higher court to get justice. (DK) 
 
The zeal to dismiss suits on preliminary grounds not only constitutes a distortion of the 
legal process but also erects a barrier to substantive access for actors in the two-way 
relationship. It precludes the determination of the legitimacy of protests and may deter recourse 
to the dispute resolution terminal. 
  
4.5.3 Legality of the Tax Appeal Tribunal 
Another major challenge facing the dispute resolution terminal is the uncertainty concerning 
the legality of the TAT. Actors may be put off instituting legal protests where there is 
uncertainty over the proper channel of protest. One participant laid out this concern in the 
following manner:  
Again, right now, there are two sides of the coin. Where the courts of higher competence have said the 
Tax Appeal Tribunal is illegal. Right now, another says it is legal. So, for a lot of businesses, we are kind 
of sceptical, how much weight can you put on the ruling or decision of the TAT if one court says it is 
illegal and another court both on the same level, the Federal High Court, ruled saying something different 
about the legality of the tribunal. Really a lot of people actually don't put a lot of emphasis on them. Yes, 
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we are guided by what they say … the chances are the fact that they have issued an opinion even if it is 
not binding it may show the mind of independent arbiters on this matter, although it doesn't constitute 
the law. (OA) 
 
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the possibility of resolving tax disputes via 
other forums remains questionable owing also to conflicting decisions by the High Court on 
this issue. For instance, in Federal Inland Revenue Service v Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation & 4 Ors,343 the Federal High Court held that disputes related to taxation are not 
arbitrable.   
However, the TAT and courts aid out-of-court settlement through their preparedness to 
stay proceedings to enable negotiations aimed at resolving disputes between businesses and the 
tax authority. This was explained by a participant in the following words:  
When you are issued an assessment, you are under obligation if you want to challenge the assessment to 
file an objection within 30 days. If you don’t file that objection within 30 days, the tax assessment 
becomes final and binding on you. You can’t do anything about it. So, with that, as far as you are issued 
an assessment, you have a problem especially when you are desirous of settling or resolving the issue 
and you don’t want to be seen as been antagonistic with the tax authority, you may be compelled to file 
your appeal or an objection – whichever you choose to do – within 30 days. This is what we do for our 
clients …. We normally go back to the tribunal to report to the tribunal that we intend to settle this matter. 
So they normally give us room to sit down and resolve the dispute. That is one positive thing about the 
practice. They will allow you ... maybe grant an adjournment to enable the parties to sit down and resolve 
their disputes. That is one of the main advantages we have. (MU) 
 
On the one hand, this improves access, which may consequently narrow (or at least prevent the 
widening) of the power gap. Where this procedure is not available, businesses may be denied 
a means of protest in the situations where they need to explore the internal dispute resolution 
mechanism. However, awareness that this avenue is available is key. On the other hand, this 
may also further the concentration of activity at the tax administration terminal. Businesses and 
tax officials are given more room to negotiate compliance. This may lead to distortions, the 
widening of the power gap and consequently, greater opportunities for the preservation of 
corruption.  
The flexibility of the TAT rules may enhance its fact-finding role by permitting the 
waiver of rules of evidence with the potential to constitute a hindrance to proceedings. This is 
also another factor that may increase access to the dispute resolution terminal and potentially 
reduce the power gap. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
343 Federal Inland Revenue Service v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation & 4 Ors (2012) 6 TLRN 1. 
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4.6 Undue Delays 
The resolution of disputes via the Nigerian courts is commonly plagued by considerable delay. 
For instance, research shows that an average case before a superior court in Nigeria lasts for 5 
to 6 years while an additional 3 to 4 years may be spent on appeal.344 However, delay in taking 
action is common to all the terminals of the tax system, not just the courts. Law-makers are 
known to deliberate on important bills for years as is the case with the Petroleum Industry Bill 
(PIB). Policy-makers may fail to respond in good time to requests for clarifications about laws 
and policies. Also, for example, the tax administration may unduly delay releasing the results 
of an audit or issuing tax credit notes. Most participants from both sides of the divide identified 
delay as a challenge. Delay can be particularly problematic for consultants caught between the 
slow turnaround time of the actors representing the tax system and the demand for speed from 
their clients. In the words of a participant:   
I know the kind of expectations my clients have of me. So I will expect same from the people I am 
liaising with ... Some of these clients are not Nigerians. So when you are liaising with the tax authority 
on their behalf, they seem not to understand when you tell them that you are trying to get a response on 
their behalf and they are not forthcoming. I have a client that we assisted during an FIRS tax audit and it 
is like five months and the tax audit report is not out. The reason why I think it is being delayed is because 
our client ... They wouldn’t really get much liability from that audit because it is a start-up company. (IE) 
 
Similar delays in the enactment of laws or formulation of policies, as is currently the 
case with the PIB, have detrimental effects on business activities. A participant explained this 
in the following words:  
We also have expectations that whatever changes or policies that have to be put in place will also be 
done speedily. There have been a couple of tax changes in Nigeria that have been ongoing for many 
years. That is not helpful for the business, because delays or lack of clarity about such tax policies also 
impact negatively on business decisions. (DO) 
Some tax officials who participated in the research recognise that delay in responding 
is an administrative challenge which they struggle to tackle. However, a tax official suggested 
that the difference in turnaround time may depend on the status of the actor requesting the 
information or service:  
The other challenge is an administrative challenge which is taking a lot of time before the taxpayer gets 
a response or feedback from a request that they have asked for …. But basically, there are some 
communications that are taken seriously. If it was coming from a small taxpayer, it may not be taken 
with all seriousness .... For those taxpayers that will enable us meet our target, we are always at their 
doorstep and communication with those taxpayers is very effective. (BI) 
 
Despite the negative impact of undue delays on businesses, there is, in many cases, no 
conspicuous formal means through which they can be addressed. Hence, actors in these cases 
                                                          
344 See Jedrzej George Frynas, ‘Problem of Access to Courts in Nigeria: Results of a Survey of Legal 
Practitioners’ (2001) 10(3) Social and Legal Studies 397. 
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can be said to possess a discretionary power to delay. As already mentioned, such discretions 
are problematic as they make awareness of breach of legal expectations difficult to detect.  
An integral aspect of the right to fair hearing enshrined in the CFRN is the legal 
obligation and expectation on courts to resolve disputes on time. Section 36(1) of the CFRN 
provides that persons are entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or 
tribunal. Also, section 294(1) places an obligation on courts to deliver their decisions in writing 
not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses. Failure to 
comply with this provision may constitute a ground for setting aside the decision if it has led 
to a miscarriage of justice (CFRN, s 294(5)). Failure to comply with this provision may also 
lead to disciplinary action taken against the judge. The judge is mandated to report such failure 
to the Chairman of the National Judicial Council (the body responsible for disciplining judicial 
officers). In practice, however, judges circumvent this provision by calling parties to re-adopt 
their final addresses before delivering their judgment, thereby partly defeating the purpose of 
this provision.  
However, the scope of this right is very limited. It does not create a justiciable legal 
obligation for many aspects of the court’s activities. A major part of the delay in court processes 
is caused by interlocutory appeals (appeals against court decisions made during the pendency 
of the suit). Neither section 36(1) nor section 294 of the CFRN address this issue. Also, there 
is usually no corresponding legal obligation on tax administrators, policy-makers and law-
makers to act without delay. Hence, for these actors, such delays are not usually a breach of 
the expectation of the legal dimension although they may breach the expectations of the moral 
dimension to the extent that delays lead to unfairness, or the economic dimension to the extent 
that they create inefficiencies. However, these other two dimensions do not normally possess 
effective force mechanisms through which this delay may be addressed. 
One exception to the delays not breaching the expectation of the legal dimension is 
where the tax authority has failed to issue a notice of refusal to amend (in response to a notice 
of objection by the taxpayer) for an unreasonably long time. In a landmark decision by the 
TAT, the taxpayer was allowed to assume that action had been taken where there was a delay 
of 2 years.345 This assumption enables the taxpayer to institute an action in court without 
waiting for the receipt of notice of refusal to amend where there has been considerable delay 
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in the issuance of this notice. Therefore, delay that could hinder access to a protest mechanism 
was redressed by this decision.  
In contrast, the Federal High Court in FHC/L/CS/1906/14346 struck out an application 
by a concerned citizen for leave to seek an order of mandamus compelling the National 
Assembly to enact the PIB, which had been before the legislature for over 6 years. The 
presiding judge stated as follows:  
I am to grant leave with the view to getting an order of mandamus to compel the National Assembly to 
pass the Petroleum Industry Bill. That, in my view, is asking the court to go too far. I am pretty sure that 
this court understands the motive behind the principle of separation of powers as enshrined in the 
Constitution. I am certain that no court will compel the National Assembly to pass laws. 
  
In the above case, the well-established legal doctrine of separation of powers barred an attempt 
by an actor to compel law-makers to act, thus leaving the actor with no legal force mechanisms 
at his disposal. 
 
4.7 Tax Administration and Tax Policy-Making 
Most businesses interact with the tax administration terminal more than any other terminal of 
the tax system. Taxpayers without direct access to policy- and law-makers may also 
communicate their grievances to the policy and law terminals through the tax authority. Where 
the views of businesses are communicated to the tax policy- and law-makers through such an 
indirect communication route, distortion in communication is likely to occur. This has resulted 
in situations where despite wide consultations with businesses and broad agreement on policy 
and legal issues, the final policy or law created is bereft of input from businesses. 
As representatives of the tax authority, both the positive and negative actions of tax 
officials are usually attributed to the organisation they represent. Therefore, where actions need 
to be taken to address a perceived wrong by a tax official, this action is often taken against the 
tax authority. In effect, many respondents see the tax administration terminal as a black-box 
despite their obvious interaction with individuals and not the tax administration directly. These 
tax officials are merely intermediaries of the tax administration dispatched to secure influence 
at a distance. The tax authority is left to deal internally with the erring tax official. This point 
was communicated by a participant in the following manner:  
When tax authorities send out their employees to work, the individual is not discharging its personal 
responsibility but the responsibility it has been assigned by the tax authority. So issues are addressed on 
a large scale on the business versus the tax authority not the business versus the tax authority employee. 
The business will handle the tax issues between them and the tax authority. The tax authority will then 
handle the internal issues with their employee. (CO) 
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This further complicates the power dynamics between tax officials and businesses. In 
interacting with business on behalf of the tax authority, the tax official will often communicate 
through a direct communication route. The directness of his communication minimises the 
potential for distortion of Communication, thereby giving the tax official greater leeway to 
actualise his intentions or further his interests. In the event that this communication constitutes 
an attempt at an illegitimate exercise of power, the official communication of resistance by the 
business through the tax authority will be indirect. This increases the likelihood of distortion 
and creates an imbalance in the power relationship between the business and the tax official. 
The punctualisation of the tax authority may also shield the tax official and his interests from 
scrutiny in the event of legitimate protest by business. 
Although the power to formulate tax policy rests officially with the Ministry of Finance 
at the federal level, this power is sometimes exercised by the FIRS. In such cases where policy 
is to be formulated on an ad-hoc basis by the FIRS, individuals with expertise in the relevant 
area are pooled together from different departments under the management of a coordinating 
director to perform this task. This is despite the existence of an official department within the 
FIRS charged with the responsibility of performing this function. The danger is that some tax 
policy-makers, as tax administrators, may retain a primary focus on maximising revenue for 
the government rather than ensuring the general wellbeing of the tax system as a whole.  
Tax officials have been accused of having a ‘Nigerian civil servant mentality’, that is, 
seeing the performance of their duties as a favour to the taxpayer. This is despite the fact that 
the FIRS’ employees are not civil servants and have different working conditions. This may 
lead to situations in which the tax officials will fail or refuse to act save where they are 
incentivised to do so by means other than their basic salary. A failure or refusal to act is an 
example of a power gap which corruption might exploit. One participant distinguished his 
experience when interacting with tax officials at different levels of the hierarchy. In his words:   
[T]he difficulties you have [when interacting with tax officials on a routine basis] is basically the fact 
that it is the civil service. The civil service is not very efficient. People think they are doing you a favour 
when it is their job. So I will say that is the biggest problem in interacting with the tax administrators 
especially interactions with the lower cadre. If it has to do with significant issues, big issues and you 
need to engage with the higher level of authority, you find them to be reasonable and cooperative. When 
you are dealing with the lower levels on routine issues it could be relatively frustrating due to lack of 
professionalism. The truth is a lot of improvement has been made. If I look back at when I started taxation 
like 9 years ago, I think there is a huge difference. There has been a serious campaign about trying to get 
their people to be more professional. Trying to get their people to do their jobs as customer service and 
see the taxpayers as customers. It is going to take a while. They have made a lot of progress but those 
issues are still there. You still don't have that level of professionalism you find when you are dealing 
with the private sector. It is not something that is restricted to the tax administrators; it is just the public 
service in general. But I think within the FIRS especially during the tenure of the last FIRS chairman, 
there was a lot of drive and movement towards making the Service a lot more professional. (SA) 
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In a similar fashion to courts and tribunals discussed above, in the opinion of many 
participants tax officials also lack adequate awareness of the law. This causes distortions and 
makes effective communication between the actors difficult.  
The lack of awareness of tax officials can be ascribed to the absence of qualified 
professionals holding certain positions (compared to the situation in the private sector). This 
creates an imbalance as pointed out by one participant:  
You find that maybe two out of the 10 tax administrators are actually chartered accountants – maybe 3 
at best. ... We have a lot of people who are perhaps not as skilled as you will see in businesses. For 
example, for someone like me, anyone who is going to sit in my position will at least be a chartered 
accountant with certain number of years of experience. For goodness sake, you will not see that. You 
will see a number of fresh graduates come out of school at times. We see a number of people come from 
other maybe banks or whatever, join the revenue and start working. In terms of the level of knowledge 
you find that there is an imbalance. (OA) 
 
One participant narrated a personal experience in which the lack of awareness could 
have led to adverse consequences for the business taxpayer:  
I was trying to resolve a dispute with the LIRS and made reference to the Double Tax Agreement between 
the Nigeria and the UK because the company involved is a UK company. To my surprise, the person I 
was discussing with was not aware of the existence of that document. He even told me that, ‘Has it been 
signed? Do we have a DTA with the UK?’ He was very rude and harsh. He was saying that you people 
should go and pay your tax …. After discussing with them after 3 months, we realised we had to send a 
copy of the DTA to them. When they reviewed it, the liability that was as high as 183 million now has 
been reduced to 45 million. They realised that they should not have subjected some of the personnel of 
the company to tax in Nigeria. (MU) 
 
Another participant had a similar experience with tax officials, which he described thus:  
The skill, the resources at the FIRS level is lacking …. For instance there was a dispute we had on section 
23 of CITA where the issue was that the exemption that the President can grant in respect of taxes should 
be gazetted. The law didn’t say that but the FIRS said if the President grants exemption to anybody [it 
had to be gazetted] but I said, ‘look that is not what the law says, you have to check and see that there is 
a difference between section 23 and 25. 25 says before the minister can sign the list of the areas where 
R&D can be ... then those must be gazetted but section 23 does not say that’. But FIRS is putting that in 
section 23. Well I said, ‘I am not the President, they granted me the exemption which means they are to 
gazette it so why are they putting it on me?’ (OLA) 
Some businesses allege that relatively new tax officials who lack a historical 
perspective tend to interpret the law out of context. Participants also expressed their perception 
of a difference in the levels of awareness amongst the various actors representing the tax 
system. This may affect the communication route which businesses may utilise when dealing 
with the tax system. Businesses are likely to be more willing to interact with the terminal where 
there is greater awareness. This may lead to the concentration of activities and power in certain 
terminals and the further neglect of others. However, where the business is not interested in 
building a good relationship with the actors representing the tax system, the reduced awareness 
by the latter actors provides an opportunity for businesses to hide their existence or their 
activities from these actors. 
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Tax policy-makers within the FIRS were commonly identified as having the highest 
level of awareness. In the hierarchy, they were followed by other tax officials, and then the tax 
judges. Tax law-makers were fingered as the least aware group of representatives of the tax 
system. However, the gap in knowledge between the tax policy-makers and the tax officials is 
made complicated by the close relationship between them. In fact, tax policy-making in Nigeria 
seems to be carried out by tax officials of a higher level in the capital Abuja.  
In explaining the relationship between tax officials and tax policy-makers, as well as 
their respective levels of awareness, one participant commented as follows:  
In reality the policy-makers are part of the revenue. Like I mentioned earlier, they are like the elite group. 
A lot of them are well read; a lot of them are well travelled; a lot of them have gone on secondments and 
cross postings. So in terms of exposure and you see a lot of them also from consulting firms. In terms of 
exposure, a lot of them are actually very well exposed. You know but when it comes to actually 
implementing these policies, cascading the knowledge down in the chain to the people businesses interact 
with, you will find out that it breaks. Which is not in itself; I will not say it is deficient. I think it is 
systemic. You don’t expect that there would be the same wide exposure across board. In terms of the 
disparity in my opinion, it is really high. You have a few people, maybe 20 or thirty people who are in 
tax policy department here who are in the FIRS here and you have maybe 500 tax administrators. So you 
have a few people who are well read and you have a lot of people who take instructions from them and 
in terms of cascading the knowledge, it does not come through and … the interaction is not smooth.(OA) 
 
One participant compared the skill level of the FIRS to that in other jurisdictions based 
on his reading of law reports thus:  
The biggest thing is the issue of skill. The skill level at that point [the tax authority] is very low. Because 
I tend to read law reports from India very frequently and you see when Tax officials appear before the 
court, the kind of views they express; I mean how convincing their arguments are. But here, you talk to 
tax policy-makers and you wonder where they are from. (OLA) 
 
On a more positive note, many participants noted that the level of awareness of tax 
officials has improved steadily over the years. One participant explained this in the following 
words:  
Previously, their understanding of the law was pretty low. It is way better now because I think internally 
there is a move towards trying to train their people well, making them better …. So their level of 
education and understanding of the law is improving and better than it was 3-4-5 years ago. (SA) 
 
This improvement is crucial. It signifies an improvement in general awareness by the 
tax administrators which reduces the power gap as it relates to interaction with the tax 
administration terminal. However, it may widen the knowledge gap across terminals which 
may in turn lead to an over-concentration of interaction with the tax administration terminal. 
In addition to deficiencies in their knowledge of the tax policies and laws, participants 
also identified tax officials’ deficient knowledge of industry as a challenge to interaction. As 
one participant explained:  
I am into maritime, you have officials that want to audit me and if I say this transaction is all about 
temporary importation bond, they don’t know it. They don’t know what is called temporary importation 
bond. Maybe you are even hearing it for the first time, then I try to explain why a transaction should be 
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exempted from a particular tax and they are arguing with me. I don’t know if you understand what I am 
trying to say. What I am trying to say is that if you have some officials that are going to be in the maritime 
sector, give them necessary training to understand the sector so as to understand the transactions. They 
need to focus on this to ensure that they carry on their work effectively and efficiently, professionally 
without arguing unnecessarily. (AE) 
 
Given that tax officials are not usually directly involved in the day-to-day running of 
the business, a factor contributing to this deficiency is the dynamic and specialist nature of 
certain businesses. This was explained by an interviewee in the following words: 
You expect more collaboration, deeper knowledge of industry. They [tax officials] are however far 
removed from trends and recent happenings in the business. So they are fixated on their idea and 
knowledge of how things used to be even though things have changed. For example, where you are in 
Nigeria today, derivatives are being traded. The tax man does not know what derivatives are. (AM) 
 
The tax authority may delegate enforcement powers to private consultants with revenue 
targets. The use of these independent consultants with their own interests creates room for 
distortions, which may widen the power gap. Where they are used, the power relationship 
between the tax authority and businesses becomes an indirect one. The ability of the tax 
authority to exercise effective power over the businesses becomes dependent first on its ability 
to exercise effective power over the private officials as well as the ability of the private officials 
to exercise effective power over the businesses. Some participants complained that pressures 
on these consultants to reach targets as well as the computation of their reward based on a 
percentage of total revenue generated may cause them to adopt aggressive stances when dealing 
with taxpayers. Another criticism of the engagement of private consultants is the inadequate 
procedures by which they may be engaged, especially by state governments. An interviewee 
called for measures to be put in place to scrutinise the procedures for engaging private 
consultants and their activities or a ban on the practice altogether. He commented thus:  
These private companies that carry out audit, what they are paid is a defined percentage of what they can 
recover from the taxpayer. So if I know that if I get something very high from the taxpayers, I will get 
something very high from the state, my results will not be fair. So, I think they should put something in 
place that will serve as a basis for screening companies that can carry out audit on behalf of the revenue. 
Or as so many people suggested in the past, that they should scrap the idea of using private companies 
at all and concentrate on the individuals in the Federal Inland Revenue Service. That is what they have 
been employed to do. They have audit departments …. I think the major problem is using private 
companies and it may just be a one man show. Someone that just started business today, writes a proposal 
to Edo State government to operate as an auditor; the state government will appoint him. And the 
procedure is normally to pay him 10 percent of whatever. I think the best way is just to scrap the idea of 
private companies ... so that if it is the employee of the revenue that is demanding for bribe, I would 
know what to do (MU) 
 
While the extent of its occurrence cannot be uncovered by this research, some 
participants identified cases of abuse of power by the tax authority. These cases are note-worthy 
at this juncture. A common case of abuse recounted by participants is the misuse of the power 
to distrain the assets of taxpayers or seal their offices. As a participant commented:  
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I have seen instances where a person in the revenue service issued a demand notice, it was responded to 
within the required time frame and the business was expecting the response from the tax authority. Rather 
than getting a response what was received was a warrant of distrain or an intention to levy the warrant of 
distrain. For me, that is an abuse of power. (CO) 
 
In such instances, the business is faced with a seemingly illegitimate application of 
force without the prior determination of the legitimacy of their initial resistance to the tax 
authority’s exercise of power. The issuance of the warrant of distrain constitutes violence in 
itself even where it is subsequently revoked following adequate protest by the business. The 
business stands to lose revenue as a result of the sealing of its premises. This threat to its 
economic wellbeing together with the social stigma attached to the sealing of the business 
premises may be sufficient in certain cases to prevent protests against illegitimate and arbitrary 
demands by the tax authority. Another participant recounted a similar experience thus:  
I have so many instances where the tax authority arbitrarily issued an assessment. They don’t serve the 
taxpayer with the assessment. He is not aware that he has been assessed. They wait for one month to 
expire. After the expiration of the one month, they now issue you with a final conclusive notice – that 
your assessment has become final and conclusive; and they attach the first assessment to it. They do it in 
some states. [The tax official will say] that you were issued [an] assessment notice and you failed to pay. 
They will go to the court and get an ex parte order to distrain your premises. You will just find them 
coming to your premises and they will seal your premises. That is a good example of what you are talking 
about, it happens almost all the time. You will not be aware that you have been assessed, there would 
even be an acknowledgement on it that you acknowledge the receipt of the document. I think I did one 
case on behalf of a company that was sealed that way. They went to the last registered address of the 
company and they posted the notice. They were aware that the company had relocated. They did not 
bother to go to the new office. In that case, because you don't want your business to suffer and you may 
not be willing to go to court. ... If maybe they seal your premises today it may take three months before 
you get an order from the court to vacate the order they got to seal the premises. So most businessmen 
will want to pay the money. (MU) 
Here, the tax authority capitalises on the orchestrated lack of awareness of the business 
to successfully exercise illegitimate power over it. However, the success of the exercise 
depends on the willingness of the business to challenge the practice in court. Where the 
business is prevented from instituting protest by the delay in court (which in effect denies the 
business substantive access to a protest mechanism), the attempt at the illegitimate exercise of 
power may succeed. The likelihood of success of such illegitimate exercise of power is widened 
in situations where the business is barred from protesting (denied formal access to a protest 
mechanism) as a result of the assessment becoming final and conclusive. One such instance 
was also recounted by the same participant thus:  
There is a case I am doing now which is very unfortunate to me because they carried out the sealing, 
everything was done, arbitrarily. The company in question was compelled to pay. They were losing 
money every day. They could not go to the court. So, when they were paying, they had the understanding 
that they will pay but they will revisit the issue; they will come back to reconcile documents. The tax 
authority agreed and accepted the money. After collecting the money, the company met them to request 
for a meeting. Their response to the company was that the tax assessment has become final and 
conclusive and they have paid. Now the company has instructed us to file an action and I have advised 
the company that they don’t have any cause of action because they have paid and the assessment has 
become final and conclusive. (MU) 
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4.8 Third Party Organisations 
From the observations of participants in this research, other actors may play a considerable role 
in determining the breadth of the power gap in the two-way relationship. This is usually the 
case where both the exercising actor and the recipient actor collude to breach the expectations 
of the dimension. They also perform this role in situations without collusion – especially where 
a recipient actor over whom illegitimate power is exercised is unable to protest. Three examples 
of such actors mentioned by the participants are business associations, public sector watchdogs 
and big accounting firms.  
Associations play a major part in the interaction between businesses and the tax system. 
They help champion causes that affect their industry. In particular, they lobby tax policy- and 
law-makers to secure changes to adverse policies and laws. Prominent examples of these 
associations in Nigeria are the Oil Producers Trading Section of the Chamber of Commerce, 
Nigeria (OPTS) and the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN). A participant explained 
the important role played by the organisation to which his business belongs in interacting with 
both tax policy-makers and tax law-makers in the following words:   
Currently the industry I represent ..., we are also a member of a larger body called the OPTS. That is the 
Oil Producing Trade Section of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. What we do is channel our 
needs to the policy-makers through the OPTS umbrella. Recently, there has been the need to create a 
Petroleum Industry Bill in Nigeria. Therefore as a matter of necessity, there was need to interact with the 
policy-makers on a frequent basis. Apart from interacting with them on a need basis, the OPTS also 
organises regular meetings with policy-makers quarterly or biannually. The OPTS [also] writes to the 
National Assembly directly [and] gets invited to meet the National Assembly. (CO) 
 
The importance of associations was felt recently in the banking industry. After 
deliberation with the association representing the banking industry, a FIRS circular was issued 
granting exemption to banks from certain provisions of the tax law that would have caused 
hardship to the industry following certain necessary steps taken by banks in response to 
regulation. As a participant narrated:  
CBN made this rule that going forward banks must only do banking business. Banks had to sell their 
non-banking financial business, for example, insurance, stock brokerage, and all of that. Banks had to do 
away with those. Of course, CBN had a very good reason for saying that but along the line people started 
studying the impact of all of that. For banks that have other businesses, non-banking businesses, if you 
are going to sell that there is going to be a big payment in terms of value added taxes, capital gains, and 
all of that. So banks had to come around it. Each bank had to evaluate its own situation; that look if I am 
going to do what the CBN has said, what is it going to be in terms of tax? How much am I going to pay? 
They had to seek certainty from the FIRS and because of that they had to exempt them from some of 
these taxes. So it is specific to banks because it is a regulation that was made specific to banks as well. 
Other people also wanted the same thing but government has said no because you are not in the same 
situation as they are. (OA) 
 
One may challenge the legality of this exemption by the FIRS on the grounds that it 
lacks the power to alter the effect of a legal provision through the issuance of a circular. That 
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this exemption was granted in the first place indicates a lack of confidence in the proper 
channels through which such changes should be actualised (that is, through the law-makers). 
Also, the fact that this exemption remains in operation without challenge or protest is an 
indication of a power gap in the two-way relationship. Such a challenge or protest may come 
from businesses in other industries that want this same exemption.  
A similar experience was recounted by hoteliers who were faced with double taxation 
as a result of the decision of the Lagos State government to impose consumption taxes on the 
services they provided. Through their association, an action was instituted in court challenging 
the actions of the Lagos State government. Such a challenge may not have been possible for 
these businesses acting individually as many of them are SMEs and lack the capacity to institute 
such actions. Associations usually have better access to the terminals of the tax system and 
promote awareness of businesses within their ranks. By doing this, they potentially reduce the 
power gap in the two-way relationship. 
Other agencies of government also play a role in the interaction between businesses and 
the tax system. This may be industry specific. For instance, the Nigerian Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI) scrutinises the interaction between businesses in the oil 
industry and tax officials to ensure that there is no collusion to defeat the law.  As one 
participant pointed out:  
You also have challenges of some other agencies of government who are always on the watch. Who 
watch over the tax administrators themselves keeping them on their toes and thinking they are in league 
with the taxpayers; like the NEITI for example. They do not go just after the taxpayers. They do go after 
the administrators. They sometimes write very incriminating opinions about the tax administrator saying 
they are in league with the taxpayers. Those kind of opinions seep into how they [tax officials] interact 
with you. (DK) 
 
Big accounting firms play a significant role in most aspects of the interactions between 
businesses and the tax system. For example, they provide assistance in the formulation and 
development of laws and policies through their leadership initiatives. They also help promote 
general awareness of tax laws through seminars and media publications. These big firms offer 
better access to the terminals of the tax system, a reduced risk of exploitation by the tax 
authority and quicker resolution of issues to taxpayers that utilise them. Many businesses 
engage these firms to battle perceived injustices such as an abuse of power as explained by a 
participant in the following words:  
[Where there is abuse of power by the tax official] what the taxpayer usually does is to involve the big 
firms as an intermediary between the taxpayer and the authority. If you involve them, I am not sure they 
will insist on it. Even the tax law makers consult the big four firms for this purpose. ... The names of the 
big four go a long way. They have a very good relationship with the tax authorities as a result of the 
issues they have resolved with them. If you talk about PWC, KPMG, they have a very good relationship 
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with the tax authority. It is because of their level of professionalism and with that the issues will surely 
be resolved. (AE) 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
In every terminal of the tax system, a power gap exists as a result of the levels of access, 
awareness, distortion and inaction. This chapter has examined this power gap from the 
perspective and in the words of the participants. It began by affirming the importance of a 
relationship with the actors representing the tax system. It then identified the variance in likely 
disposition and experience between small and local businesses on the one hand and large and 
multinational businesses on the other hand. Thereafter, it descriptively analysed the 
perspectives of the participants regarding the interactions between businesses and the tax 
system. In the process, it highlighted the impact of the four mechanisms in extending the power 
gap in the channels of communication. In sum, it provided a platform for the discussion of the 
role and means by which corruption sustains itself in the relationship between business and the 
tax system in Nigeria.  
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CHAPTER 5 CORRUPTION AND THE TWO-WAY RELATIONSHIP EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH FINDINGS (II) 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical findings as they relate to corruption and the two-way 
relationship. It begins by revisiting the meaning of corruption based on the expectations of 
participants in the research. It then proceeds to discuss corruption in the two-way relationship, 
focusing on issues raised by participants such as wages, discretion, collusion, and corruption 
in the broader context of Nigerian society. The penultimate section discusses the role which 
businesses may play in tackling corruption from the perspective of the participants. This leads 
to the conclusion which restates the thesis. 
  
5.2 Revisiting the Meaning of Corruption 
As discussed in previous chapters, while the theoretical definition of corruption remains 
important, the real practical difficulty lies in distinguishing between corrupt and non-corrupt 
acts in any given setting. This difficulty is heightened by the fact that the tag ‘corruption’ can 
be bestowed upon different actions depending on the time and jurisdiction under 
consideration.  I argue that in every social context there are dimensions that possess roughly 
independent codes and programmes through which an action can be adjudged corrupt or not 
corrupt. The number of these dimensions in a given context depends on the extent of functional 
differentiation that has taken place within it over time. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the legal, economic, political and moral 
dimensions. These dimensions stipulate ideal limits for an actor’s exercise of power. 
Corruption therefore is an action which oversteps these limits and brings about a result in which 
the actor secures a gain which the dimension under consideration does not permit. Such 
corruption may exist in three strata of a given society (at the level of dimensions, at the level 
of social expectations and at the level of actions). Certain facts garnered from the empirical 
research may shed some light on this approach to understanding corruption. 
The empirical research primarily seeks to elucidate corruption at the level of actions. 
The participants were questioned about their expectations of the actions of actors in the two-
way relationship. By understanding these expectations and their sources, it is possible to 
identify the dimensions through which they may adjudge an act corrupt or not corrupt. 
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5.2.1 Expectations of the Economic Dimension 
Based on the responses of participants, the need for efficiency and the achievement of the 
general economic goals of the tax system seem paramount for businesses. This suggests that 
acts taken by actors which are inefficient and from which these actors derive gain that 
contravenes the general economic goals of the tax system can be adjudged corrupt from this 
economic dimension. This remains the case even where the action in question does not violate 
the law, culture or sense of morality of individuals in the society. Participants couched their 
particular concern for efficiency in different terms. Some pointed out the need to maintain 
foreign investment and to avoid unduly inconveniencing businesses as goals which every tax 
system should strive to attain. For instance, a participant commented thus:  
At the end of the day, you want businesses to thrive; you want increased foreign direct investment, and 
you want the economy to grow. If taxation will hinder that expectation, I don't think it is in anyone’s 
interest. It is only expected that we are reasonable in our judgements and come to a reasonable agreement 
or point and try to apply the law in a manner that will not create discomfort or that will not create 
something that will affect businesses. (DA) 
 
The participant above recognises a negative obligation which should prevent the law 
from unduly disrupting economic enterprises. In his view, the application of the law (as a 
communicative action) should be guided by these economic expectations. Another participant 
identified, as a prevailing expectation, the need for the tax system to positively support 
businesses thus:  
What you expect them to do is to make policies that will support businesses in contributing to the 
economy. They should think about the taxpayers and the practicability of whatever policy they are 
bringing out. If I cannot obey, if you are making policies that cannot be obeyed, it is as good as 
useless. (YE) 
 
The expectation described above relates not to the application of existing laws but to 
the creation of policies and laws in the first place. Expectations of the economic dimension can 
also be couched as a need to take into account the commercial realities when dealing with 
business taxpayers, as a participant did, thus:  
We want them to be able to take commercial realities into consideration in decisions around creation of 
tax policies.... We want tax policies that have some relevance and bearing to its target. For us, it is not 
enough to just have tax policy changes; we want it to have relations with the realities on ground. (DO) 
 
This concern for investment and the overall commercial realities should have factual 
implications for the content and structure of the tax system. One participant highlighted some 
examples of these practical implications in the following words:  
The truth is, whether we like it or not, we say as a country we want to encourage investment and tax may 
not be the number one consideration for an investor but it does factor in. Because in Nigeria for example, 
one of the things people complain about is multiple taxation – loads and loads of taxation everywhere. 
In that environment, you don't make yourself very competitive to investors. So it is really for them to put 
that in mind; have a clear understanding of the policy direction. It should not be the question of there is 
a random person that is sponsoring the legislation and everybody just goes with it. They need to look at 
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the realities of the environment, where the government is trying to go or going, and make policies along 
these lines. And just generally, make policies that do not inconvenience businesses, policies that do not 
have an opposite effect or result. So if I give the classic case of the VAT thing. As far as the law goes, 
the intention is not for the government to owe companies 2 billion in taxes …. But if you have created a 
policy that has given that result, you should be very interested in addressing it and mitigating the impact 
on businesses. If you agree that it is very difficult for money to come out of government to refund 
taxpayers, why don’t you create a medium where you can use whatever you owe them as a credit against 
some other taxes? Because in some countries what you have is you can net-off certain taxes against 
others. If you do something like that, companies will be happy. Because the intention is not to hold their 
money or subject them to double taxation. So they need to put businesses in mind, understand clearly 
what the policy direction is and if by chance they make a piece of legislation that is causing collateral 
damage, they should quickly intervene to address the other issues. (SA) 
 
Beyond acting with efficiency in mind, a participant observed that the tax authority 
should also strive to build up the effectiveness of the practices and systems of businesses thus:  
What I expect from them is not just to collect tax but to help businesses develop an effective tax system 
.... If a business has an effective tax system, it means the only way such businesses will not pay the 
correct tax is if there is a dubious intention by the business to evade tax. There are times when businesses 
don’t pay the correct tax not because they want to evade tax but just because they don't know how to do 
the right thing. So if an organisation has an effective tax system, more taxes will be paid to the 
government. The tax administration’s revenue will be boosted as a result of taxpayers having an effective 
tax system. So it is a win-win situation. (CO) 
 
5.2.2 Expectations of the Legal Dimension 
The law, which comprises both soft and hard positive rules, is also a prominent source of 
expectations for many participants. This is especially the case in relation to the level of taxation 
to be imposed on a particular business or transaction. A participant, for example, emphasised 
the law’s role in determining the social responsibility of businesses. According to this 
participant, the social responsibility of businesses or taxpayers in general should not fall short 
or exceed that stipulated in the law:  
There are laws. As a socially responsible citizen, I know we have to pay taxes. But I will not want to pay 
more than what is required under the tax law. So if they have a better understanding and there is better 
collaboration from them, businesses will pay the tax it is due to pay: no more, no less. (AM) 
 
This responsibility extends to the tax officials who are expected not to act in a manner 
that contravenes the provisions of the law. This was pointed out by a participant in the 
following words:  
I don’t expect the tax authority to do anything outside the tax laws. They are governed by the tax laws. 
Everyone liable to tax is governed by the tax laws. They can’t do ... – they are not supposed to do – 
anything outside the tax laws. They have other provisions governing the administrators. I don’t expect 
them to do anything outside the regulatory framework. (YNO) 
 
This respect for the law was linked to the need to avoid the payment of bribes which is 
one form of corruption expressly identified as a crime. On this, a participant commented as 
follows: 
They are trained to do their work. They are accountants, they are lawyers and they know the laws. When 
you say tax, tax, tax, you are talking about the law. That is where professionalism comes to play. You 
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[should] not [ask] whoever, your client, who is the taxpayer, to pay you bribe to compromise the process 
and not do the right thing. (RO) 
 
5.2.3 Expectations of the Moral Dimension 
Apart from efficiency and the law, fairness, objectivity and reasonableness featured as common 
expectations of the participants. However, I argue that these expectations do not constitute a 
dimension per se. They are only relevant to the extent that they are recognised and applied by 
the legal, moral or economic dimensions. What is clear is that this requirement of fairness, 
objectivity or reasonableness may constitute a prevailing expectation within the legal or 
economic dimension. Nevertheless, these concerns may also extend beyond these two 
dimensions to become part of a moral dimension. This is evident where participants recognise 
an obligation on the tax authority to act in a fair manner which extends beyond their ordinary 
legal obligation or their obligation to act effectively. As a participant explained:  
We have a national tax policy that preaches fairness and all of that. It will be nice to have those things 
implemented. If you have laws, the best you can do is to pack up your business and leave the country if 
you don't want to abide by the laws. Otherwise you have to comply with those laws. I don’t see businesses 
saying, ‘no these laws are harsh’. But in administering these laws you have to be fair, you have to treat 
every taxpayer equally. There shouldn't be preferential treatment because you know this person is 
swinging to the right or the left. It has to be fair ... If you still don’t do that thing that is not fair, then you 
are not complying and you still maybe subject to penalties and if you go to arbitration despite these your 
good reasons for not being able to comply, you are still going to be blamed. Taxpayers just wish that 
there is a bit of a balance in all these. (OA) 
 
In the quotation above, the participant recognises the potential for legal rules to contain 
obligations pertaining to fairness. However, where the legal rules are unfair, failure to comply 
with them may attract sanction from legal mechanisms. In other words, fairness is not a valid 
defence for failure to comply with legal obligations, save where the law contains an inherent 
obligation of fairness. However, the participant goes further to suggest that laws (with or 
without this inherent obligation of fairness) should be applied in a fair and reasonable manner. 
This justifies recognising the existence of a dimension different from the legal dimension from 
which this expectation or demand for fairness is sourced. In other words, the law itself may be 
subject to an expectation of fairness sourced from the moral dimension which exists 
independent of the law. Many participants recognise that this fairness requirement demands 
that businesses should not be taxed multiple times as recognised by this participant in the 
following words: 
The law is supposed to be fair and I am sure it is never at the time we are persuading them. For example, 
with the Hold Co example, we do not think that it was the intention of the regulators to seek to tax the 
same income two or three times. However, the way the law has been couched means that if you are going 
to be compliant with this law, that same income will be subjected to tax two or three times at different 
levels because there is also the withholding tax on that. So, our expectations are that we would be able 
to persuade them to be reasonable and try to be fair because part of the canons of taxation is fairness. 
That is our expectation really. (DA) 
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In the above quotation, the participant recognises the law as the source of power and 
expectations. However, his words indicate an expectation that the institutional limits on the 
exercise of power exceeds the express contents of the law. Put differently, there should be 
fairness in the exercise of the powers bestowed upon actors by the law. Here, the expectation 
of fairness is not wholly independent of the law. It is an integral part of giving meaning to the 
law. This is, however, not a call for the application of emotions or prejudice as explained by a 
participant thus:  
We want the tax administrators to be fair minded in interpreting the tax laws. We don't want emotion or 
prejudice coming into the interpretation of tax laws. (DO) 
 
The above quotation indicates a demarcation between personal feelings and the 
institutionalised ideal of fairness. A call for fairness is a plea to an institutionalised ideal. 
Though this ideal can only take effect when recognised and acted upon by an empowered actor, 
it seems, at least notionally, distinct from the subjective perceptions of the actor. 
    
5.3 Corruption in the Two-Way Relationship  
Based on the above premises, corruption in the two-way relationship can be identified by 
reference to the positive (soft and hard) laws, the economic considerations (such as efficiency), 
and fairness/reasonableness relevant to the attainment of the general goals of the tax system. 
That a corrupt action can be illegal, inefficient and immoral was recognised by a participant in 
the following words:  
It is against the law – compromising your position to get money from people. It is also inefficient. 
Someone owes hundred, you reduce it to 50 and you get 20. If the person is truly supposed to pay 100, 
the government has lost 50 and you have enriched your pockets. It is immoral and it is not right. (RO) 
 
While expectations of the economic, legal and moral dimensions featured in the 
responses of participants, political expectations were noticeable absent. This thesis argues that 
the absence of political expectations reflects the weakness of political institutions in present-
day Nigeria. The varied expectations of participants were often encapsulated in the call for 
greater professionalism from actors representing the tax system. As one participant noted:  
Definitely I will expect that they should be professional.... I think professionalism encompasses a lot. 
They shouldn’t expect you to grease their palms before they do the right thing. (IE) 
 
Corruption, here, is viewed as anathema to professionalism. This expectation of 
professionalism traverses the various dimensions in Nigerian society. In other words, it 
embodies the expectations of the legal, economic and moral dimensions of the said society. 
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Corruption in the two-way relationship is inextricably linked to corruption in Nigerian 
society in general. For one participant, there is no point in focusing on corruption in just the 
tax system since it affects all sectors of the Nigerian economy. This participant commented 
thus:  
I am sure you know corruption permeates all sectors of the Nigerian economy. So FIRS or the tax 
administration cannot be expected to be sanctimonious when the entire [nation] is corrupt. So anyone 
talking about corruption in Nigeria to me, we are all wasting our time. If judges are corrupt, why will 
FIRS not be corrupt? Why won’t they be? We are all trading in the same market. If there are measures, 
why have they not been caught? So I do not know, don’t narrow down corruption to one sector of the 
economy. They can take 9.3 million in a private jet to South Africa to go and buy ammunition so which 
corruption is more than that in an economy that has moved to a cashless society? If I want to withdraw 
200,000 from my account today, I can’t. But someone can carry 9.3 million dollars on a plane to go and 
trade. So corruption, I don’t like discussing it, because I feel we are not addressing the real issue. (OLA) 
 
The pervasiveness of corruption has been shown to directly affect the attitude of 
individuals within the society to corruption. Dong, for instance, argued that corruption may 
have ‘contagion effects’,347 implying that individuals may ‘condition their corruption 
behaviour on the behaviour of other individuals’348. Owing to this contagion effect, businesses 
are likely to engage in corruption where such practices are rampant amongst other businesses 
in their social environment.349 As Kahan explained for crimes in general, this proceeds from a 
self-fulfilling reality brought about by the consequential increase and decrease of the 
probability of escaping punishment and stigma attached to the crime respectively.350  
Corruption in the wider society also affects the willingness of business to comply with 
their tax obligations. To the extent that it affects compliance, it indirectly affects corruption in 
the relationship between business and the tax system. This is because it may deter individuals 
engaged in prior non-compliance from protesting against or rejecting an invitation to 
participate in corruption.  
One participant described corruption as ‘a thing that is in the blood of people living in 
this country’ (OLA). This is indicative that it has been internalised by individuals in society, 
thereby becoming their likely disposition in certain circumstances. Corruption may have 
                                                          
347 See also, Rajeev Goel and Michael Nelson, ‘Are Corrupt Acts Contagious? Evidence from the United States’ 
(2007) 29(6) Journal of Policy Modelling 839. 
348 Bin Dong, Uwe Dulleck and Benno Torgler, ‘Conditional Corruption’ (2012) 33 Journal of Economic 
Psychology 609, 610. 
349 Bertrand Venard, ‘Organizational Isomorphism and Corruption: An Empirical Research in Russia’ (2008) 89 
Journal of Business Ethics 59; Jamie D Collins, Klaus Uhlenbruck and Peter Rodriguez, ‘Why Firms Engage in 
Corruption: A Top Management Perspective’ (2008) 87 Journal of Business Ethics 89; Shaomin Li and Ming 
Ouyang, ‘A Dynamic Model to Explain the Bribery Behaviour of Firms’ (2007) 24(3) International Journal of 
Management 605. 
350 Dan M Kahan, ‘Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 
394; See also Raaj Sah, ‘Corruption Across Countries and Regions: Some Consequences of Local Osmosis’ 
(2007) 31 Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2573; Jens Anvig and Karl Moene, ‘How Corruption 
May Corrupt’ (1990) 13 Journal of Economic Behaviours & Organisation 63. 
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seeped into the moral fabric of society, and consequently, into the relationship between 
business and the tax system. In light of these warnings, it is imperative to question whether 
corruption in the two-way relationship is worth addressing independent of corruption in society 
as a whole.  
Corruption in the relationship between businesses and the tax system may take a variety 
of forms. However, the most common form identified by participants is the demand by or 
receipt of payments by tax officials as consideration for reducing the tax liability of businesses. 
Other forms include payment to tax officials to reduce the administrative burdens of 
compliance or to fast-track the legitimate exercise of power by the actors representing the tax 
system. It also includes the sale of other services (like tax clearance certificates and tax forms) 
which should otherwise be free.351  
The examples of corruption are potentially endless. This is owing to the fact that what 
constitutes corruption for a given actor depends on his second order observation of the 
dimensions in society.  However, the import of such an observation will vary depending on the 
extent of the actor’s power as determined by his social positioning. One participant, for 
instance, identified a form of corruption which he called scapegoating. In his words:  
There are many forms …. One of them is what I would call scapegoating or I don't know what term to 
use. Sometimes certain companies are fingered or identified for reasons that are not objective and they 
are scrutinised under this basis. That is corruption. Where you are not choosing who to assess on a fair 
basis but rather on a likely to succeed basis or on a susceptibility basis based on who you can take more 
advantage of; in which case sometimes you will see the FIRS wake up and start a march on say a South 
African multinational simply because they can; when for a good number of years some other companies 
have gone unaudited or un-assessed. (CHU) 
 
Two classes of corruption are identifiable in the two-way relationship depending on the 
presence or absence of collusion between the actors involved (collusion corruption and 
extortion corruption). Many participants suggested that most instances of corruption occur 
where there is some consensus of interest between two or more actors. For instance, taxpayers 
unwilling or unable to settle their tax obligations may seek the aid of tax officials in this regard 
for a fee. There was a common perception among many participants that some sort of collusion 
is crucial for the existence of corruption in many instances. When asked about corruption 
without collusion, one participant stated as follows:  
Most times, it takes two to tango. Most times, if there is an act of corruption, it means the company has 
also taken part and you don’t find them kicking back because they are also culpable. So what you find is 
them gradually shifting away from that norm to become more compliant maybe by changing their tax 
consultant. So they will pay the cost of being more compliant. [Of no collusion situations] That rarely 
happens. What you find is if he makes demands and the company does not meet the demand, he will 
                                                          
351 This has been called harassment bribes. See Kaushik Basu, ‘Why, for a Class of Bribes, the Act of Giving a 
Bribe should be Treated as Legal’ (Ministry of Finance, Working Paper, 2011) 
<http://www.kaushikbasu.org/Act_Giving_Bribe_Legal.pdf> accessed 5 July 2015. 
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most likely assess the company based on the provisions of the tax law. The reason why he is asking for 
bribe is to waive the position of the tax law to favour the company for a bribe. If the company refuses to 
pay the bribe, he will most likely stick to the provisions of the tax law and the company will pay whatever, 
because that is the right thing to pay. (YE) 
 
In the above quotation, the participant recognises the potential for a unity of interests 
between the tax official and the business to engage in corruption. This unity prevents protests 
which should follow from the illegitimate exercise of power. However, the unity of interest 
here is not stable. As the business becomes more compliant, their interests change, and their 
inclination to resist an illegitimate demand increases. Another participant based the unlikely 
nature of corruption without collusion on the premise that although a tax official may demand 
a bribe, they lack the ability to compel taxpayers to comply with this demand. The participant 
stated:  
I have not really been privy to such issues before but what I expect is that no tax authority or tax authority 
employee can force businesses to do what they do not want to do unless the business owners are also 
fraudulent.  Otherwise, no employee of the tax administration can insist or hassle the business. (CO) 
 
In other words, as pointed out by a third participant, in situations where a demand has 
been made of a company unwilling to participate in corruption, the company is free to turn 
down the demand and request that the proper process be followed.  
What I know is if you are not going to play ball, what you will do is let the process, the formal legislative 
process go ahead. What guys would usually do is let the process go ahead, if someone is asking for a 
bribe or something. (SA) 
 
This indicates that tax officials cannot draw force from the social environment to 
compel an unwilling business to agree to an illegitimate exercise of power; neither can they 
rely on their own capacity to achieve the illegitimate goal.  
It is important that collusion is not seen as an inextricable part of corruption based on 
the false premise that there is no corruption where the initial demand is turned down or 
protested against. A mere demand may constitute corruption regardless of whether it is 
accepted or protested against. There seemed to be a feeling amongst some participants that 
such demands are only problematic where the individual who refused or protested against the 
demand is subjected to an unfavourable or a wrongful exercise of discretion as a result. For 
instance, one participant in recounting his experience, stated as follows:  
I remember having a meeting with one company. The officer was trying to tell me that if I want to talk 
business that he will help us. He won’t be harsh on the company. ‘Officer we are not liable, I don't have 
anything to hide’. Things like that exist. If you don't give, they will not take. Most of the people or 
companies we represent will not. I have never represented a company that will tell you to give money to 
the tax authority. Even at that, if you have evidence to prove that someone asked for bribe from you to 
influence their decision and because you refused to pay they came out with a result that is not favourable 
to your business, you can challenge it. (MU) 
 
171 
 
Also, not all parties to ‘collusion-corruption’ are positively interested in the act or its 
consequences. Some are cajoled into agreement by various actors. This complicates the 
distinction between collusion-corruption and corruption without collusion. There may be 
situations where the circumstances for the business are so dire that their desire to participate in 
corruption can be described as vitiated. There may also be a spectrum between full intention 
and no intention to participate voluntarily which impacts on the classification of corruption. A 
business, for instance, may be pushed to voluntarily participate in a corrupt enterprise, not only 
to ensure its survival but also based on a wrong impression of the nature of its legal liability. 
This may or may not be combined with either a lack of awareness of or access to (or even belief 
in) the channels of communication through which the true nature of its liability can be 
determined. 
 
5.4 Corruption in the Tax Administration Terminal  
Most responses from participants about corruption were related to activities in the relationship 
between businesses and tax officials. This accords with existing research that identifies tax 
collection as one of the areas much affected by corruption.352 This may be due to the high 
amount of interaction that takes place at the tax administration terminal relative to other 
terminals of the tax system. One participant explained his perception that corruption mainly 
takes place at the tax administration terminal in the following words:  
I am not sure it may be frequent in the area of tax laws and tax policies. But when you drill down to the 
area of tax administration; that is where it will be more rampant. In the sense that probably a tax audit 
officer comes [to do] a field audit to your company and you know that probably you have not been 
compliant in your taxes and you know that probably you have understated your liability by a couple of 
millions and because of corruption and poverty in Nigeria you feel that if I settle him with 500 thousand 
he will go. (OI) 
 
A link can be drawn between corruption and the arbitrary exercise of power by tax 
officials. Where tax officials are allowed to tender arbitrary audit reports to businesses, this 
creates an opportunity for corruption to thrive as explained by one participant thus:  
In terms of things encouraging corruption, I will say in the conduct of their audit, they need to do more. 
They tend to overly estimate additional liabilities. You find that after the conduct of their audits and they 
come up with a report, most times there are certain things they should have considered. Any layman 
would know that these things are not applicable which would reduce the liability but because of their 
revenue drive – their own objective of generating additional revenue – they tend to just overestimate or 
blow out of proportion what the additional liability should be. So if ordinarily I should be paying 
additionally 20 million, you can be sure that after the audit they will come up with something like 100 
million so you then have to go back and forth, meetings, bring more evidence to show this, more 
schedules to prove this and at the end of the day after months of back and forth you arrive at what the 
additional liability will be …. Not every taxpayer wants to go through this back and forth. Rather than 
                                                          
352 See Fredrik Galtung, ‘Current Strategies for Combating Corruption: A Study of Corruption in the Tax 
Administration’ (Transparency International, 1995). 
172 
 
go through what the law has provided when you can object to an assessment and object to a liability, 
they rather just tell them this is what I am willing to pay and this is what I am willing to give you. There 
are some tax officials that are willing to go that route. Rather than go through months of back and forth 
and months of objection and reassessment and objection, they rather just settle and move on. I think that 
is something that encourages corruption. (DA) 
 
Certain points can be deduced from the extract above. Firstly, the participant explained 
that the wrongfulness of the assessment is something which ‘every layman would know’. This 
suggests that the assessment constitutes a distortion of the law, which is likely to be deliberate. 
This is supported by the statement of the participant that this distortion is likely guided by the 
interests or objectives of the tax official to generate additional revenue. Secondly, he states that 
the process through which the true liability of the taxpayer should be determined is potentially 
burdensome (in terms of time and effort required). These burdens constitute a barrier to 
substantive access to this process. It also indicates unwillingness to access this protest 
mechanism (inaction). Hence, on the one hand, a power gap is created owing to deliberate 
distortion of the law. On the other hand, restriction of access or inaction regarding the protest 
mechanism maintains the gap which corruption might exploit.  
Another factor which may encourage corruption in the two-way relationship is the 
breadth of discretionary powers of tax officials. According to a participant:  
[T]here are always lots of loopholes in the tax law which requires the tax authority to use their discretion. 
Because of using the discretion, they try to enrich themselves. So many provisions are not clear-cut 
leaving room for selective implementation by the tax authority. These lead to a lot of corrupt resolution 
of issues. (AF) 
 
This power is extended where the business (the recipient actor) lacks awareness of the 
applicable law. As one participant explained:  
What happens is that the tax official intends to interpret a section of the law and because he has discretion 
he asks that taxpayers to cooperate with him to enjoy such favours as reduced tax, and refusal will unduly 
subject the organisation or the business to tax. The game is if you play ball with me, if you pay bribe or 
anything like that, you will not have to pay that much of taxes. They play on the intelligence and 
knowledge of the business or entity. If a business or taxpayer knows the law and argues it properly, they 
find it difficult to approach such business or taxpayer for bribe or anything. (AM)  
 
Here, discretionary power breeds corruption as a result of the deficiency in awareness 
it creates on at least two levels. On the first level, owing to the discretionary powers, it is 
difficult to determine whether the tax official has exercised his discretion in accordance with 
the law or whether a distortion of the law has occurred. If, for instance, the business complies, 
or even fails to comply, with the demand, protest by third parties or by the business in the event 
of non-compliance will be challenging without evidence of the demand itself. On the second 
level, as pointed out by the participant, the discretionary power may be a product of the 
deficiency in awareness suffered by the business. Where the business is adequately aware, it 
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may be able to establish a correct manner for the exercise of powers which may suffice to 
preclude corruption.  
A participant identified that the low pay of civil servants makes corruption difficult to 
resist. He stated:  
The tax officers are civil servants. They are not paid that great anyway; so there is an inducement. A lot 
of companies do not believe in paying their taxes. They have a need to find a way to pay an amount that 
is way less than what they should be paying … it is fact that tax officials are not paid that greatly … that 
makes it difficult to resist. (SA) 
 
A connection has been made between the emolument and general working conditions 
of tax officials and corruption as far back as Ancient Egypt. A high salary was paid to Scribes 
(tax officials), thereby increasing the financial consequences of dismissal for involvement in 
corruption.353 However, various empirical studies have produced seemingly inconsistent 
results on the relationship between corruption and the level of pay of civil servants. For 
instance, Huang explains that attempts to address corruption (which had grown over time in 
China from the Ming Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty) by increasing the salaries of public officials 
were unsuccessful.354 However, Van Rijckeghem and Weder in their empirical research found 
a correlation between low levels of corruption and high salaries of public officials relative to 
manufacturing wages.355 Using a case study of the Ghanaian tax system, Chand and Moene356 
also argued that improving the working conditions of tax officials can curb corruption where it 
is done simultaneously with other necessary reforms of the system. These other reforms include 
reducing the tax rate (in order to diminish the benefits of corruption); simplifying the tax laws 
so as to reduce the discretionary powers of tax officials; and increasing the scrutiny of tax 
officials in order to increase the likelihood that punishment will follow any corrupt act.  
Low pay manifests as interests of actors in the two-way relationship. In other words, 
low salaries create an additional incentive for tax officials to engage in corruption. This interest 
by itself does not create a power gap but it impacts on the power relationship through the 
operations of the four mechanisms (distortion, awareness, access, or inaction), and in particular 
distortion of communicative actions. Where distortion, for example, is not possible, having an 
interest in private gain (more income) is not sufficient to create an avenue for corruption. 
                                                          
353 Christopher Adam, ‘Testing for Regime Shifts in Short-Sample African Macroeconomic data: A Survey of 
Some Monte Carlo Evidence’ (Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Working 
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356 Sheetal Chand and Karl Moene, ‘Controlling Fiscal Corruption’ (International Monetary Fund, IMF 
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However, in an environment where distortions are inevitable and difficult to detect, addressing 
interests becomes vital. Nevertheless, addressing interests is no less challenging than tackling 
distortions in the two-way relationship. 
 
5.5 Corruption and Protest Mechanisms 
General channels exist through which businesses may protest or raise awareness about an 
alleged wrongful exercise of power. These include escalating the issue up the hierarchy, 
instituting an action or, in the case of crime, reporting the matter to the criminal law 
enforcement agents. Regarding escalating a dispute up the hierarchy, one participant 
commented as follows:  
If it is something that is an isolated act of the tax official, what you probably find is that the affected 
businesses will take the issue to his superiors. So you find a lot of businesses where they have serious 
issues with their tax offices here, they take the issue to Abuja where they have the policy unit or where 
the more senior people are because generally they find them more reasonable. So if it is an isolated act 
of an official, or an office, people will usually escalate it. (SA) 
 
Some participants commented that before utilising the channels of protests, many 
businesses would initially seek to resolve the disputed issue with the actor/organisation with 
whom the dispute arose. In a case of negligence, for instance, a participant stated as follows:  
When negligence is noticed, it is brought to the attention of the official .... If it can be resolved amicably 
without having to involve the tribunal or the court, then we will resolve it amicably. Otherwise we will 
involve the tribunal or court. There is an office in Abuja known as the tax policy desk. The first call will 
be to write to the policy desk to get their view and interpretation, so that we can inform the tax official 
the position of the policy desk of his organisation on the issue. If it is in line with our view, then we do 
this. If it is not in line with our view, then it means there is a gap in the understanding of the tax provision. 
The next step is to seek the view of the Tax Appeal Tribunal. Based on Nigerian tax law, you go to the 
Tax Appeal Tribunal first, appeals lie to the High Court. (AM) 
 
In a case of incompetence, another participant described his likely steps in the following 
manner:  
In such instances [of incompetence], I will imagine that there would be complaints. We have attended 
tax audits where, if you are not satisfied with the position, i.e. if you think the tax official handling the 
audit is not competent and his practices are not aligned with the position of the law, we complain …. 
You make representations and hope that they could give the file to someone else to handle .... This 
happens a lot. Your interpretation of a particular section may not be the same as mine. You will always 
make your position known and if at the end of the day you do not agree that is when you will seek legal 
help ... by going to the Tax Appeal Tribunal .... (DA) 
 
Businesses may also instigate protest through their representative body or organisation. 
This is more likely to occur where the action protested against has a considerable negative 
impact on a group of businesses. A participant commented regarding negligent actions by tax 
policy- and law-makers as follows:   
Well, if it is a tax [law] maker, there are times we have to live with some negligence on the part of tax 
law makers, and what happens is everybody interprets it the way they like. But if the negligence is going 
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to have a major impact on the business, what I see businesses do is go to the umbrella body and write to 
the tax lawmakers to make amendments. (CO) 
 
However, businesses may not utilise channels of protest even where an actor representing the 
tax system has acted to their detriment.  
Corruption is often a crime or at the least a breach of the terms of an actor’s 
empowerment. Hence, procedures do exist to tackle corruption both within and outside the tax 
system, ranging from dismissal from service to imprisonment. Corruption of this nature in the 
two-way relationship does not survive because there are no measures to tackle it. Rather, 
corruption thrives because the measures that exist are suffocated or otherwise made redundant 
by an environment where deficiency in awareness, restriction of access, distortion of 
communication and inaction reign supreme.  
While most participants expressed a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the 
measures put in place to tackle corruption, one participant identified some likely beneficial 
effects of anti-corruption measures. In his words:  
It ensures that both parties are mindful and more thoughtful about their interactions. It ensures that to a 
large extent objective discussions are had by the parties involved. It also focuses on the heart of tax 
practice in Nigeria in ensuring that tax technical issues becomes the key focus rather than the gratification 
that will come out of it. So those measures make a lot of difference, and it also helps in sanitising the 
practice of tax in Nigeria. Because then both old timers and the new generation are mindful of what the 
implications are. And they will try to promote the culture of non-corruption. (DO) 
 
Other participants mentioned some other positive effects of these measures. For 
instance, it has heightened the level of awareness of taxpayers about their rights and 
responsibilities as one participant explained thus:  
I think it created more awareness for the taxpayers. They are more aware of their rights. They still have 
a decision as to whether they want to follow due process in getting things done or sorting out their tax 
affairs or whether they want to continue in their old ways. There is more awareness that you can actually 
get things done without paying your way. (DA) 
 
As this participant pointed out subsequently, increased awareness has provided 
taxpayers with greater flexibility to determine whether they wish to participate in corruption or 
comply with the law. According to this participant:  
In certain instances, I think it has made the relationship between some taxpayers and tax officials.... I 
mean for the taxpayers that are willing to do things the right way, it is no longer business as usual for the 
corrupt official, so they tend to try to make things a bit more difficult; so a tax clearance certificate that 
should normally be issued in 3 days of application or maybe a week from the date of application may 
take up to a year. 
  
This presence of protest mechanisms should ordinarily reduce the occurrence of 
extortion corruption. Rather, as expressed in the quotations above, tax officials bent on 
extorting corrupt gains may yet accomplish their motives by exploiting the actual or perceived 
inefficiencies in the system.  
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Based on the balance of responses from participants, there is the perception that the 
measures to tackle corruption in the tax system are rarely activated by individuals directly or 
indirectly affected by corruption due to several factors including the need to maintain a 
relationship, the fear of a backlash, the lack of awareness of the procedures, the non-compliant 
nature of businesses, and the lack of belief in the system as a whole. One participant commented 
that despite the seeming prevalence of corruption, he has not come across a case of corruption 
in the law reports he publishes. This to him suggests that not enough is being done to tackle 
the phenomenon. He stated that:  
We have so many, they are there. I don’t have any case. I do tax law reports and I do tax generally. It’s 
hard to come across any case where someone has been convicted or even been tried on account of this. 
So it is a big problem. I don’t think there are any measures. They are just laws in the textbook. They are 
not effective. (MU) 
 
The measures to tackle corruption may not be effectively implemented due to the lack 
of political will or interest in enforcing the law. One participant, for instance, explained this in 
the following words:  
I can assure you that there are measures. In fact the laws are there but it is just to wake up the laws. They 
are sleeping laws. The legislation is there. There is nothing in Nigeria … our laws are already there to 
address those issues but the challenge is someone needs to have political will to say, ‘you know what, 
we will implement this’ .... I feel our laws are sufficient. What we have today can actually check the 
issue of corruption. I am not talking about tax administration efficiency, because our laws are still very 
old. But what we have currently is enough to check corruption. (OI) 
 
Ineffective implementation of the available laws may also be due to the existence of 
countervailing interests on the part of the enforcers as explained by another participant thus:   
The measures I can say is effective if they implement it the way it is. But when you have put a measure 
in place but you are also circumventing the measure yourself, it is not likely to produce the desired result. 
But if they fully implement it, I am sure it will curb corruption to a large extent. (AF) 
 
Yet again, the above quotation indicates that interests of actors influence the power 
relationship through distortion of communicative actions. The circumvention of measures put 
in place to tackle corruption prevents these measures from limiting the power gap in the two-
way relationship between businesses and the tax system.  
One factor affecting the means to tackle corruption is the need for evidence. Before 
proper protest or force can be applied to reduce corruption, it is crucial that any such allegation 
can be established based on the rules of evidence. As one participant questioned:  
How do you prove it? You know corruption is a criminal issue. How will you be able to prove it? (DK) 
 
Another participant pointed out a potential consequence of making an allegation 
without adequate proof thus:  
For corruption, that is the truth. Nobody takes action. The onus of proof is on you, and where you are 
unable to prove, you may be the scapegoat. (AF) 
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Even businesses that protest against corrupt practices and are able to establish their case 
against the corrupt official are not free from ‘scapegoating’ as one participant explained thus:  
It reduces it because when you complain to their representative that this is the problem you are having 
with the tax official, they will surely face sanction. And once one official gets sanctioned, other officials 
who come to the business subsequently will not ask for encouragement. They will come with the intention 
of being difficult and frustrating the business knowing full well that they will not receive any extra benefit 
from that business. Taxpayers find it discouraging to be complaining with the hope of sanctioning the 
tax officials. They find it difficult. Because they feel if you do that, you get noticed and you may likely 
have problems. No company wants to have problems with government officials. (AF) 
 
Some of the processes involved in protesting against corrupt activities are too long. One 
participant commented on this point thus:  
How effective are they? Maybe this is probably a question I have not answered. They are effective but 
the process may be long. If you go through the court system, the process of getting judgement could be 
very long. And that can affect your business. ... People will rather work on the relationship with the tax 
official. (AM) 
 
Research by Cule and Fulton357 show that the increase in measures to tackle corruption 
such as penalties and audits may have an adverse effect on tax evasion and corruption in 
environments where corruption is pervasive. The perceived pervasiveness of corruption makes 
protest against the act difficult in more ways than one. For instance, businesses may be deterred 
from protesting by escalating issues to superior officials due to the worry that the superior 
officials are not only aware of the occurrence of corrupt practices but are also expressly 
complicit. As a participant explained:  
The kind of environment we have here most government agencies are known to be corrupt …. So it is 
more or less where you can talk to someone who is above the person you are relating with. If that person 
gives instruction to the person below him to do these things, you can’t beat it. You either dance to their 
tune or find an alternative way to go about it. (RO) 
 
Also, experienced corrupt officials are careful and demand bribes in situations where 
they are likely to be successful. As a participant stated:  
It is one of those things; the person that is asking for a bribe has probably ‘sized you up’. At the point he 
is asking he thinks you are willing to play ball. Alternatively, the person that is asking you for a bribe is 
someone who is relatively high up. So I guess guys just understand the Nigerian system. If you are not 
going to give a bribe, you just end it there and say you are going to do the right thing. I am not sure how 
frequently people actually report people. I don’t think it is that frequent. (SA) 
 
Individuals willing to circumvent the law are not difficult to find in an environment 
where many taxpayers are not tax conscious. Also, ‘finding a partner with whom to engage in 
a corrupt transaction and escaping detection or punishment becomes easier as the proportion 
of individuals who are corrupt increases’.358 A participant explained this point thus:  
                                                          
357 Monica Cule and Murray Fulton, ‘Business Culture and Tax Evasion: Why Corruption and the Unofficial 
Economy can Persist’ (2009) 72 Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organisation 811. 
358 Abigail Barr and Danila Serra, ‘Culture and Corruption: An Experimental Analysis’ (2010) 94 Journal of 
Public Economics 862.  
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A lot of Nigerians are not tax conscious. We are not tax compliance conscious. And because we are not 
tax compliance conscious the next thing is to look for a short cut so that you are not caught in the long 
arm of the law. The law empowers the tax official to distrain your company if your company is not 
compliant and you have not settled your tax liability. But I mean, you can settle it the Nigerian settlement 
way. (OI) 
 
A major deterrent to a protest against corruption is non-compliance. As one participant 
explained:  
The measures advise that nothing should be given to the tax officials and if they make demands they 
should be reported to whoever directed them to audit. The only problem is that in most cases, it is unlikely 
that the person reporting has complied fully. So if he finds someone who with a little encouragement will 
ignore his non-compliance or partial compliance, he is more likely to accept and negotiate with the tax 
official, than report. (OI) 
  
This does not in any way suggest that only non-compliant companies are exposed to 
corruption. Even compliant companies may feel pressured into corrupt practices as pointed out 
by the same participant, thus:  
In the case of companies that comply, as I earlier said the tax officials are unhappy with the fact that 
there are no loopholes to exploit and may delay your clearance. In such situations you find even 
compliant companies giving some “encouragement” to prevent such delays and frustration. They don't 
just want to disturb themselves. They want to move on. The more they complain the more problems you 
face subsequently. Once a business has an issue with the officials, it gets noticed and the officials try to 
checkmate it. No taxpayer wants to listen to that. I am not saying that they cannot complain. I am looking 
at the factors that discourage them from complaining. (AE) 
 
Some corrupt officials may take advantage of the deficient knowledge of clients 
interacting directly with the tax authority without the assistance of seasoned tax professionals. 
As one participant pointed out:  
Most times when you go with tax consultants, seasoned tax consultants, they don’t bring it up, but you 
end up hearing from the client that this is what the tax authorities have said. And then you are like 
seriously; but when you go there they don't say that. It now depends on the client to either go the right 
way or go back and settle the other way; but it is the client’s call …. I know there was a situation like 
that where we had gone in and we did not know that before we were asked to come on board the tax 
authority had negotiated, had told the client that they needed to pay some money so that the whole thing 
could die or to write off the liability. When we now went in and the guy was so mad seeing a new tax 
consultant and we didn't know, it was later on the client told us. Because I think there is a committee you 
can report to or give suggestion about the services but I am not sure that if recommendations are actually 
– if there is anybody that looks into it. There are suggestion boxes, where you can drop things. You can 
actually go to Abuja where you have the headquarters to lay your complaints. (RO) 
 
Even tax consultants may establish corrupt relationships with the tax authority to enable 
them to meet internal performance targets. As the same participant also explained:  
I am sure most accountant tax managers also have their own performance goals. Most times, to minimise 
the tax you are paying and to minimise costs. You want to, maybe, if instead of paying 100 I pay 20 I 
can save my company 80. (RO) 
 
In many cases, the individuals aware of the corruption are the culprits and hence not 
likely to protest against its occurrence. Other businesses not directly involved in the corrupt act 
will not protest as they are not aware. Even where they are aware, they may not protest as it 
may not be in their interest to do so. This was described by a participant in the following words:  
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If the company obliges; decides to be corrupt; the two parties are ok with the arrangement, most likely it 
is going to sail through. Other businesses won’t be aware. They are rarely aware. They won’t protest 
because it is not their business. They are not paying the taxes. It does not affect them. (YE) 
 
One participant explained that measures to tackle corruption cannot be effective owing 
to the large percentage of businesses in the informal sector that are not ordinarily affected by 
changes in the tax system. In the opinion of this participant as produced below, for measures 
against corruption to be successful, there is the need to ensure that more businesses are brought 
into the tax net by, for example, the adjustment of the VAT tax rate.359 This seemingly 
contradicts research which shows that countries with a higher proportion of direct taxes to 
indirect taxes are more likely to be less corrupt than countries with a higher proportion of 
indirect taxes than direct taxes. In the words of a participant:  
I don’t think it has any effect because a lot of guys are not educated on the tax system in Nigeria. For us, 
tax is still a pie in the sky affair. For big companies, I will say it would affect …. For a country where 70 
percent of the sector is in the informal sector. The only thing that will affect the informal sector I still 
repeat is when probably there is an adjustment of the indirect tax rate, the VAT. That is when the informal 
sector will be affected. (OI) 
 
The difficulty in tackling corruption is heightened where there are inefficiencies in the 
system. Tax officials determined to milk their office may resort to these inefficiencies to derive 
corrupt gains. On how inefficiency may be exploited for corrupt purposes, one participant 
commented as follows:  
If I apply for the certificate – all things being equal – if there are no issues, I should be able to get it by 
next week or maybe in two weeks at the latest. They just unnecessarily tend to take longer. Now maybe 
the objective is that taxpayers may then be constrained or encouraged to give them something to facilitate 
or fast track that or maybe they just want to unnecessarily make things longer. I don't know. But I think 
it can be seen as straining the relationship. It can also be seen again as a means used to try to encourage 
corruption. It is two-fold. (DA) 
 
Some companies feel compelled to engage in corruption as a result of their previous 
failings. An example of such failings is negligence or inefficiency in documentation by 
businesses. In situations where they are unable to provide documentary evidence of their 
activities, businesses are more likely to engage in corruption as explained by one participant 
thus:  
One of the challenges is that actually some companies, they know what they are doing but they don’t 
have documents to back it. When there are no documents, you can’t support your case and when you 
can’t support your case, you more or less fall prey. So you can't back it up. So if you can't prove to be 
beyond reasonable doubt that you are actually right, then you may fall. It is not as if you are guilty but 
you are more or less compelled to pay that amount because of your own negligence – because you don't 
have proper documentation. In that instance, when you cannot support your position, when they ask you 
and you don't have the normal checks to support your position. (DA) 
  
                                                          
359 Yongzheng Liu and Haibo Feng, ‘Tax Structure and Corruption: Cross Country Evidence’ (2014) 162 Public 
Choice 57. 
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5.6 The Role of Businesses in Tackling Corruption 
Businesses, a frequent party to ‘collusion-corruption’, have a role to play not only in raising 
awareness of corruption but also in dealing with the phenomenon within their ranks.360 Here 
again, large and multinational companies take the lead. They are more likely than small and 
domestic companies to have internal mechanisms for checking corruption. These internal 
mechanisms form part of the rules in the legal dimension that constrain actors from exercising 
their powers in a corrupt manner. Whether these internal measures will be effective will depend 
on the levels of awareness, access, distortion and inaction in the relationship with officials of 
the business. These measures may differ from company to company. One participant describing 
the internal measures within his company stated as follows:  
In my organisation, yes; internally, you are not meant to give if it is demanded. Even if it is demanded 
and I don’t give, I am required to even record it – note it – in my organisation. So in effect I have an 
engagement or an advocacy with any of the external tax policy stakeholders, and there is a demand for 
gratification from me, I would not give but at the end of it, I am required to come back to the office and 
register the incident. So that provides a check. The tax authorities’ leadership also requests that if there 
is any corrupt practice noted, they should be reported to their chairmen. (DO) 
 
One participant described an experience of how internal measures were utilised to 
punish an erring staff member thus:  
I know one of my colleagues had an issue where a company outside Nigeria has a subsidiary here and 
the tax manager or so to speak had dealing with the tax authority and some money was paid so that the 
liability could be reduced. At the end of the day, there was a global corporate audit where they got to 
know … the guy was fired and the company went on to pay the difference. You have companies like 
that. Some companies have controls to protect them from such occurrence. (RO) 
 
In explaining why the internal measures put in place by companies may work, the same 
participant stated as follows: 
You have to tell me why you have to pay this and the reasons for paying this. So if you explain to me I 
will release the money and I have to get a receipt, a documentation that says you have paid a hundred 
and a clearance from the revenue saying everything is fine. So to some extent it works.  
 
In many cases, the actions of multinational companies are regulated by domestic anti-
corruption measures of their home state with extra-territorial effects. From the responses of 
participants, this seemed to have an impact on their attitude towards corruption. As one 
participant explained: 
But there are many others that frown strictly at bribery. An example will be companies that are affiliated 
to the US SEC companies and are related to the American companies. They never give bribes. Even if it 
costs them more to defend a position they think is right, they would rather do that. So if the liability being 
contested is say 10 million and it is going to cost them an additional 10 million to pay tax advisers and 
lawyers to make sure they are on the right side, they would rather do that than bribe someone to reduce 
the liability. (DA) 
 
                                                          
360 See Principle 10 of the United Nations Global Compact 2004. 
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Over time, such multinational businesses establish a reputation for not offering bribes 
to tax officials. Such a reputation is sustained by their willingness/ability to challenge 
arbitrariness and abuse, as well as their capacity to withstand frustration and delay. This 
reputation constitutes in a sense a social expectation between the businesses who have it and 
the actors representing the tax system. Many participants were quick to point out that their 
establishment had this positive reputation. One participant, for instance, commented thus:  
Corruption is not an issue for us, we have made efforts to make the case clear in terms of what our 
expectations are, in terms of what we can do, in terms of what standards we are held by. And that is quite 
clear to the people we interact with. That does not mean this is the same for other organisations. (DO) 
 
Finally, some participants noted that, for corruption to be effectively tackled, both sides 
of the relationship (and in particular businesses) must do their part. As one participant 
explained:  
For the policies to be really effective, it has to be from both sides. When you have a business that has a 
no gift policy, and you have the actor or the tax regulator on the other hand that is expecting some form 
of gratification maybe some year-end gift and the business is not forthcoming, there is no similarities in 
policies or in expectations and that could create a strain on the relationship. I think the bottom line is for 
businesses to have a rigid policy about offering gifts or any form of gratification or form of assistance to 
the tax authority. Businesses who do this no gift policy are known for that. I used to work in a consulting 
firm where the tax authority already knows you will not give them anything. The main thing they ask us 
for at the end of the year is calendars and diaries because they know that is the only sort of thing they 
can get from us. Sometimes, the tax authority gets used to the fact that you will not give them any form 
of gratification. Businesses are majorly the ones who can drive the no-corruption in the tax system. If all 
businesses do that, the tax authority on the other hand will understand the stand of the businesses and 
they will it have the choice but to align with that position. (CO) 
 
This indicates the multidirectional nature of the exercise of power as well as the 
multidirectional nature of the measures required to tackle corruption. On the one part, the tax 
officials, for instance, must be constrained by their institutional environment in their interaction 
with the businesses. Likewise, businesses and their representatives must be constrained 
effectively by their institutional environment in their interaction with tax officials and other 
actors representing the tax system. This would provide a more effective general environment 
to prevent the sustenance of corruption in the two-way relationship. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the empirical findings on corruption and the two-way relationship. It 
began by revisiting the meaning of corruption. It argued that one can understand corruption 
through the expectations of the individuals within a given society. Based on the expectations 
of the participants in this research, it identified three prevailing dimensions within which 
corruption may be defined (legal, economic and moral). The lack of reference to the political 
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dimension by the participants is indicative of the limited role played by political considerations 
in a society where political institutions are weak.  
This chapter also considered the various issues of access, awareness, distortion and 
inaction that may create a power gap and avenue for corruption in the two-way relationship. It 
discussed the role played by discretion, wages arbitrariness, collusion and the business 
community in encouraging or discouraging corruption. In each case, it linked these issues to 
the power gap as the avenue through which corruption sustains itself in the two-way 
relationship.  
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CHAPTER 6 THE LAW, CORRUPTION AND THE TWO-WAY RELATIONSHIP 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This penultimate chapter contains a discussion of the means through which corruption may be 
addressed in the two-way relationship. It focuses on the use and limits of the law in achieving 
this goal. It recognises that the law may play a direct or indirect role in addressing corruption 
in the two-way relationship. In section 2, I argue that the law’s definition of and punishments 
for corruption in the two-way relationship (and in society more broadly) should be constructed 
in a manner that reduces the horizontal gap between the dimensions to the barest minimum. 
The focus on the barest minimum is due to the likely impossibility of eliminating this horizontal 
gap in its entirety while maintaining the boundaries of the different dimensions in a social 
context. In section 3, I argue that law must tackle the issues of access, awareness, distortion 
and inaction so as to reduce the power gap that corruption exploits in sustaining itself in the 
two-way relationship. In doing this, I point out the potential for the law to both increase and 
reduce the power gap through its influence on these four mechanisms. This leads to the 
conclusion in which I restate the principal arguments of this thesis.  
 
6.2 The Direct Impact of the Law on Corruption  
The law directly impacts on corruption in the two-way relationship by identifying acts which 
are corrupt as well as imposing penalties on actors found guilty of those acts. These 
punishments may range from imprisonment to the loss of a position of power. The law’s 
description and penalisation of these acts also constitute inputs in other dimensions through 
which these acts can be addressed. For instance, fines are valid inputs within the economic 
dimension. Also, describing an act as a crime impacts on the description of the act within the 
moral dimension. An actor may lose his position of power within the political dimension as a 
result of the application of the law to his situation. However, as the main institution for tackling 
corruption, the law’s definition of any act as corrupt or otherwise illegal is crucial to whether 
the act can sustain itself in the two-way relationship.  
Where an act is expressly adjudged corrupt under the law, the continuous existence of 
the act depends on its ability to hide from the reach of the law. The law’s reach will differ 
depending on the strength of the institutions through which the law is enforced. In countries 
with weak legal institutions, individuals are more likely to observe corruption (as defined by 
the law) in their day-to-day activities. However, the natural trend towards development means 
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that corruption cannot always rely on an enduring state of weak institutions for its sustenance. 
As economies develop and institutions become stronger, corruption must find other ways to 
survive. One way is to limit itself to certain areas which the law (even with strong institutional 
mechanisms) traditionally finds difficult to reach. Corruption may, in this way, retreat to areas 
such as the discretionary powers of actors. An exercise of such discretion based on ethnic bias, 
for instance, may be difficult to establish in a given case owing to a lack of awareness that the 
action breached the expectation of the legal dimension. This makes it difficult for strong 
institutions to tackle this form of corruption. A second way is to exist in forms that the law 
finds difficult to address. One such form is the difficult distinction between gifts and bribes. 
This is especially the case where the gift is provided in a non-monetary form, for instance, 
sexual advances. In both of these ways, corruption must remain in check and must not exceed 
certain boundaries. Where such boundaries are exceeded, the ordinarily strong institutions will 
act to tackle corruption by imposing penalties on the actors involved.  
A more formidable way through which corruption may secure sustenance in 
environments with strong institutions is by attaining the support of the law. Strong institutions 
may struggle in dealing with actions that are seemingly corrupt (owing to their nature and 
consequences) but are adjudged not corrupt by the law. Due to their potential re-
characterisation as legal and not corrupt, it becomes pertinent to view actions through the lenses 
of other dimensions other than the law in order to decipher their nature. In doing so, a basic 
examination of the acts and their consequences in light of the actions and consequences of other 
acts that are clearly corrupt under the law is telling. The hackneyed distinction between tax 
avoidance and evasion, for example, may be subjected to this form of analysis. In drawing this 
distinction, tax avoidance is often defined as those actions of a taxpayer that reduce his tax 
liability within (at least the letter of) the law. Tax evasion on the other hand refers to illegal 
means of reducing one’s tax liability.  
The link between corruption and tax evasion has long been established and analysed by 
many academics in the field. For instance, research by Johnson and others361 found a significant 
correlation between bureaucratic corruption and the underreporting of sales by firms in five 
Eastern European countries using firm-level survey data. Also, Tanzi and Davoodi362 argue 
                                                          
361 Simon Johnson and others, ‘Why do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism’ (2000) 
76 Journal of Public Economics 495. 
362 Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, ‘Corruption, Growth, and Public Finances’ in KJ Arvind (ed), Political 
Economy of Corruption (Routledge 2001) 89. 
185 
 
that tax evasion is likely to be high in economies where corruption is also high. Chun363 finds 
that income tax evasion may increase as a result of a reduction in penalties brought about by 
corruption, whilst Nurtegin364 identifies eradicating corruption as a principal method for 
reducing tax evasion. 
Such analysis exposes the potential congruence between evasion and corruption, 
especially in respect to collusion-corruption. The common example of such congruence is the 
receipt of bribes by tax officials to turn a blind eye to deliberate non-compliance by taxpayers. 
However, as already discussed, corruption need not only exist in relation to evasion where there 
is some collusion. Corruption may be the sole result of the exercise of power by the tax official 
over a business in the form of extortion in which case the business – an unwilling ally – cannot 
reasonably be said to have colluded. Arguably, the tag ‘corrupt’ should be placed on the tax 
official and not on the business.  
Attempts to link corruption to tax avoidance have been rarer.365 This is primarily due 
to the fact that corruption is widely expected to be illegal while tax avoidance (or any act 
adjudged to be so) is legal. This legal/illegal distinction has sufficed in many circles to protect 
tax avoidance from association with corruption. However, observing tax avoidance and 
corruption based on the expectations of other dimensions may yield different results. This is 
not only because certain features of tax avoidance may be similar to those of tax evasion 
(involving both collusion and extortion corruption) but also because the consequences on the 
tax base, tax effort, fairness, efficiency, certainty and other possible indices through which one 
can measure the success of the tax system and the state are sometimes also alike.  
My thesis centres on the power dynamic between actors in the two-way relationship 
and situates corruption within this dynamic. It is therefore important to examine the potential 
differences and similarities in the power dynamics (both within and outside the law). This can 
be achieved by analysing factual yet fictitious instances of evasion and avoidance. Five 
scenarios are listed and discussed below to illustrate this point.  
 
 
                                                          
363 Cyrus Chun, ‘A Model of Income Tax Evasion with Venal Tax Officials: The Case of Taiwan’ (1990) 45(3) 
Public Finance/Finances Publiques 392. 
364 Kanybek Nur-tegin, ‘Determinants of Business Tax Compliance’ (2008) 8 The BE Journal of Economic 
Analysis & Policy 1; see also, Jean Hindricks and others, ‘Corruption, Extortion and Evasion’ (1999) 74(3) 
Journal of Public Economics 395. 
365 See, for example, Gillian Brock and Hamish Russel, ‘Abusive Tax Avoidance and Institutional Corruption: 
The Responsibilities of Tax Professionals’ (Edmond J Salta, Working Paper No 56, 2015).  
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Scenario 1 
A business’ tax liability should be £100. The business is unwilling to pay £100 and 
seeks a tax official willing to accept a bribe to reduce this tax liability. This tax official 
is found and the deal is struck.  
Scenario 2 
A business’ tax liability should be £100. The business is unwilling to pay £100 and 
seeks a tax law-maker powerful enough to influence the law to reduce the tax liability. 
The business offers to support the tax law-maker by funding their political campaign 
within the law.  
Scenario 3 
A business’ true tax liability is £100. However, the business is unaware of this. A 
corrupt tax auditor arbitrarily serves the business an assessment stating that its tax 
liability is £200. The business is warned that if it does not pay £200, its premises will 
be closed. The business is only willing and able to pay £100 and has no reasonable 
means of establishing its true tax liability. Based on a later suggestion by the tax official, 
the business pays £100 as tax and £10 as bribe to the tax official.  
Scenario 4 
A business’ true tax liability is £100. The business is unwilling to pay this sum. The 
business meets an influential tax policy-maker and informs them that it is only willing 
to pay £50. The business threatens to leave the jurisdiction if £50 is not made its tax 
liability. The tax policy-maker succumbs and issues ‘side letters’ to the business. These 
side letters are honoured by the tax authority and the business’ tax liability is reduced 
to £50. 
Scenario 5 
The business’ liability in State A is £100. The business is unwilling to pay this sum. 
The business approaches State B and promises to artificially move its profits to State B 
if State B accepts £50. State B accepts £50.  
In each scenario described above, power has been exercised in respect of a business’ 
tax liability resulting in the business paying less tax than it should have paid (with the exception 
of scenario 3 in which the business paid the correct tax but incurred additional liability in the 
form of the bribe paid to the tax official). Under the laws in many jurisdictions, a crime would 
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have been committed in scenarios 1 and 3 but not in scenarios 2, 4 and 5. The question that 
arises is whether there are substantial differences between these scenarios to justify the 
different treatment under the law.  
Scenario 1 involves collusion-corruption. Both the business and the tax official will be 
adjudged to have acted corruptly by most dimensions of the society. Both individuals have 
secured illicit gain as a result of their exercise of power in a manner that falls short of the 
expectations of the legal, economic and moral dimensions of society.  
In scenario 2, both the business and the tax law-maker have not breached the law. No 
crime has been committed. Yet, to the extent that the special law passed in favour of the 
business is economically inefficient in the circumstances, it is arguable that the tax law-maker 
has exercised his power in a manner that breaches the expectations of the economic dimension 
of the society. The said official has also secured a gain which (though legal) constitutes 
economic waste. Consequently, it is arguable that the tax official has acted corruptly from an 
economic perspective.  
He may also have acted corruptly from a moral perspective to the extent that the laws 
enacted are unfair on the taxpayers and electorate in general. The business can also be said to 
be corrupt from an economic perspective. By influencing the change of the law for its private 
benefit, it has secured illicit economic rents and has abused its power to the extent that the law 
created is inefficient. This is therefore potentially a case of collusion-corruption from an 
economic perspective.  
Scenario 3 is an instance of coercion/extortion-corruption. The business is arguably an 
unwilling ally to corruption. The state does not lose directly as a result in terms of revenue but 
may lose indirectly as a result of the payment to the tax official. To the extent that such 
payments encourage the tax official to continue extorting money from businesses, this may 
discourage future compliance and damage the reputation and efficiency of the tax system. The 
business also stands to lose as a result of the additional tax burden imposed on it.  
Scenario 4 is a comparable situation of extortion but for which no party can be said to 
be corrupt under the law in most jurisdictions. Power in this case is exercised by the business 
over the state. Although such exercise of power may not violate positive laws, it may be 
improper – economically or morally speaking – to the extent that it leads to the creation of an 
inefficient or immoral law. The business also derives gain from the new law which can be 
classed as illicit flowing from the inefficiency or immorality of the law. In this case, extortion-
corruption from an economic or moral perspective can be said to have occurred.  
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Scenario 5 is similar to scenario 2 in the sense that collusion-corruption from an 
economic perspective can be said to have occurred. The main difference is that while the state 
official in scenario 2 acted for his personal interest, the official in scenario 5 has acted for the 
interest of his state. To the extent that the action of the tax official in scenario 5 leads to the 
inefficient allocation of capital and taxes across states (depriving the state which ordinarily 
should impose tax on that activity from taxes), corruption can be said to have taken place. This 
is despite the fact that state interests rather than private interests may have been served as a 
result of the act.  
In understanding the sustenance of corruption in the two-way relationship, it is therefore 
important to examine the potential for actors to secure protection from strong institutions by 
modifying the form but not the substance of their actions. It is also important to consider the 
extent to which the law can protect seemingly corrupt actions from being addressed by 
mechanisms existing in other dimensions.  
In light of the above, it is argued in this thesis that the definition of corruption under 
the law should be such that it takes into account the expectations of other dimensions as much 
as reasonably possible. Put differently, corruption must be defined in the tax laws in a manner 
that reduces the horizontal gap between the dimensions in the society. This approach to 
corruption in the two-way relationship poses certain challenges. The first challenge is the 
presence of numerous other dimensions in society depending on the level of functional 
differentiation that has occurred. A solution to this challenge involves limiting the applicable 
dimensions to those foremost in the minds of actors within the field. In the case of the tax 
system in Nigeria and around the world, this would arguably be the economic and the moral 
dimensions. Concern for efficiency and fairness should be integrated into the definition of 
corruption under the law. This would ensure that the existing machinery of the law can be 
utilised to support and address corruption both within the law and under these other dimensions. 
Even more importantly, it will ensure that the law does not constitute a barrier against the 
attempts by other dimensions to address what they consider to be corrupt. Beyond the definition 
of corruption, law should also take into account the force mechanisms inherent in other 
dimensions when devising its own penalties and procedures against corruption.   
However, there may be certain unresolvable inconsistencies between the legal, moral 
and economic dimensions which make it difficult to eliminate the horizontal gap while these 
dimensions still reserve the right to determine its content, structure and trajectory through its 
internal codes and programmes. Therefore, the goal of the law in addressing corruption through 
its definition and force mechanisms cannot be absolute. A more realistic goal would be to 
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reduce the horizontal gap to its barest minimum. However, this thesis does not attempt to 
suggest what this barest minimum is or how it should be achieved.  
 
6.3 The Indirect Impact of Law on Corruption in the Two-way Relationship  
The law’s contribution to corruption in the two-way relationship is not limited to defining and 
imposing penalties on corrupt acts. The law may also help expose corrupt acts or otherwise 
provide a shield under which such acts may hide from both strong and weak institutions.  
As argued in previous chapters, deficiency in awareness, restriction of access, distortion 
of communications and inaction not only plague the communication link between business and 
the tax system but also influence the power gap through which corruption guarantees its 
sustenance in the two-way relationship. Hence, law may play an indirect role in the sustenance 
of corruption in this relationship through its impact on these four mechanisms. 
  
6.3.1 Awareness  
The law in describing an act as corrupt or not corrupt influences the values which should be 
conferred on these Actions. The law also affects the knowledge of the existence, procedures 
and instruments of actors in the two-relationship. The law achieves this through its rules on 
freedom of information, privacy and confidentiality, whistleblowing and secrecy, to name a 
few.  
Freedom of information is entrenched in the laws of many jurisdictions. Such laws 
permit interested individuals to petition the state for the release of public and other official 
documents relating to the actions or inactions of actors in the two-way relationship. However, 
the right to information contained in such laws is usually not unlimited. This right may be 
overridden on grounds of national security or general public interest. Where the public 
authority wishes to deny this request, the onus usually falls on them to justify this decision.  
Laws on freedom of information are not functional until they are activated by interested 
actors. Hence, in societies where inaction is common, such laws may remain merely decorative. 
Also, the potential for denial of requests on grounds of national security and public interest 
creates loopholes within which corrupt activities may be hidden. Even where, with the aid of 
these laws, information is made available for exposing corruption, such information does not 
guarantee adequate awareness. The process of transmitting information may be plagued by 
distortions as a result of which an actor’s awareness of the activities may remain deficient. The 
relevant actors may not also take the necessary steps to gain awareness or may be prevented 
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from doing so by certain barriers such as language and education. Therefore, while freedom of 
information laws may aid awareness, they does not guarantee it.  
A common ally to the law that guarantees freedom of information, which is often 
characteristic of democratic settings, is the law that guarantees the freedom of the press.366 
Corruption has been held to be lower in countries with higher press freedom.367 The press is 
often more active and willing to imbibe and act on information available to them. Hence, a free 
press increases the effectiveness of laws on freedom of information.  
With or without an entrenched law on freedom of information, the investigative 
activities undertaken by the press may aid the revelation of corrupt practices and instigate the 
protest or force mechanisms against corrupt officials. For example, investigations by the 
Washington Post in the infamous Watergate Scandal led to the resignation of President Richard 
Nixon in 1974. Also, the investigations by the Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism 
(PCIJ) led to the impeachment and trial of erstwhile President Joseph Estrada for corruption in 
2000. Following an extensive report by the PCIJ into the lifestyles of officials of the Philippines 
Bureau of Internal Revenue, tax collectors were investigated, suspended, retired or 
transferred.368  
However, while the press may be free, they may be controlled by private interests and 
tainted by political and economic bias. This may transform the press to a source of distortion 
rather than awareness. Houston and others, for example, argue that there is a positive 
correlation between corruption in bank lending and media concentration.369 Also Besley and 
Prat370 highlight the dangers of media capture in democratic governments. Rather than aiding 
the fight against corruption, compromised media may protect corruption by concealing it.371 
This challenge is captured in the intermittent debates about the extent to which press freedom 
should remain unbridled.372  
                                                          
366 For the relationships between free press and corruption, see Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder, ‘A Free 
Press is Bad News for Corruption’ (2003) Journal of Public Economics 1801; Tim Besley and Andrea Prat, 
‘Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability’ (2006) 96(3) American 
Economic Review 720.   
367 Johann Lambsdorff, The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and Policy 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 45. 
368 See Rod Macdonnell and Milica Pesic, ‘The Role of the Media in Curbing Corruption’ in Rick Stapenhurst 
and others (eds), The Role of Parliament in Curbing Corruption (World Bank 2006) 112. 
369 Joel Houston and others, ‘Media Ownership, Concentration and Corruption in Bank Lending’ (2011) 100 
Journal of Financial Economics 326. 
370 Besley and Prat (n 367). 
371 Richard Nielsen, ‘Corruption Networks and Implications for Ethical Corruption Reform’ (2003) 42(2) 
Journal of Business Ethics 125, 136. 
372 Following the Leveson Inquiry in the UK, for example, some have searched for a balance between regulation 
and press freedom. See George Brock, ‘The Leveson Inquiry: There is a Bargain to be Struck over Media 
Freedom and Regulation’ (2012) 13(4) Journalism 519. 
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Standing in opposition to laws safeguarding freedom of information and the press are 
those protecting the privacy and confidentiality of individuals. The presence of both forms of 
laws – one seemingly aiding awareness and the other seemingly hindering it – is typical of the 
legal dimension in which rights criss-cross and determine the limits of each other. Privacy and 
confidentiality is particularly important when the issue is the taxation of businesses. Most 
jurisdictions protect the confidentiality of the tax affairs of businesses as part of the scheme to 
encourage openness and transparency between businesses and the tax authority. However, in 
encouraging openness between these two actors, privacy and confidentiality creates a 
smokescreen which makes scrutiny of their relationship (especially in suspected cases of 
collusion corruption) challenging. The UK Public Accounts Committee, for example, 
complained that their effort to scrutinise HMRC’s ‘tax deals’ with certain large companies was 
hindered by the HMRC using laws on confidentiality.373 Tax administrators in possession of 
confidential information about businesses and their dealings with the tax authority are usually 
bound by laws and other administrative rules that govern the terms of their employment to 
refrain from divulging such information. However, this obligation is usually tempered by rules 
permitting whistleblowing. In many cases, however, there may be a fine and dangerous line 
(for the tax official) between illegally divulging confidential information and whistleblowing. 
One example of this fine line is the case of Osita Mba, the HMRC whistleblower who was 
allegedly maltreated by the HMRC.374 Also relevant is the treatment of the ex-PWC employees 
who leaked the Luxembourg tax authority rulings.375 
This situation is compounded by secrecy laws that apply to government officials 
holding sensitive positions within the tax system. These secrecy laws further forbid these 
officials from divulging official secrets.376 Secrecy laws may also be part of the state official 
policy for encouraging investment. For instance, bank secrecy laws protect the identity of 
taxpayers owning wealth stashed in offshore accounts, thus aiding international tax evasion 
                                                          
373 See Public Accounts Committee, HM Revenue and Customs 2010-11 Accounts: Tax Disputes, Sixty-First 
Report of the Session 2010-12 (HC 2010-12, 1531) EV 82 (Tax Disputes); Osita Mba, ‘Transparency and 
Accountability of the Tax Administration in the UK: The Nature and Scope of Taxpayer Confidentiality (2012) 
2 BTR 187. 
374 See Rajeev Syal, ‘How HMRC Treated its Goldman Sachs Tax Deal Whistle-blower as a Criminal’ The 
Guardian (London, 29 April 2013).  
375 Reuters, ‘Luxembourg Court Charges French Journalist over LuxLeaks Role’ The Guardian (London, 23 
April 2015). 
376 See, for example, FIRSEA, s 50. 
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and avoidance. In recent times, there have been various unilateral, bilateral and multilateral 
attempts to counter such bank secrecy laws with the goal of enabling transparency.377  
 Law may also aid awareness by creating and strengthening obligations on the part of 
businesses and the actors representing the tax system to develop their knowledge of the laws 
(relating to taxation and corruption) and the industry within which they operate. Laws may 
specify minimum qualifications, as well as mandate an appreciable level of training and 
continuous professional development, for key actors in the two-way relationship.   
 
6.3.2 Access 
Laws may aid or hinder access to the protest and force mechanisms through which corruption 
in the two-way relationship may be addressed. By creating avenues for protest, such as courts, 
ombudsmen and committees, the law provides individuals willing to challenge corruption 
access with a means to do so. The media is one platform through which protest against 
corruption can be carried out. Therefore, by ensuring a free media, the law also grants access 
to a protest mechanism.  
The courts are a major mechanism through which protest is achieved within the legal 
dimension. Therefore, access to the courts is crucial. However, certain rules may exist which 
hinder access to the courts. The main examples of these laws include the laws on standing 
(locus standi), statute of limitation and immunity clauses.  
In civil matters, the rules on locus standi were formulated to protect the courts from 
being inundated with claims from busybodies who had no interest in the suit. In its earlier 
forms, rules on locus standi granted access to individuals whose private rights had been 
infringed. However, over time, the rules on locus standi have become increasingly watered 
down to grant greater access to individuals with direct and indirect interest in the subject matter 
of the suit. In its present form in Nigeria, the rules on locus standi grant access to individuals 
with sufficient interest in the subject matter of the suit.378 The current sentiment of the Nigerian 
courts to the issue of standing is captured in the words of Fatayi Williams CJN in Adesanya v 
President of Nigeria and anor379 thus:  
                                                          
377 See, Laura Szarmach, ‘Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States’ Settlement in the 
UBS Case’ (2010) 43 Cornell International Law Journal 409; Niels Johannesen and Gabril Zucman, ‘The End of 
Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown’ (2014) 6(1) American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy 65. 
378 See Godwin Okeke, ‘Re-Examining the Role of Locus Standi in the Nigerian Legal Jurisprudence’ (2013) 
6(3) Journal of Politics and Law 209. 
379 Adesanya v President of Nigeria and anor (1981) 1 All NLRI. Ironically, the court found that the litigant 
lacked sufficient interest in this case.  
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I take cognisance of the fact that Nigeria is a developing country with a multi-ethnic society and a written 
Federal Constitution, where rumour-mongering is the pastime of the market places and construction sites. 
To deny any member of such a society who is aware or believes, or is led to believe, that there has been 
an infraction of any of the provisions of the Constitution, or that any law passed by any of the Legislative 
Houses, whether Federal or State, is unconstitutional, access to a Court of law to air his grievance on the 
flimsy excuse of lack of sufficient interest is to provide a ready recipe for organised disenchantment with 
the judicial process. 
 
Based on this sentiment, the courts are likely to find that a willing litigant has sufficient 
interest in the suit. Standing becomes problematic in the two-way relationship where a taxpayer 
seeks to challenge a communicative action relating to another taxpayer’s affairs. This may be 
a law, policy or action of the tax authority relating to another taxpayer. The UK courts were 
formerly unwilling to grant locus standi in such cases,380 save in situations where both 
taxpayers are close competitors.381 Recent developments in the law suggest that a litigant in 
such cases would have locus standi.382 It is, however, yet to be seen whether the grant of locus 
standi in such cases merely constitutes formal, rather than substantive, access. In other words, 
whether the courts will set aside an exercise of power in favour of a taxpayer on the application 
of another.383 The tax authority may also wish to challenge the constitutionality of private 
arrangements entered into by taxpayers concerning their tax liability. The Nigerian court held 
that the tax authority had sufficient interest to institute such proceedings.  
In criminal matters, an action is usually instituted not by the victim but by the state, 
save in exceptional circumstances. Hence, where the state fails to take criminal action against 
the transgressors, then the victims and other third parties possess very limited rights to force 
the institution of such proceedings in most jurisdictions. The Nigerian Supreme Court in 
Ogbuagu v Ogbuagu,384 for example, decided that, while the court may entertain cases on the 
breach of the Code of Conduct by public officers, this Code does not entitle private individuals 
to institute actions on its account.  
Another common legal restriction of access to courts is the statute of limitations. Such 
statutes impose time limits on the rights of actors to institute civil claims. After the expiration 
of time, such actions are statute-barred. Most jurisdictions have both general and special time 
limitations on the institution of actions. General limitations apply to all suits of a given subject 
matter. Special limitations apply depending on the parties or courts involved.  
                                                          
380 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd 
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Within the Nigerian tax system, for instance, a taxpayer seeking to challenge a notice 
of assessment must institute an action within 30 days of his receipt of the said notice. Where 
such action is not so instituted within that time period, the notice is deemed to be final and 
conclusive and therefore can no longer be challenged in court. This bar can create a power gap 
as it may prevent a taxpayer from challenging an illegitimate exercise of power.  
No suit can be brought against public officers (which includes most actors representing 
the tax system) after three months of an act taken by the said officer in the course of his duty.385 
This rule does not apply where the act complained about is ‘outside the colour’ of the office or 
duty of the public officer386 or where the damage caused by the act is continuous.387 These 
exceptions prevent actors from using this provision as a shield to commit crimes (e.g. engage 
in corruption) or frustrate taxpayers.   
In Nigeria, taxpayers cannot be assessed for tax on income accruing to them after a 
period of 6 years. There is an exception to this rule where crime or fraud is committed. This 
exception empowers the tax authority to challenge the tax liability of a taxpayer secured by 
corruption (or other forms of crime) at any time and to charge penalties and interests on any 
unpaid tax. On the one hand, this may deter knowledgeable taxpayers from engaging in 
corruption but on the other it may encourage the extortion and hostage-taking of taxpayers that 
had earlier engaged in corrupt activities. These hostages may lose their substantive access to a 
protest mechanism when faced with extortionate or repressive activities.  
Finally, Section 308 of the CFRN grants immunity from prosecution to certain 
important public officers within the tax policy terminal of the tax system while they remain in 
office. This immunity extends to actions instituted for breach of the Code of Conduct. The 
effect of this immunity is to restrict or at least delay access to a force mechanism through which 
the interests of these actors may be aligned with the ideal. However, it does not preclude 
challenges to the actions taken by these actors. Where these actions breach the ideal, they may 
yet be challenged by a recipient actor or third party. This immunity is another example of a 
legal instrument with the potential of maintaining a power gap between the actors in the two-
way relationship. 
 
  
                                                          
385 See Public Officer Protection Act, s 2; FIRSEA, s 55 (for tax officials).   
386 See Attorney-General of Rivers State v Attorney-General of Bayelsa State & Anor (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt 1340) 
123, 148 and 149. 
387 ibid. 
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6.3.3 Distortion of Communication  
In applying force on corrupt actors, the courts as the primary force mechanism will be called 
upon to determine both the facts and the applicable law. In performing this task, there is 
considerable potential for distortion arising from the methods through which such discovery of 
facts is made. In adversarial legal systems, the fact-finding process is a battle between the 
parties, each portraying the facts in a light that suits its averments. As a result, distortion of 
facts is common. This is worsened by the fact that the courts are prevented from descending 
into the arena of conflict as they must remain impartial umpires. Hence, the facts established 
by the courts may not be the true facts. Often, they are the product of a superiority contest 
between rival counsels as mediated by laws regulating what and how facts are to be established.  
Although the laws of evidence were created and refined over the years to ensure that 
the facts established are true, these laws often constitute a barrier to such true facts. For 
instance, the law may provide that documentary evidence of a fact is inadmissible merely 
because the document in question does not satisfy certain formal requirements which may or 
may not affect the validity of the contents of the documents.  
Also, the legal rules or canon through which the courts interpret statutes also permit 
distortions contrary to their original goals. Conventionally, the role of the court is to interpret 
the laws. The courts are bound by the law and must give effect to it. This conventional role is 
captured in the primary rule of interpretation – the literal rule. This rule requires the court to 
give effects to words in statutes based on their ordinary grammatical meaning. The application 
of literal rule has received even greater acceptance within taxation. This is because, since tax 
law involves the appropriation of the property of citizens, it is imperative that such 
appropriation should not be permitted save where the law clearly and expressly says so. 
However, the complexity of tax statutes, inability of the law to cater for the penumbra, and the 
creative ways in which taxpayers comply with the law have pushed the courts to apply other 
canons of interpretation. These include the golden rule which permits a deviation from the 
literal rule where the application of the literal rule will lead to absurdity; the mischief rule 
which implores the courts to interpret the statute in light of the mischief or problem which the 
said statute was created to address; and purposive interpretation which requires the courts to 
interpret the statute in light of its purpose.  
It is common, especially in the field of taxation, for the interpretation of the law to differ 
depending on the canon of interpretation employed. This creates considerable room for 
distortion of the law when applying it to the facts. This situation is further exacerbated where 
the potential for judicial activism is taken into account. As a result of the potential distortion 
196 
 
of the facts and the law, the courts may arrive at a decision which differs from the true situation 
of things in light of the real intent of the law. 
Therefore awareness of the potential for distortion by the arbiters responsible for 
dispute resolution is crucial. However, tackling distortion of this sort is challenging. It is argued 
that while arbiters should be more rigid in their interpretation of laws and facts, they should 
apply a certain degree of flexibility when dealing with procedures used to determine facts and 
law. Rigid procedures and technicalities such as requisite formality of documentation should 
not be permitted to constitute barriers to the factual resolution of disputes. These arbiters must 
also give regard to resources available to the parties in the suit. Small and local businesses are 
more likely to lack the requisite processes to defend their claims in court. Hence, arbiters should 
be mindful of this fact and be prepared to waive formality requirements depending on the 
particular circumstances. These specific changes are possible within the special fact-finding 
tribunals that form the first step of the external dispute resolution terminal of the tax system. 
Hence, the strengthening of this terminal (by the resolution of uncertainty concerning its 
jurisdiction and the improvement of its perceived and actual independence) is a crucial aspect 
of the process required to maintain a protest mechanism with limited distortions.  
 
6.3.4 Inaction 
The law seemingly has a limited role in ensuring action by actors. This is based on the premise 
that the law is usually concerned with wrong actions rather than wrong omissions. However, 
the law addresses omission by creating obligations to act. The creation of such obligations at 
various points in the two-way relationship between businesses and the tax system may help 
reduce the power gap. This is especially the case in relation to undue delays. The law in many 
instances creates clear timelines within which businesses must take action (such as filing 
returns and filing objections to assessments). Although similar obligations already exist in 
relation to the actors representing the tax system, it is arguable that these should be extended 
to cover the various instances where undue delay negatively affects the relationship between 
business and the tax system. These instances include the delay in reviewing tax laws, 
responding to requests for clarification of the law, providing tax documentation and resolving 
tax disputes. This duty to act should be accompanied with rights of businesses to protest and 
apply force on actors representing the tax system that breach it. However, extending this 
obligation is not without its challenges. Firstly, there will be situations where the undue delay 
is due to bureaucracy or other surrounding circumstances which are beyond the control of the 
actors involved. Hence, any law imposing a time limit may either create unfairness and 
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inefficiency if enforced or be ignored by the enforcers on the grounds of fairness and efficiency. 
Secondly, conferring rights on businesses assumes that businesses will be willing and able to 
protest in line with those rights. In situations where businesses tend not to protest owing to 
practical considerations, such rights to protest would have limited impact. This issue can be 
resolved by creating a corresponding duty on the part of an actor (possibly a third party) to 
protest in the event of a delay. This may succeed depending on the willingness and ability of 
the said actor to instigate this protest.  
The law may encourage protests against illegitimate exercise of power by protecting 
whistleblowers or limiting the application of secrecy laws. Also, the imposition of asymmetric 
as opposed to symmetric liability for bribe givers and takers may encourage reporting of and 
deter the illegitimate demand of bribes in the case of harassment bribes. Harassment bribes are 
bribes paid by individuals for services which they are ordinarily entitled to. It is distinguishable 
from collusive bribery where both the bribe giver and the bribe taker exchange favours, with 
the bribe giver receiving that which he is not ordinarily entitled to it. With collusive bribery, 
there is a unity of interest between the parties based on the favours mutually enjoyed. Third 
parties are often required to protest or challenge such enterprises as the parties are unlikely to 
protest even in cases where the punishment for bribery is asymmetrical.388 In contrast, Abbink 
and others389 conducted an experiment that reveals the potential of asymmetric liability to 
increase reporting of bribes and reduce demand for bribes in cases of harassment bribes. It also 
shows that these benefits of asymmetric liability may be reduced where the economic 
incentives for the bribe giver are not sufficient or retaliation by the bribe taker is possible.  
To some extent, inaction may be indirectly tackled by the law where the law addresses 
the levels of awareness, distortion and access in the two-way relationship. It is argued that these 
other mechanisms are the underlying causes for inaction in many instances.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Tackling corruption is not a task of the law alone. Other dimensions in society possess their 
own mechanisms through which they tackle corruption. Nevertheless, the law has a central, yet 
limited, role to play in tackling corruption in the two-way relationship. In doing this, the law 
must ensure that it does not constitute an obstacle to legitimate means of tackling corruption 
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by other dimensions in society. In this chapter, I have suggested two main ways in which the 
law can achieve this task. Firstly, the legal definition of and punishment for corruption should 
be constantly revised to ensure that any horizontal gap amongst the dimensions is reduced to 
the barest minimum. This may be achieved by including codes and programmes into the law, 
thereby creating a structural coupling between the law and these other dimensions that ensure 
similar yet independent progression amongst the dimensions in society concerning corruption. 
Secondly, law must tackle the power gap through its impact on the levels of awareness, access, 
distortion and inaction in the two-way relationship. While the law may be unable to solve all 
the challenges posed by these four mechanisms, a review of the law with these factors in mind 
will limit the power gap and with this constrain the avenue through which corruption sustains 
itself in the two-way relationship.   
 
  
199 
 
CHAPTER 7 SHIFTING THE FOCUS TO THE POWER GAP AND ITS 
MECHANISMS: CONCLUDING CHAPTER 
7.1 Introduction  
This concluding chapter seeks to achieve two main goals. Firstly, it will attempt to justify a 
call for the shift in focus from certain prominent themes in the existing literature (transparency, 
accountability, monopoly and discretion) to the power gap and its four mechanisms. Secondly, 
it calls for further research on applying the concept of the power gap, not only to other societal 
relationships and jurisdictions but also to the international arena with states, multinational 
companies and international organisations as the principal actors. 
  
7.2 Shifting the Focus?  
In societies where corruption is prevalent, there is a recognised tendency for actors to view its 
infiltration of and persistence in institutions as a fait accompli. It is the duty of academics to 
think productively about ways to reduce corruption in these institutions. Such productive 
thinking may lead to the identification of certain themes or concepts which indicate actions that 
policy-makers may take to tackle corruption. Four prominent themes (transparency, 
accountability, monopoly and discretion) can be identified in the existing literature. 
Accountability, monopoly and discretion, for example, feature in Kiltgaard’s formula on 
corruption (that is, corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability).390 This 
section briefly examines these themes in a bid to justify the call for a shift in focus to the power 
gap and its four mechanisms. 
  
7.2.1 Monopoly  
Monopoly features regularly in economic literature on corruption. Some academics have 
argued that the lack of competition or the over-concentration of powers in certain actors enables 
corruption to thrive in public institutions. As a result, they have identified the decentralisation 
of powers as a government policy that may reduce corruption. However, both empirical and 
theoretical research have produced conflicting results on the relationship between monopoly 
or concentration of powers (decentralisation) on the one hand, and corruption on the other hand. 
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With regard to decentralisation, for example, while Breton391  and Weingast392 argue that 
decentralisation will reduce corruption, Banfield393 and Manor394 argue that decentralisation 
will increase corruption. The results of empirical studies by Treisman395 and Goldsmith396 also 
show that decentralisation increases corruption, while similar empirical studies by Estache and 
Sinha,397 and Gurgur and Shah398 show the reverse.  
The creation of more public service outlets may improve efficiency and reduce 
corruption. This is as a result of increased competition between outlets. Gray Molina and 
others,399 for example, find a reduction in informal payments where there is competition in the 
provision of government services. In contrast, however, the creation of more public service 
outlets may provide more options to actors seeking willing allies to participate in corrupt 
practices, especially in a social environment where corruption is rife. 
Arguably, focusing on monopoly or the lack of competition does not adequately address 
the core mechanisms exploited by corruption in the two-way relationship. In cases where lack 
of competition or monopoly breeds corruption, the core issue is the presence of a power gap 
brought about by restriction of access, deficiency in awareness, inaction and distortion of 
communications. Hence, emphasis should be placed on addressing the power gap by 
influencing the levels of these four mechanisms.  
 
7.2.2 Discretion  
Discretionary powers have been recognised as a stronghold for corruption in public 
institutions.400 It is a common argument that the breadth of an actor’s discretionary powers is 
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a rough indication of his capacity to engage in corruption. Some researchers argue that there is 
a positive correlation between discretionary powers and corruption.401 Hence, by reducing or 
even eliminating discretionary powers, corruption may be minimised.402 
However, discretionary power is not merely a product of laws or administrative rules. 
Rather, like any other phenomenon in the two-way relationship, it is a product of a network of 
human and non-human actors. An actor may possess discretionary powers even in situations 
where such powers are not expressly conferred on the actor by laws or administrative rules. 
Thus, merely altering the content of these rules may have limited or no effect on the breadth of 
an actor’s discretionary power.  
It is also noteworthy that corruption does not require discretionary powers to thrive. 
Corruption may result from the exercise of non-discretionary powers in a manner that 
contravenes ideal expectations. Also curbing discretionary powers is not always efficient, 
especially as certain roles require flexibility. Rather than focusing on eliminating or reducing 
discretionary powers, it is therefore imperative to identify and address the main underlying 
challenges posed by discretionary powers.  
I argue in this thesis that the challenge is not discretion per se but the power gap as 
widened by the levels of the four mechanisms. For instance, the problem with discretionary 
powers may be the increased likelihood that the ‘ideal’ will be distorted in a manner that is not 
easily noticeable. This is because where there is discretionary power, it may be difficult to 
detect whether the actor has exercised his powers in line with the ideal. Where non-
discretionary powers are exercised, a distortion of the ideal can easily be identified by 
comparing the ideal and the outcome of the exercise. In cases where discretionary powers are 
exercised, recourse may have to be made to the motives behind the exercise. Such motives are 
difficult to determine in many cases. This illustrates that the underlying challenge with 
discretionary power may be issues of awareness and distortion. Hence, focusing on the issues 
of awareness and distortion would lead to more targeted and productive ways to tackle the real 
                                                          
401 Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella, ‘The New Economies of Corruption: A Survey and Some New Results’ 
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challenges posed by discretionary powers. A shift in focus is therefore likely to be more 
beneficial than a broad and arbitrary attempt to reduce or eradicate discretionary powers. 
  
7.2.3 Transparency  
Transparency, and its sister concept accountability, have featured prominently in the literature 
on corruption.403 Two main facets of transparency are openness and clarity. While openness 
refers to the accessibility of institutional actors and actions, clarity refers to the ease with which 
these actors and actions can be understood.  
Transparency, like monopoly and discretionary power, points policy-makers in the right 
direction in terms of actions needed to tackle corruption. Improving transparency reduces the 
information asymmetries that may prevent recipient actors and other third parties from 
protesting against an illegitimate exercise of power.404 However, it does not sufficiently 
identify the underlying challenges that corruption exploits. This is mainly due to its tendency 
to lead to a focus on just one side of the relationship. The call for greater transparency, for 
example, demands greater openness and clarity from state actors and institutions (such as the 
terminals of the tax system). However, it often ignores the considerable role played by the 
actors interacting with these institutions in securing such clarity and openness. Making 
institutions open or clear does not guarantee openness or clarity since the actors on the other 
side of the relationship may fail or be unable to take advantage of it.405 Put differently, merely 
focusing on openness or clarity without ensuring that it leads to increased access or awareness 
may fail to inspire the changes required to tackle corruption. Bauhr and Grimes have also 
argued that actors may fail to hold public office holders to account despite transparent practices 
revealing the wrongs of these officers. In their words, the attitude of these actors may be one 
of ‘resignation’ rather than ‘indignation’ in the face of corruption exposed by transparency. 
This is more likely to be the case in societies where corruption is rife.406 
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Therefore, a shift in focus from transparency to awareness and access better ensures 
that the underlying challenges exploited by corruption are addressed. The call for this shift is 
not intended to belittle the important role played by transparency. It merely requires that 
transparency be categorised as one of the issues to be considered in achieving greater access 
and awareness rather than as the focal point in the battle against corruption.  
 
7.2.4 Accountability  
Accountability, a prominent theme in the literature on corruption,407 is also capable of different 
meanings. One may identify two angles of accountability. The first angle covers an actor’s 
personal accountability for actions that affect others. The second angle covers the ability of 
other actors to hold an actor accountable for the latter’s actions.  
Accountability is an umbrella concept that covers the various concerns captured in the 
power gap and the four mechanisms. When interpreted broadly, it roughly equates to a state of 
no corruption. This broad interpretation or the lack of specificity renders the call for greater 
accountability in practice unhelpful. There is a need to deconstruct this call for greater 
accountability in order to uncover the actual mechanisms responsible for the lack of 
accountability in a given relationship or society. The power gap and four mechanisms concept 
is a product of such deconstruction. By identifying the different limits placed on actions by the 
ideal expectation of the dimensions in society, the power gap concept highlights the differing 
standards against which one may be held accountable. Also, the issues of distortion, access, 
awareness and inaction provide a clearer picture of the elusiveness or challenges of 
accountability in social contexts. Thus, it provides better guidance to policy-makers on the 
steps required to achieve accountability or curb corruption. 
The above premises further validate the call for a shift in focus from accountability to 
the power gap and the four mechanisms. 
  
7.3 Further Research  
Admittedly, this call for a shift in focus can only be fully justified after testing the concept of 
the power gap and the four mechanisms in other research beyond the scope and limitations of 
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the current research. Firstly, it would be beneficial to study empirically the two-way 
relationship in social contexts, other than Nigeria. In this regard, a comparative analysis of this 
relationship in developed and developing countries would be a positive step towards fully 
understanding the susceptibility of the relationship to the four mechanisms. Secondly, even 
beyond taxation, there are other relationships in society customarily plagued by corruption (for 
example, procurement processes). An empirical study of these other relationships could be 
conducted with the power gap and the four mechanisms as a guide. Thirdly, a quantitative 
analysis of the levels of access, awareness, distortion and inaction as against the prevalence of 
corruption would also shed more light on the usefulness of the power gap concept.  
Fourthly, the concept of the power gap and the four mechanisms applies not only to 
corruption but also to sundry other acts that fall short of the ideal expectations of the dimension 
of any given society. Hence, further research applying this concept to other forms of 
malfeasance may aid its development and improve its application to corruption in the two-way 
relationship between businesses and the tax system.  
Most interestingly, the power gap concept may be applied to the international tax arena 
with states, international organisations (such as the OECD, EU and UN), and multinational 
companies as the principal actors in the relationship. In this arena, the rule-setters are often the 
international organisations. These organisations are responsible for the policies and rules 
contained in the bilateral and multilateral treaties that shape the framework of the international 
tax system.408 The tax administrators are the various states charged with the responsibility of 
giving effect to these international tax rules. The arbiters are the growing international tax 
dispute resolution centres and the domestic dispute resolution mechanisms, to the extent that 
they entertain international tax disputes. Many of these disputes relate to transfer pricing (i.e. 
the price at which transfers of goods and services are made between related entities).409  
The application of the concept of the power gap and the four mechanisms to the 
international arena is pertinent. This is in light of the burgeoning interest of tax policy-makers 
in the challenges created by harmful international tax competition, base erosion and profit 
shifting. Harmful tax competition refers to practices by states which encourage non-
compliance, unduly distorts the allocation of capital and labour, or disrupts the agreed means 
for allocating taxing rights. It includes imposing no taxes on economic activity, preferential 
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regimes and secrecy laws. The fight against such practices was led by the OECD but has 
recently been overtaken by the movement to tackle base erosion and profit shifting. Teather 
makes a compelling argument as to why these practices should not be termed harmful.410 Base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to the current movement led by the OECD/G20 
targeted at practices of multinational companies that unduly exploit the gaps in international 
tax rules to reduce their tax liability.411 
There is a growing number of cases in which multinational companies collude with 
state actors to flout the ‘ideal expectations’ of the international tax regime contained in the 
international tax rules, the individual and collective conceptions of fairness and the overarching 
economic goals of promoting growth and efficiency.  
For instance, in 2014 there was a discovery led by journalists of seemingly aggressive 
tax planning strategies by over 300 multinational companies with the aid of tax rulings by the 
Luxembourg tax authority (Luxembourg Tax Leaks).412 The practices of these companies have 
been described as immoral. In the words of Margaret Hodge, head of the UK Public Accounts 
Committee, these companies are not being accused of engaging in illegality. Rather they are 
being accused of being immoral.413 However, some of these practices have crossed the fine line 
between morality and illegality. For instance, the deal between Amazon and Luxembourg has 
been labelled illegal state aid by the European Commission. The European Commission has 
also accused Ireland and the Netherlands of breaching the rules on state aid through covert tax 
deals.  
Regarding the cases exposed by the Luxembourg Tax Leaks, it is vital to ask questions 
about how the state of affairs, currently condemned internationally, persisted for almost a 
decade unperturbed. Applying the power gap concept, it is arguable that the state and 
multinational companies involved were able to further their private interests while breaching 
the ideal (as contained in the EU law on State Aid – legal dimension – or conceptions of fairness 
– moral dimension) owing to the a) lack of awareness on the part of third parties willing to 
challenge the action; b) lack of access to a force mechanism through which the action can be 
challenged on the part of those who were aware; c) distortion of Communication; and d) 
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inaction on the part of those who were aware and had access to a force mechanism that operates 
without considerable distortion. 
The ideal is as contained in the EU law on State Aid (legal dimension) or conceptions 
of fairness (moral dimension). The European Commission, for example, was arguably unaware 
of the deals before the leaks. One may question the rationale behind so much secrecy in the 
resolution of tax disputes. Apart from creating room for a power gap, this may have a negative 
effect on the growth of international law of taxation. To the extent that the activities were 
merely immoral and not illegal, its persistence can be attributed to the absence of an adequate 
force mechanism. Some civil society organisations are willing to challenge these practices but 
lack access to a functional force mechanism. In one case involving Dyson Ltd,414 the arm’s-
length standard was applied in a manner that enabled the company to incur deductible interest 
expenses for a loan that was interest free. This led to a reduction in the taxable profits of the 
company and can arguably be described as a distortion of the arm’s-length standard (distortion 
of Communication). Arguably, the Luxembourg government and tax authority actively 
colluded in the process. There is a good chance that they were aware but they chose not to act 
as this suited their interests (inaction). 
 
7.4 Conclusion  
As states struggle to generate sufficient revenue from the tax system whilst attracting, 
encouraging and sustaining investments, societal factors such as corruption are likely 
challenges. Despite its widespread condemnation, corruption manages to infiltrate and impact 
on the results of this struggle of states. This research therefore set out to understand how 
corruption manages to persist in a relationship closely associated with this struggle (that is, the 
two-way relationship between business and the tax system). It recognises the need to avoid a 
state of helplessness by identifying concepts or themes that may guide policy-makers in their 
bid to minimise corruption. It argues that corruption sustains itself in this two-way relationship 
by exploiting a power gap, influenced by the levels of access, awareness, distortion and 
inaction. In its concluding chapter, it calls for a shift in emphasis from traditional concepts such 
as transparency, accountability, discretion and monopoly to the power gap and its four 
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mechanisms. However, it recognises that this shift can only be fully justified after conducting 
further research on the usefulness of the power gap concept. 
In all, it augurs hope that the concept of the power gap and its four mechanisms will aid 
the design of a tax system that strikes an adequate balance between the potentially conflicting 
needs for investments and revenue generation in countries where corruption is endemic. It is 
worth reiterating that this is essential in these years of austerity and heightened international 
tax competition as the need to encourage, attract and sustain investments remains foremost in 
the minds of governments of both developed and developing countries. 
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Appendices 
A. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW OF TAX 
PROFESSIONALS 
Questions 1 to 3 seek to derive information on the levels of interaction between businesses and 
the actors representing the tax system.  
Question 4 targets information on general factors affecting the interaction.  
Questions 5 to 12 seek information on the expectations of businesses regarding the actions of 
actors representing the tax system. These will also help provide information on how businesses 
respond to the actions of these actors.  
Question 13 seeks information on what actions businesses identify as corrupt. Questions 14 to 
17 are direct questions on corruption and the relationship between businesses and the tax 
system.  
1) Do tax officials interact with: 
a. Tax policy-makers?    
b. Tax law-makers? 
c. Tax arbiters? 
d. Businesses? 
2) How do tax officials interact with 
a. Tax policy-makers? 
b. Tax law-makers? 
c. Tax arbiters? 
d. Businesses? 
3) How often do tax officials interact with: 
a. Tax policy-makers? 
b. Tax law-makers?  
c. Tax arbiters? 
d. Businesses? 
4) What factors affect (positively or negatively) tax officials’ interaction with: 
a. Tax policy-makers? 
b. Tax law-makers? 
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c. Tax arbiters? 
d. Businesses?  
5) From your experience, what do tax officials generally expect in their relationship with (in 
terms of the actions of): 
a. Tax policy-makers? 
b. Tax law-makers? 
c. Tax arbiters? 
d. Businesses? 
6) Why are these actions expected?  
7) From your experience, what unexpected actions occur (in terms of the actions of) in the 
interactions/relationship between tax officials and: 
a. Tax policy-makers? 
b. Tax law-makers? 
c. Tax arbiters? 
d. Businesses?  
8) Why do you classify these actions as expected or unexpected?  
9) How do businesses respond when an action is to their benefit? 
10) How do businesses respond when an action is detrimental to them? 
11) Why do businesses respond in these manners to the actions by: 
a. Tax policy-makers? 
b. Tax law-makers? 
c. Tax arbiters? 
d. Tax officials?   
12) What are the likely responses by businesses when the action is a case of: 
a. Negligence? 
b. Incompetence? 
c. Misinterpretation of the law? 
d. Inefficiency? 
e. Abuse of power? 
f. Corruption?  
13) What forms of corruption could occur in the relationship between businesses and:  
a. Tax policy-makers? 
b. Tax law-makers? 
c. Tax officials 
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d. Tax arbiters? 
14) Why do businesses respond the way they do when the action is corruption? Are there any 
other reasons that affect the response?  
15) What factors encourage corruption in the relationship between businesses and: 
a. Tax policy-makers? 
b. Tax law-makers? 
c. Tax officials? 
d. Tax arbiters? 
16) Are there laws or policies that contribute to corruption in these relationships?  
17) How do the measures put in place to tackle corruption affect the interaction between 
businesses and: 
a. Tax policy-makers? 
b. Tax law-makers? 
c. Tax officials? 
d. Tax arbiters?     
B. BREAKDOWN OF PARTICIPANTS (SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS) 
 
TYPE NUMBER 
SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS 18 
INHOUSE TAX CONSULTANTS 
(MAINLY LARGE BUSINESSES) 
15 
TAX OFFICIALS 10 
EXTERNAL TAX ADVISERS 17 
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C. SURVEY REPORT  
1.  Large businesses are more likely to comply with their tax liabilities than small 
businesses  
 
 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
Strongly 
Agree 
  
 
40 36.36% 
2 Agree   
 
59 53.64% 
3 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
 
 
0 0.00% 
4 Disagree   
 
9 8.18% 
5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  
 
2 1.82% 
 Total  110 100.00% 
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2.  Multinational businesses are more likely to comply with their tax obligations than local 
businesses 
 
 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
Strongly 
Agree 
  
 
32 29.09% 
2 Agree   
 
57 51.82% 
4 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
  
 
5 4.55% 
5 Disagree   
 
14 12.73% 
6 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  
 
2 1.82% 
 Total  110 100.00% 
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3.  Nigerian tax laws are vague  
 
 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
Strongly 
Agree 
  
 
2 1.85% 
2 Agree   
 
32 29.63% 
3 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
  
 
13 12.04% 
4 Disagree   
 
57 52.78% 
5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  
 
4 3.70% 
 Total  108 100.00% 
 
214 
 
4.  Tax officials have broad discretionary powers  
 
 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
Strongly 
Agree 
  
 
6 5.56% 
2 Agree   
 
50 46.30% 
3 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
  
 
9 8.33% 
4 Disagree   
 
39 36.11% 
5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  
 
4 3.70% 
 Total  108 100.00% 
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5.  Tax officials apply the law based on their true meaning  
 
 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Always   
 
21 19.27% 
2 Very often   
 
45 41.28% 
3 Sometimes   
 
38 34.86% 
4 Rarely   
 
3 2.75% 
5 Never   
 
2 1.83% 
 Total  109 100.00% 
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6.  The tax collection activities of tax officials are adequately scrutinised  
 
 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Always   
 
13 11.93% 
2 Very often   
 
44 40.37% 
3 Sometimes   
 
35 32.11% 
4 Rarely   
 
17 15.60% 
5 Never  
 
0 0.00% 
 Total  109 100.00% 
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7.  Tax officials abuse their powers  
 
 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Always   
 
1 0.92% 
2 Very often   
 
16 14.68% 
3 Sometimes   
 
61 55.96% 
4 Rarely   
 
24 22.02% 
5 Never   
 
7 6.42% 
 Total  109 100.00% 
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8.  Businesses protest against corruption  
 
 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Always   
 
9 8.18% 
2 Very often   
 
17 15.45% 
3 Sometimes   
 
38 34.55% 
4 Rarely   
 
41 37.27% 
5 Never   
 
5 4.55% 
 Total  110 100.00% 
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9.  Please rank the following classes of actors based on their level of awareness of Nigerian 
tax laws  
 
 
# 
Ques
tion 
Small 
busin
esses 
Large 
busin
esses 
Multina
tional 
busines
ses 
Local 
busin
esses 
FIR
S 
offic
ials 
Stat
e tax 
offic
ials 
Legisl
ators 
Mini
stry 
of 
Fina
nce 
offic
ials 
Co
urts 
Tribu
nals 
4 Low 53 2 3 42 0 5 15 10 6 4 
5 
Very 
low 
27 0 1 32 0 1 2 1 1 1 
3 
Aver
age 
23 36 9 23 13 31 49 42 28 13 
2 High 4 57 53 10 45 45 30 38 49 51 
1 
Very 
high 
3 14 44 0 51 26 9 15 24 39 
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10.  Please rank the following classes of actors based on the level of corruption you believe 
they engage in  
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# Question 
High 
corruptio
n 
Average 
corruptio
n 
Low 
corruptio
n 
No 
corruptio
n 
Canno
t say 
Total 
Response
s 
7 Legislators 35 32 17 5 20 109 
2 
Large 
businesses 
24 50 20 0 13 107 
3 
Multinationa
l businesses 
35 29 23 3 19 109 
8 
Ministry of 
Finance 
officials 
26 35 25 2 21 109 
9 Courts 14 27 27 6 35 109 
1
0 
Tribunals 10 22 28 14 35 109 
6 
State tax 
officials 
21 37 29 2 18 107 
4 
Local 
businesses 
18 36 29 4 19 106 
5 
FIRS 
officials 
16 34 37 5 17 109 
1 
Small 
businesses 
16 29 41 3 19 108 
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11.  Where wronged or faced with a problem when handling their tax affairs, small 
businesses:  
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# Question Always 
Very 
often 
Sometimes Rarely Never 
Total 
Responses 
2 
Go to 
legislators 
0 2 12 42 51 107 
6 
Go to the 
media/press 
0 4 16 45 42 107 
8 
Go to 
enforcement 
agencies (like 
the police or 
EFCC) 
0 5 22 43 37 107 
5 
Go to 
officials of 
the ministry 
of finance 
2 9 21 44 31 107 
1 
Go to 
court/TAT 
3 4 16 55 30 108 
10 Do nothing 7 22 33 22 20 104 
7 
Go to their 
representative 
body (e.g. 
MAN) 
4 17 43 25 18 107 
9 
Rely on 
informal 
relationships 
7 37 30 22 11 107 
3 
Go to persons 
with 
influence 
6 23 45 21 10 105 
4 
Go to 
superior tax 
officials 
4 32 50 18 2 106 
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12.  Where wrong or faced with a problem when handling their tax affairs, large 
businesses  
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# Question Always 
Very 
often 
Sometimes Rarely Never 
Total 
Responses 
10 Do nothing 4 1 10 32 57 104 
1 
Go to 
court/TAT 
21 45 36 4 3 109 
8 
Go to 
enforcement 
agencies (like 
the police or 
EFCC) 
1 5 32 49 20 107 
2 
Go to 
legislators 
0 14 42 32 18 106 
6 
Go to 
media/press 
2 9 32 44 20 107 
5 
Go to 
officials of 
the ministry 
of finance 
4 19 40 27 17 107 
3 
Go to persons 
with 
influence 
8 24 34 29 13 108 
4 
Go to 
superior tax 
officials 
23 46 32 5 2 108 
7 
Go to their 
representative 
body (e.g. 
MAN) 
14 20 40 24 10 108 
9 
Rely on 
informal 
relationships 
5 18 38 25 21 107 
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13.  Small businesses have access to:  
 
 
# Question Always 
Very 
often 
Sometimes Rarely Never 
Total 
Responses 
1 
FIRS 
officials 
30 27 26 14 5 102 
2 
State tax 
officials 
32 38 29 5 3 107 
3 Legislators 5 3 26 41 32 107 
4 
Ministry 
of finance 
officials 
3 5 29 40 30 107 
5 Courts 12 9 36 31 19 107 
6 
Tax 
Appeal 
Tribunal 
17 11 32 29 18 107 
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14.  Large businesses have access to:  
 
 
# Question Always 
Very 
often 
Sometimes Rarely Never 
Total 
Responses 
1 
FIRS tax 
officials 
70 34 4 0 0 108 
2 
State tax 
officials 
59 31 7 5 5 107 
3 Legislators 16 21 46 14 10 107 
4 
Ministry 
of finance 
officials 
18 24 36 17 10 105 
5 Courts 33 33 29 7 4 106 
6 
Tax 
Appeal 
Tribunal 
40 28 30 7 3 108 
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15.  I work in the: 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
Private 
sector 
  
 
27 27.00% 
2 
Public 
sector 
  
 
73 73.00% 
 Total  100 100.00% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 2 
Mean 1.73 
Variance 0.20 
Standard Deviation 0.45 
Total Responses 100 
 
16.  I deal with:  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
Small 
businesses 
  
 
5 5.38% 
2 
Large 
businesses 
  
 
15 16.13% 
3 
Small and 
large 
businesses 
  
 
73 78.49% 
 Total  93 100.00% 
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Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 2.73 
Variance 0.31 
Standard Deviation 0.55 
Total Responses 93 
 
17.  I have been engaged in tax practice for:  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 1-5 years   
 
36 36.00% 
2 6-10 years   
 
24 24.00% 
3 11-20 years   
 
34 34.00% 
4 
More than 
20 years 
  
 
6 6.00% 
 Total  100 100.00% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 4 
Mean 2.10 
Variance 0.94 
Standard Deviation 0.97 
Total Responses 100 
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